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1 INTRODUCTION 
The final touches of the present dissertation were added during the COVID-19 
pandemic in 2020. Governments all around the world have made significant efforts 
to stop the spread of the virus, usually by quarantining the infected people and by 
“social distancing”. Both previous actions proved to be effective in flattening the 
Coronavirus Curve a.k.a. keeping the number of infected people below a critical 
value at a given time. In many countries, the violation of the restrictions has serious 
consequences, e.g. it can be resulted in an infringement procedure against the 
citizen. Thus, the valid location of the infected person has to be provided and proven 
unambiguously. For example, in South Korea, a unique tracking device is strapped to 
the wrist of the infected citizens to monitor their movement during the 
quarantine [1]. In Hungary, a mobile application is under development which is 
suitable for providing the information on whether a person was dangerously close 
to another infected one [2]. Both abovementioned methods are based on a GNSS 
system, such as the American GPS, or the Korean Positioning System (which will be 
launched soon) or the European GALILEO. However, the location information 
provided by the unique bracelet or the mobile device in the previous examples 
cannot be considered trusted from a cryptographical point of view. The question 
arises on how the location information can be authenticated in a cryptographic 
sense.  
The first aim of the dissertation is to reveal the security problems of the GNSS 
systems, especially the GPS, and then overviewing the existing solutions for the 
revealed security breaches by comprehensively examining the related scientific 
literature. Additionally,  to give solutions for the revealed security breaches and 
provide a way to authenticate location information from a cryptographical point of 
view. 
During such critical periods – such as the outbreak caused by the virus COVID-19 – 
the proper and reliable operation of the critical infrastructures is crucial. Critical 
infrastructures such as the newly invented multi-user ventilators – used for 
respiratory support – controlled by PLC-s (as small SCADA system), or the public 
services, as emergency services, energy or water providers, or communication 
services (as large SCADA systems) are indispensable during “peacetime” also.   
The second aim of the dissertation is to uncover the vulnerabilities of one of the basic 
building blocks of such SCADA systems mentioned above, namely the Modbus RTU 
industrial communication protocol, and studying the existing solutions for the 
revealed vulnerabilities by comprehensively examining the related scientific 
2 
 
literature, also to give a solution for the uncovered weaknesses from a 
cryptographical point of view.  
The first section of the dissertation is an introduction. In the second one, those 
cryptographical foundations are formulated, that are essential for understanding the 
designed secure protocols. Cryptographical primitives, such as the encryption 
schemes, digital signatures, hash functions, and the timestamp are explained along 
with necessary preliminary mathematical knowledge, such as the finite fields, the 
random polynomials, and the Lagrange interpolation. 
In the third section, two protocols are presented to solve the problem of 
authenticating the location information, calculated by a mobile device from the data 
transmitted by GPS satellites. The protocols developed by my coauthor and me are 
called  „location-stamping”. In addition to the description of the „location-stamping” 
methods, security analysis for the higher safety level protocol is given in Section 3. 
Furthermore, a US patent application of a portable electronic device is presented 
applying one of our „location-stamping” protocols. Additionally, in Section 3., the 
weaknesses of the GPS are analyzed extensively from the geographical and 
cryptographical points of view. Existing solutions for the well-known and recently 
detected security problems are also reviewed and presented here. 
The fourth section deals with the security breaches of critical infrastructures. In this 
section, the detailed description of SCADA systems and industrial protocols are 
given, focusing on the Modbus protocols. Security problems and lack of security are 
analyzed by the “Attack Tree Method” to point out the weaknesses of the Modbus 
protocols. A secure Modbus RTU protocol is presented. The bibliography contains 
references in the order of appearance. 
Summarizing the above, my dissertation aims to reveal and solve the 
cryptographic/structural shortcomings of two communication methods. 
Communication between the GPS satellites and receivers and communication 
between field devices (like sensors and actuators) in a SCADA system. 
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1 CRYPTOGRAPHICAL FOUNDATION 
As it is mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation aims to reveal and give 
solutions for the cryptographic problems of two different types of communication 
methods, for the problem of GPS signal authentication and the problem of 
authentication of messages in a Modbus RTU flow. To understand the connection 
between the two parts of this dissertation, first, it is essential to know what is meant 
by communication in both cases. In the field of cryptography and signal processing 
the concept of communication defined by the Shannon model, which is called 
sometimes Shannon-Weaver model designed by Claude E. Shannon [3] and Warren 
Weaver [4]. The model can be seen in Figure 1. In a later section, the Shannon-
Weaver communication model with extended information related to the 
communication in GPS and Modbus respectively is presented.  
 
 Shannon-Weaver model of communication 
As Figure 1 shows, communication is always realized between an information source 
(sender) and an information destination (receiver). The information source is the 
part “which is producing a message or sequence of messages to be communicated 
to the receiving terminal” [3]. On the other side, the information destination is the 
part of the system which is intended to get the message sent by the information 
source.  
The message can vary in type. For example, the time and destination information 
sent by a GPS satellite or a command sent in a Modbus based SCADA system, which 
is resulted in the change of some characteristic can be considered as messages. The 
information is transformed with the help of an encoder to a physical signal which 
can be carried on the communication channel, and back to its original form by a 
decoder. The encoder “is the party which operates on the message in some way to 
produce a signal suitable for transmission over the channel” [3].  The decoder 
“ordinarily performs the inverse operation of that done by the encoder, 
reconstructing the message from the signal” [3]. A channel is a physical medium, 
which can be the air, vacuum or any kind of metal together with a physical signal, for 
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example, a sound or an electromagnetic wave like radio, microwave, infrared, 
gamma transmitted by the medium.   
The channel in the case of the GPS is the vacuum and air together with different radio 
waves or in the case of Modbus based SCADA systems the channel can be the air 
together with a radio wave especially along a metal wire namely wire waves.   
In cryptography, insecure and secure communication channels are distinguished. 
Unsecure communication channels are exposed to several different threats, so the 
communication and the transmitted messages can be damaged in many ways. If the 
channel is insecure, an attacker can read, modify or delete the messages according 
to the Dolev-Yao model [5], and the channel can be controlled by the attacker too. 
It means that many security properties of the communication can be violated. 
Reading the message harms the confidentiality property of the communication, 
modification of the messages harms integrity and freshness and controlled channel 
can harm both confidentiality and integrity furthermore it allows the attacker to 
impersonate the sender or the receiver in the communication, which harms the 
authenticity of the participants. 
As a conclusion, it can be stated that insecure communication channels are lack of 
every property that is necessary to prevent the attacks against communication like 
eavesdropping, modification of the messages sent through the channel or 
impersonating the participants of the communication. To be able to provide reliable 
information exchange in any communication, a secure communication channel is 
necessary. Based on the related scientific literature [6], [7], [8], [9] a communication 
channel is considered secure if it provides the following properties between the 
sender (information source) and the receiver (information destination) during the 
transmission of the messages: confidentiality,  cryptographic authenticity (from now 
on authenticity),  data integrity and freshness. Although such a channel will not 
guarantee, that the messages are ever received [10].  
“Confidentiality and authenticity are independent but dual properties” of secure 
channels, as stated in [8].  Confidentiality can be defined in many ways; a few 
definitions are listed below. According to Mauer et al., confidentiality “intuitively, 
means that the encrypted message (the ciphertext) transmitted from the sender A 
to the receiver B does not leak information about the contents of the message (other 
than, for example, its length)” [11]. Another paper of Maurer et al. defines 
confidentiality as the following: “a channel provides confidentiality if its output is 
exclusively accessible to a specified receiver and this fact is known to the potential 
senders in the channel” [8]. Based on the book of Katz et al., confidentiality is 
“keeping information secret from all but those who are authorized to see it” [12]. 
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Another definition by Blanchet says that “confidentiality, means that the adversary 
cannot obtain some information on data manipulated by the protocol” [13]. 
Like confidentiality, authenticity can be defined in many ways too, and a few 
definitions are mentioned below. Maurer et al. definition is the following “a channel 
provides authenticity if its input is exclusively accessible to a specified sender, and 
this fact is known to the receivers” [8]. Katz et al. say [12] that authenticity definition 
is the next: “authenticity requirements include knowledge or verifiability of the true 
identity of the party a key is shared or associated with.” Definition based on 
Blanchet’s paper is: “when B thinks he has run the protocol with A, he emits a special 
event end. When A thinks she runs the protocol with B, she emits another event 
begin. Authenticity is satisfied when B cannot emit his end event without A having 
emitted her begin event” [14]. Another definition by Blanchet says that 
“Authentication means that, if a participant A runs the protocol apparently with a 
participant B, then B runs the protocol apparently with A, and conversely. One often 
requires that A and B also share the same values of the parameters of the protocol” 
[14]. In this dissertation, the definition of Blanchet et al. [8] is used for both 
properties. It has to be remarked that authenticity in the above sense can be 
achieved by message authentication or entity authentication.  “Message 
authentication simply authenticates one message; the process needs to be repeated 
for each new message. Entity authentication authenticates the participant of the 
communication (i.e. message sender and receiver) for the entire duration of a 
session.” [15]. Alternatively, “entity authentication mechanisms allow the 
verification, of an entity’s claimed identity, by another entity, and, the authenticity 
of the entity can be ascertained only for the instance of the authentication 
exchange” [16]. 
The next cryptographic characteristic that has to be considered is the data integrity, 
and while definitions of confidentiality and authentication can vary, data integrity is 
clearly defined in the related scientific literature. Data integrity is the property that 
provides proof that the message between the participants (message sender and 
message receiver) has not been modified throughout the communication. 
Alternatively, as Katz et al. give, data integrity is “ensuring information has not been 
altered by unauthorized or unknown means” [12]. As the last property the freshness 
is defined in the following way, “a given message is new, in the sense that it is not a 
replay of a message sent at a previous time” [17]. 
In cryptography when a communication channel has to be secured, the following 
methods are available: symmetric or asymmetric (or public) key algorithms and 
cryptographical hash functions (from now on hash functions). In this dissertation, 
only a brief explanation can be found about the cryptographic algorithms mentioned 
6 
 
above, for more detailed information see [12] and [17]. Figure 2. shows the provided 
cryptographic properties by the listed algorithms. 
 
 Provided cryptographic properties by cryptographic algorithms  
To define the abovementioned cryptographic methods, it is necessary to introduce 
some of the basic concepts of cryptography. A cryptosystem is defined as a tuple of 
five sets, namely the plaintext space, the ciphertext space, the keyspace, the family 
of encryption functions and the family of decryption functions. The plaintext space 
consists of all the messages to encrypt in a language that is commonly understood, 
and the ciphertext is the set of all possible combinations of a given cipher alphabet. 
Keyspace contains keys to encrypt and decrypt messages. Encryption functions 
perform the process of encrypting the plaintext to the ciphertext to only authorized 
parties can access it. Similarly, decryption functions perform the process of taking 
the ciphertext and converting it back into plaintext. Both encryption and decryption 
functions require a key to operate correctly. 
Before describing the existing cryptosystems, a few essential mathematical concepts 
and problems are defined and formulated here for better understanding. In 
cryptography for security considerations, many times huge numbers are used up to 
4000 bits binary length.  To be able to improve the speed of operations between 
these numbers, special sets are used, especially finite fields. Based on [12] the finite 
field  “is a field 𝐹 which contains a finite number of elements. The order of 𝐹 is the 
number of elements in 𝐹. If 𝐹 is a finite field, then 𝐹 contains 𝑝𝑚 elements for some 
prime 𝑝 and integer 𝑚 ≥  1. For every prime power order 𝑝𝑚, there is a unique 
finite field of the order 𝑝𝑚. This field is denoted by 𝐺𝐹(𝑝𝑚), or 𝐹𝑝𝑚  .” If 𝑚 = 1 then 
it is called finite prime field, otherwise extension field. Elements of the finite prime 
field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) can be represented  as integers of the set {0,1,…,p-1}, elements of 
extension fields can be represented as polynomials over this set. In a finite field, the 
elements can be added, subtracted, multiplied and divided each other with getting 
a result that exists in the finite field. A distinct element of a finite field is called the 
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generator element, which is exceptional in such a way, that all the elements of a 
given finite field can be calculated by raising the generator elements on different 
powers. 
Elliptic curves are another particular set of points that can serve as a basis of hard 
mathematical problems. Elliptic curves are such algebraic curves, where the points 
on the curve satisfy the following equation : 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏, where 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑎, 𝑏 are 
elements of a finite field. That points together with the infinite one form a finite 
Abelian group with the “chord and tangent” method. An elliptic curve can be defined 
over any finite field, although these curves have different characteristics. 
Random polynomials are another important concept, that is used in cryptography 
often. Under random polynomial, those polynomials are meant that are having 
random coefficients from a uniformly distributed set of values. The random 
polynomials can be defined, for example in a finite prime field. That case is 
formulated such as 𝑃(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑥
𝑖𝑛
𝑖=0 , 𝑎𝑖 ∈  𝐺𝐹(𝑝)  
As a basis of cryptosystems, hard computational problems are used, such as the 
integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problem. Integer factorization refers 
to the following. If a positive integer 𝑛 is given, then the  𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1…𝑘 prime numbers 
need to be found if 𝑛 = 𝑝1
𝑒1𝑝2
𝑒2 …𝑝𝑘
𝑒𝑘 .   
Discrete logarithm problem can be defined in finite fields or over elliptic curves. The 
problem is formulated in a finite prime field below. Given a prime 𝑝, a generator 𝛼  
of 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) and 𝛽 element of  𝐺𝐹(𝑝)  find the integer 𝑥, where 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑝 − 2 and 
satisfies the equation 𝛼𝑥 ≡ 𝛽 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. 
After providing the definitions, it is possible to explain the cryptosystems used in this 
dissertation. Based on the number of the keys and the relation between the 
encryption and decryption keys, symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems can be 
distinguished. In the case of symmetric cryptosystems, symmetric key algorithms 
are used for the process of encryption and decryption, otherwise asymmetric key 
algorithms.  
In symmetric-key cryptography, a shared secret key – encryption and decryption 
keys are the same – is used between the two parties of the communication, and with 
this common key, the messages can be encrypted and decrypted although the 
exchange of the shared secret key can be challenging, mostly because of the lack of 
a secure channel between the participants. Exchange of the common key on an 
insecure communication channel results in that the key will be revealed for any 
malicious third party. In addition, trust issues might arise between the participants 
of the communication. In the field of cryptography, it is called the key distribution 
problem. Thus, a secure key establishment method is essential. Under key 
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establishment based on [12] “a process or protocol whereby a shared secret 
becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use” is 
meant. Key distribution problem can be solved by key agreement protocols, key 
transport protocols, or by secret sharing methods, which all different approaches of 
key establishment. Key transport protocols are those, “where one party creates or 
otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)” [12]. While 
key agreements are those, in which two (or more) parties derive a shared secret as 
a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these, (ideally) 
such that no party can predetermine the resulting value” [12]. Secret sharing 
“involves a dealer who has a secret, a set of n parties, and a collection A of subsets 
of parties called the access structure. A secret-sharing scheme for A is a method by 
which the dealer distributes shares to the parties such that, any subset in A can 
reconstruct the secret from its shares, and any subset not in A cannot reveal any 
partial information on the secret” [18]. It can be stated, that without a trustworthy 
key establishment, the set-up phase of any symmetric cryptosystem is cumbersome. 
The most commonly used key establishment protocols are the Station to station 
protocol [18], the Internet Key Exchange Protocol family [19], the MTI family of 
protocols [20], the MQV protocol [21] or the Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) [23] 
method and its alterations. The protocols are based on asymmetric key 
cryptography, explained later. SSS uses random polynomials over finite fields along 
with the Lagrange interpolation method to share and reconstruct keys between 
multiple parties.1 The method is based on the fact that finding real roots of a high 
degree polynomial is hard if the degree is greater than 5. Lagrange interpolation2 
provides a way to reconstruct the secret. If the shared key cannot be revealed, then 
the confidentiality property of the secure channel is provided. However, these 
methods cannot assure the authenticity of the messages or the entities and the data 
integrity and freshness of the messages, because symmetric key algorithms are 
sensitive to brute force, impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) [22], 
[23]. So, additional technics like key agreement protocols have to be used because 
 
1 Participants: dealer and stakeholders.Goal is to divide a secret 𝑆 into 𝑛 shares (𝑠0, 𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛−1), such 
that knowledge  of 𝑡 or  more shares makes 𝑆 easily  computable, but knowledge of 𝑡 − 1 or less shares 
leaves 𝑆 completely undetermined. Setup: the dealer chooses a large prime 𝑞, and selects a polynomial 
with the degree 𝑡 − 1 over ℤ𝑞
∗  such that 𝑃(0)  ≡  𝑆 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞). Then computes 𝑠𝑖  ≡  𝑃(𝑖)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞), 𝑖 =
1, . . . , 𝑛 and distributes 𝑠𝑖 to the shareholders 𝐷𝑖  , 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛. Reconstruction phase: for any 𝑆𝐻 group  
of 𝑡 shareholders compute the 𝑃(0) ≡  ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑖(0)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑖∈𝑆𝐻 , where 𝐿𝑖-s are nonsecret constants.  
2 Given a set of points (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥𝑖 ≠ 𝑥𝑗  𝑖, 𝑗 = 1… 𝑡 , the Lagrange interpolation is defining a 
polynom, which roots are the given points. The polynom can be found in the form given below: 
𝐿(𝑥) =  ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑙𝑗(𝑥)
𝑘
𝑗=0 , where 𝑙𝑗(𝑥) =  ∏
𝑥−𝑥𝑚
𝑥𝑗−𝑥𝑚
0≤𝑚≤𝑘
𝑚≠𝑗
 , 𝑗 ∈ [0, 𝑘] 
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of the beforementioned manner to reach the goal, namely, to provide a secure 
communication channel.  
Symmetric key algorithms can be classified into block and stream ciphers based on 
the amount of data encrypted at a particular time. Block cipher encrypts a 
predefined block size while stream ciphers one bit or byte of the plaintext at one 
step. In the case of stream ciphers, the used keystream has to meet strict 
requirements, to ensure a proper security level. Depending on the underlying block 
coding mode, the block ciphers are better in fixing noise or attacker generated 
modifications during decryption. Block ciphers are more popular and widespread.   
The most commonly used symmetric key algorithms are the Triple Data Encryption 
Standard (3DES) [24], the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [25], the Blowfish 
[26] the Twofish [27] and the Rivest cipher family (RC). Members of the RC family 
are stream ciphers, the 3DES, AES, Blowfish, and Twofish ciphers are block ciphers. 
3DES, Blowfish, and Twofish algorithms are Feistel ciphers (FC), and AES is a 
Substitution-Permutation network (SPN). Both FC and SPN uses more rounds to 
permute the input and invert the bits of the input, but that input is divided into 𝑁  
pieces in the case of the Feistel ciphers – 𝑁 = 8 in 3DES, 𝑁 = 4 in Blowfish and 
Twofish –, while the SPN operates on the whole input in every round. In Figure 3., 
the general structure of symmetric key algorithms is displayed.  
 
 The general structure of symmetric key algorithms 
Until the use of symmetric key algorithms mostly limited to data encryption, the 
asymmetric key algorithms used for more purposes, like data encryption, key-pair 
generation, digital signature or key exchange, in the case of asymmetric key 
algorithms, a pair of a secret/private and a public key is used to ensure the 
confidentiality and entity authentication during the communication, while these 
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algorithms do not ensure data integrity and freshness. Private and public keys are 
different but mathematically connected. Only the private key must be kept secret, 
and there is no need for key exchange via a secure channel. Asymmetric 
cryptography is based on hard mathematical problems, like integer factorization 
along with modular exponentiation or discrete logarithm problem over different 
algebraic structures or elliptic curves.  
The most commonly used asymmetric algorithms for key exchange, as it is 
mentioned before, the Station to station protocol [18], the Internet Key Exchange 
Protocol family [19], the MTI family of protocols [20] or the MQV protocol [21]. 
Station to station and Internet Key Exchange protocols are based on the hardness of 
integer factorization, MTI, and MQV protocols security is related to the problem of 
discrete logarithm.  
The most often used asymmetric algorithms if the purpose is encryption are the 
following: RSA [28], Rabin [29] , ElGamal [30] and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) 
[31] [32]. The RSA algorithm is one of the first and still in use an asymmetric key 
algorithm that is ever designed, it is based on the hardness of integer factorization 
formulated earlier. RSA is traditionally used in TLS (Transport Layer Security) 
handshakes, or it is part of the long been popular PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) end to 
end email encryption program. Rabin encryption is the least popular, but still used 
encryption system of the above, its security is based on the difficulty of integer 
factorization also. The security of the ElGamal encryption scheme is related to the 
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem over a finite prime field explained 
previously. ElGamal encryption is modified by Koblitz [31] to use elliptic curves, and 
it is called Menezes-Vanstone Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem or Elliptic Curve Elgamal 
[33]. The ECC security relies entirely on the hardness of the discrete logarithm 
problem over elliptic curves. Elliptic curve cryptography is widely applied, for 
example, in the internal governmental communication of the USA, in the Tor browser 
or the technology of bitcoin. The leading role in the field of asymmetric cryptography 
is slowly taken over by elliptic curve cryptography. The general structure of 
asymmetric data encryption algorithms is displayed in Figure 4. 
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 The general structure of asymmetric key algorithms 
As it is mentioned above, asymmetric key cryptography is used to provide digital 
signature. In the case of the digital signature, the sender has to be authenticated in 
the communication. The sender using its private key and signs the message, on the 
other side, the receiver using the public key paired to the private key of the to be 
authenticated sender verifies the signature. Digital signature schemes are sensitive 
for MITM attacks and not able to provide freshness and confidentiality during the 
communication, but these algorithms ensure entity authentication and non-
repudiation. The most commonly applied digital signatures are the following RSA 
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) [28], Rabin [29], ElGamal [30] and Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [34]. Although asymmetric key cryptography requires 
less effort when the secrecy of the keys is under observation, but the underlying 
mathematical methods and its implementation take much more time. The general 
structure of the digital signature can be seen in Figure 5.  
 
 The general structure of digital signature algorithms 
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In the case of asymmetric key algorithms, there is no need to exchange keys because 
anybody can know the public key. Thus a way has to be provided to discover public 
keys and ensure the falsification and abuse of them. Infrastructure has to be set up, 
which is responsible for key distribution and key management; it is called Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) [35]. Trusted third parties are involved in the communication by 
the PKI, and certificates are provided by the trusted third parties to verify the 
connection between the public keys and the claimed owner entities. PKI is formed 
by several components, such as the Certification Authority (CA), the Registration 
Authority (RA), the Certificate repository (CR) and the Key Archival Server (KAS). 
Every user is assigned to a CA through a registration process maintained by the RA. 
Verifiable relevant information about the user is provided by the user during the 
registration, what then verified and associated with a unique username by the RA. 
Public-private key pair is generated after registration in the PKI. The public key is 
then available to anybody, and the CA provides a proof – a certification – of the 
association between the identity of the user and the public key. In the PKI then the 
CA “acts as the root of trust in public key infrastructure and provides services that 
authenticate the identity of … entities in a network” [36]. Valid certifications are 
stored in the CR, after expiration time certifications are relocated to the KAS.  
Hash functions as the third option, are one-way functions with an arbitrary length 
input and a fixed-length output.  Hash functions are in possession of the properties 
such, the output is easy to compute for any given input, it gives the same output for 
one particular input (deterministic), the output is not revealing any information 
about the input (preimage resistance), and it is practically impossible to find two 
different inputs to get the same output (collision resistance). There exist two main 
types of hash functions, the unkeyed, which is used for providing data integrity; it is 
called Message Integrity Codes (MIC). Moreover, the keyed, which is able to provide 
not just data integrity but also message authentication, it is called Message 
Authentication Codes (MAC). Unkeyed hash functions have the advantages that no 
key is necessary, but only message integrity is provided, which is just one of the many 
properties that are necessary to ensure a secure channel. Keyed hash functions 
provide message authentication beside message integrity; that is the reason why 
these algorithms serve as a basis of several solutions. The most commonly used MIC 
are the members of the Secure Hash Algorithm family (SHA) [37], the SHA-256 and 
SHA-512 and the Paralellizable MAC (PMAC) [38]. The general structure of  hash 
function can be seen in Figure 6. 
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 The general structure of hash functions 
All the algorithms mentioned above referred to as cryptographic primitives, that are 
well established, comprehensively verified building blocks of cryptographic 
communication protocols.  
Although the following – lastly mentioned – cryptographic primitive is not able to 
encrypt the plaintext, decrypt the ciphertext, sign or verify documents. In the 
communication process to check the freshness of a message, it is necessary to know 
the time of the sending and the receiving. To provide time information, the 
timestamp method is used in cryptography. It can be used with the time information 
of the participants, but the time provided by the parties cannot be assured as reliable 
information. To get reliable and useful time information, the clocks on each side of 
the communication have to be synchronized and secured. The timestamp 
guarantees reliable time information, timeliness, and uniqueness if the secure and 
synchronized clocks are provided, or a trusted third party generates the timestamp. 
Timestamps' function is to detect replay of messages. The exact definition is the 
following “timestamping is recording the time of creation or existence of 
information” based on Katz et al. [12] Timestamps are based on the idea, that if a 
message has arrived within a predefined time interval, then the message is fresh 
enough.  
In this dissertation, a new type of cryptographic primitive a so-called „location-
stamp” is introduced. Reliable time information is provided by the timestamp with 
„location-stamp” reliable location information – based on the GPS – is desired to 
provide. Referring back to the definition of the timestamp the „location-stamp” can 
be defined the following way: „location-stamping” is recording the location of and 
information at a given time.  
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2 GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM 
3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND APPLICATIONS 
3.1.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
“GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) is a generic term denoting a satellite 
navigation system. A GNSS involves a constellation of satellites orbiting Earth, 
continuously transmitting signals that enable users to determine their three-
dimensional position with global coverage” [39]. 
The story of GNSS – displayed in Figure 7. –  started on the 4th of October in 1957, 
when the USSR launched the first satellite named Sputnik 1. 
 
 History of GPS and GLONASS until 2013 
American researchers from the John Hopkins University started to investigate the 
radio signals emitted by the above satellite and found out that using the Doppler 
effect, they can determine the orbit of the satellite. Later, they figured out that their 
former method can be used to detect the location of any object on the surface of 
Earth. Soon the TRANSIT (Navigation Satellite Program) project in the USA and the 
PARUS project in the Soviet Union started, which aim was to launch satellites into 
space in the right constellation to be able to detect the precise global position of 
objects. In the 1970s during the so-called Space War, the GPS (Global Positioning 
System) and the GLONASS (GLObalnaya NAvigatsionaya Sputnikova Sistema) 
systems design process were started based on the experiences of TRANSIT and 
PARUS projects, improving the precision of the earlier ones by installing atomic 
clocks on the satellites. With the help of these exact onboard clocks, not only the 
accurate location but the precise time information can be provided as well. During 
the next two decades, the GPS improved a lot, and in 1995 it reached Full Operational 
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Capability (FOC). “FOC status means that the system meets all the requirements 
specified in a variety of formal performance and requirements documents” [40]. The 
GLONASS reached its FOC status much more later in 2011. Other nations installed 
two other GNSS in the last decade, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System designed 
by China, and the Galileo (European Global Satellite Navigation System) by the 
European Union, both will reach the FOC state at 2020. It can be stated that today 
the positioning, navigation and timing services of the GNSS mentioned above 
together cover the whole globe. In the following, the technical description of the 
American GNSS, i.e. the GPS will be only given since at the time of our research it 
was the most popular, commonly used and stable system.  
GNSS, in general consists of three main parts, the Space, the Operational Control 
and the User Segment as it is shown in Figure 8.  
 
 Structure of GNSS 
In general, the Space Segment contains a set of satellites orbiting Earth in a Medium 
Earth Orbit (MEO). MEO is the area in space around Earth, which altitude from the 
sea level is higher than 2000 km but less than 35786 km. The orbital altitude of 
GLONASS is 19100 km, that of BeiDou is 21150 km, and that of GALILEO is 23222 km. 
Space Segment is the part of the GNSS, which is responsible for the generation, 
modulation, and transmission of code and phase signals. Tasks are controlled by 1 to 
4 highly stable atomic clocks installed on each satellite. Furthermore, satellites of the 
Space Segment must store, periodically refresh and broadcast the navigation 
message (NAV) which is provided by the Operational Control Segment. “The NAV 
provides all the necessary information to allow the user to perform the positioning 
service” [41]. 
The Space Segment of GPS consists of 31 satellites (April 2019) [42], 24 satellites of 
them form the core constellation, the additional seven satellites can increase the 
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performance, reliability, and precision of the GPS. All the satellites are orbiting Earth 
in a MEO, about 20200 km high above the sea level, and with an orbital radius 26600 
km. The 24 satellites are divided into six groups, and each group is located on 
different orbital planes. Orbital planes are inclined 55° to the equatorial plane, and 
the orbital planes are equally spaced about the equator with a 60° difference. Such 
a constellation can provide that any time anywhere on the surface of Earth at least 
four satellites is “visible” for a user, which is indispensable to get precise location 
information. Figures 9. and 10. are for a better understanding of the structure of the 
system. Table 1. shows the basic parameters of the GPS constellation. Data for this 
section are provided by [43]. 
 
  
 A GPS satellite orbit [44] 
 
 Expandable 24-Slot satellite constellation of GPS [45] 
17 
 
Table. 1. Parameters of GPS constellation 
Parameter Value 
Total number of launched satellites  67 
Number of active satellites 31  
Number of inactive satellites 36  
Number of satellites in the core constellation 24 
Number of satellites in the expandable 24-slot constellation 27 
Number of orbital planes of the constellation 6 
Number of satellites on an orbital plane 4 
The inclination of the orbital planes 55° 
Orbital radius 26 600 km 
Orbital altitude 20 200 km 
 
Generally, the Operational Control Segment is the part that is responsible for the 
flawless operation of the constellation of the satellites and the generation and 
refreshment of the navigational message (NAV) transmitted by the satellites. For the 
purposes described above, it tracks the orbital configuration, checks the condition 
and the clock information, if it is necessary gives corrections for all these critical 
properties, and periodically resends the navigational message to all orbiting satellite. 
In the case of the GPS, the Operational Control Segment contains one Master 
Control Station (MCS), an Alternate Master Control Station (AMCS), Monitoring 
Stations all around the world near to the equator and Ground Antennas as it is 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
 Control Segment 
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The MCS and AMCS control, maintain and operate the Space Segment, so generate 
the NAV, check the health of the satellites, synchronize the constellation and 
monitor the system performance. The Monitoring Stations have all the necessary 
devices to be able to collect and process satellite, atmospheric, and meteorological 
data. The Ground Antennas are sending the data – collected and processed by the 
other two parts of this segment – to the Space Segment to keep the system moving 
and to improve the effectiveness of it, using radio waves. Between the Space and the 
Ground Antennas the communication is two-way, but between the Monitoring 
Stations and the Space Segment communication is one way, since only the ground 
antennas can send and receive messages from the Space Segment. For a more 
detailed description of the system, see [43]. 
The third central part of the system is the User Segment which is composed of 
uncountable GNSS/GPS receivers. The main task of these devices is to receive the 
signals broadcasted by the satellites possessing the relevant information to solve the 
navigation equation in purpose to get the precise location information, i.e. to 
calculate the GNSS/GPS coordinates. As it is mentioned before the primary aim of 
the GNSS is to provide location information globally, but it can be used to many other 
purposes depending on the user’s needs. The three most common applications are 
positioning, navigation and time determination (PNT). It is essential to mention that 
the communication between the User Segment and the Space Segment is one-way, 
the satellites broadcast information and the receivers are only able to receive it. 
As it is stated earlier, the GNSS satellites are continuously broadcasting information. 
The type of carrier signals, the used radio frequencies and the content of the 
message sent through the air are depending on the specification of the different 
GNSS systems. In the case of GPS, two kinds of signals can be distinguished, the 
legacy carrier (before 2005) and the modern signal (after 2005). The legacy signals 
are transmitted via two radio frequencies named Link1 (L1) and Link2 (L2). Both 
frequencies are derived from a base frequency which is generated by an onboard 
frequency synthesizer device on each satellite, exact frequency of L1 is 1575.42 MHz, 
and L2 is 1227.60 MHz The modern signals are using the L1 and L2 carrier frequencies 
of the legacy signals, and a new carrier frequency the L5, which exact value is 1176.45 
MHz. Two services are provided by the GPS, namely the Standard Positioning 
System (SPS) and the Precise Positioning System (PPS). SPS is for public use, it is 
open and free of charge, in contrast to PPS, which is an encrypted service available 
only for military and authorized civil users. In the case of the legacy signals, the L1 
carrier is used for transmitting the SPS and PPS, but L2 is only reserved for the PPS. 
Because the PPS is capable of dual-frequency mode, the accuracy of this service is 
higher than the accuracy of the SPS, namely the overall global average accuracy of 
SPS is 7.8 m while this value is 2.6 m in the case of PPS. L1 and L2 are modulated with 
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different pseudo-random-noise (PRN) codes to be able to carry the 
course/acquisition code (C/A) for the civil, and the precision code (P(Y)) for the 
military users respectively. In the case of modern signals, the L1, L2 and L5 carrier 
frequencies are used for SPS and L1, and L2 are used for PPS. L1 is modulated with 
different PRN codes to carry C/A, L1C, P(Y) and M-codes, after modulation L2 can 
carry the L2C, P(Y) and M-code, and L5 with the help of it. 
Accuracy of the recently introduced L1C, L2C, and M-code matches or slightly 
outperforms the performance of the legacy signals. Earlier because of safety reasons 
the so-called Selective Availability was applied on both services, i.e. both codes were 
encrypted with a time-varying frequency offset, and the ephemeris and almanac 
information were encoded too. Selective Availability was terminated in 2000. Legacy 
GPS signals are carrying the GPS Navigation Message (LNAV), LNAV messages 
contain information about the health of the satellite, ephemeris and almanac 
parameters, ionospheric parameters, clock correction terms and satellite 
configuration parameters. Ephemeris and almanac describe the orbital parameters 
and clock information of the actual satellite, the almanac is less accurate than 
ephemeris, and GPS coordinates can be calculated without the almanac, but 
ephemeris is essential for the calculation. Modern GPS signals are containing the 
CNAV or the CNAV2 message, which in content only slightly differs from the legacy 
NAV, but the structure is different in many ways. The following table shows the 
characteristics of the SPS and PPS services. 
Table. 2. GPS signals 
 Standard Positioning Service Precise Positioning Service 
Application Civil Military 
Legacy   
  Frequency L1 L1, L2 
  Signals Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) Precision code (P(Y)) 
Modern   
  Frequency L1, L2, L5 L1, L2 
  Signals L1C, L2C, L5 M-code 
 
The most often used service of GPS is positioning, which is for determining the 
position of a given object on the surface of the Earth. If the reference system is 
known, then the position can be given by three coordinates, which are the latitude, 
the longitude and the altitude coordinates of the object. Based on the related 
literature usually, two base reference system is used in the case of GPS, the 
Conventional Celestial Reference System (CRS) and the Conventional Terrestrial 
Reference System (TRS). As the following table shows the CRS is an inertial reference 
system, which origin is located in the Earth’s center of the mass, the x-axis of it is 
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heading to the vernal equinox, and z-axis of it is orthogonal to the equatorial. TRS 
system origin is the Earth’s center of the mass, the x-axis in this particular system is 
heading to the intersection of the equatorial and mean Greenwich meridian, while 
the z-axis is equal to the axis of the Earth’s rotation and it is heading to the 
Conventional Terrestrial Pole.  Y-axis in both coordination systems can be found like 
complementing the right-handed system with the corresponding x and z axes. The 
differences between the two systems include not only the technical parameters but 
the purpose of the systems as well. CRS is used to define the location of the satellites 
in the system precisely. TRS is for defining the location of a receiver. 
Table. 3. Reference frames 
Coordinate 
system 
Type Origin X-axis Z-axis Y-axis 
CRS Inertial Earth’s 
center of 
the mass 
Heading to 
the vernal 
equinox (first 
point of 
Aries) 
Orthogonal 
to the 
equatorial 
Complementing 
the right-
handed system 
together 
TRS Earth-
Centered 
Earth Fixed 
Earth’s 
center of 
the mass 
Heading to 
the 
intersection 
of the 
equatorial 
and mean 
Greenwich 
meridian 
Same as the 
axis of 
Earth’s 
rotation and 
it is heading 
to 
Conventional 
Terrestrial 
Pole 
Complementing 
the right-
handed system 
together 
 
 
So, if the GNSS/GPS receiver is available, and the satellites are broadcasting the 
proper signals included the ephemeris of the system, then the positioning can be 
done. The receiver at first starts to look for visible satellites in an area of the sky 15° 
above the horizon. Based on the actual time of the receiver, the almanac of the 
system – which, as it was mentioned before contains information about the orbit of 
the satellites – the receiver can easily find the three or four satellites which are at 
least necessary to the positioning method. Ephemeris is containing information – like 
clock correction values, more precise orbital data – which helps to improve the 
accuracy of the positioning. The positioning method is based on a well-known 
mathematical principle, namely on the trilateration. Applying trilateration, the 
position of an object near the surface of Earth can be determined as follows:  
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1. The receiver gains signal from three satellites.  
2. Calculates the distances – not the accurate geometric distances – between 
itself and the satellites. The calculation is based on the travel time of the signal 
from the satellite to the receiver. The travel time (∆𝑇) is the difference 
between the emission (𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇)) and reception time (𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑣(𝑇)).  
∆𝑇 = 𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑣(𝑇) − 𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇)  
The travel time is then multiplied by the speed of light to get the 
pseudorange (𝑅) between the satellite and the receiver. The gained 
distance is called pseudorange because although the emission time is 
measured by a high precision atomic clock installed on the satellite, the 
inaccurate clock of the receiver provides reception time; thus the 
pseudorange contains many errors. 
𝑅 =  𝑐∆𝑇  
3. The three pseudoranges then determine three spheres on which the receiver 
can be located. The intersection of these three spheres determines two points, 
but only one of them is located somewhere near to the surface of Earth, and 
this is the one considered as the position of the receiver. Trilateration 
presented in Figure 12. 
 
 Trilateration [43] 
The position determined the way as mentioned above, with the help of three 
satellites, is accurate only if the clocks of the satellites and the receiver are precisely 
synchronized, which is usually not true. To eliminate the error caused by clock 
problems, a fourth satellite is necessary. Then the method is the following: 
1. The receiver gains signal from four satellites. 
2. Calculates the four error-laden pseudoranges (𝑅𝑖) between itself and the 
satellites. Since the same receiver is used to calculate the pseudoranges, the 
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error in the reception time (𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟) is equal for all observations. The clock error 
then can be calculated, and the measurement can be corrected. 
𝑅1  =  𝑐(𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑣(𝑇1) − 𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇1)  + 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟)
𝑅2  =  𝑐(𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑣(𝑇2) − 𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇2)  + 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟)
𝑅3  =  𝑐(𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑣(𝑇3) − 𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇3)  + 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟)
𝑅4  =  𝑐(𝑡𝑟𝑐𝑣(𝑇4) − 𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇4)  + 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑟)}
 
 
 
 
 
3. The intersection of the four spheres determined by the corrected 
pseudoranges defines a single point, which is the desired position. 
3.1.2 APPLICATIONS RELATED TO MY RESEARCH 
While the years have passed since the day, when Bill Clinton president of the USA 
has ordered to stop disarrange the satellite signals, the number of services based on 
the GNSS/GPS has increased in an unexpectedly considerable amount. Only 
creativity and imagination can give a limit to the different types of applications. The 
original purpose of the GPS was clearly military, but after the Selective Availability 
was terminated such an opportunity gained ground which caused significant changes 
in many fields of the civil, scientific, industrial and governmental segment as well. In 
the following, a non-completed list of the available applications is given (see Table 
4). Such an application became a vital part of our everyday life. Based on a survey, 
which was taken in 2015 by the Geo awesomeness [46], 90 percent of people use 
applications based on GPS on their mobile phones in the USA. So, it seems obvious 
researching the authentication issues of this field.  
Providing cryptographic or structural protection of any data – like any other safety 
solution – costs time, storage place and money, so only such data should be 
protected, which are valuable enough.  The question arises: are these GPS 
coordinates so important? The answer depends on the application. For example, in 
the case of navigation, the GPS receiver calculates GPS coordinates so often, and the 
calculation of the coordinates takes a little time only, and if it is a public application, 
protecting the data cryptographically is not very important, on the other hand, the 
structural safety of the service is necessary. However, for example, if proof of the 
location of your neighbour’s fence is needed, in order to prove that it is falsely placed 
on your property, then it is quite sure that the official establishments are expecting 
more reliable proof than the GPS coordinates of the fence calculated by a simple GPS 
receiver. To get satisfying proof for the above problem, exact measurement is 
necessary proceeded by the Land Register. Processing of such a complaint takes 
much time, but if reliable – approved by the authorities – GPS coordinates would be 
available, time and money could be saved. Considering the following situation 
reliable GPS coordinates provide a suitable solution too. If a car is parked on the 
border of a parking zone, where parking is free of charge, and a mindless parking 
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attendant imposes a fine still even though there is no misdemeanour happened, a 
reliable proof is needed to protect ourselves. Mobile phones are always available 
and can calculate GPS coordinates, i.e. if an application would exist which provides 
reliable GPS coordinates. The only thing which should be done is installing the 
application on the mobile phone and calculating the coordinates of the car then file 
the information to the authorities. Another possible situation, where reliable GPS 
coordinate can be helpful too, is the following. A supervisor of the Land Registry 
founds a field with a serious proliferation by ragweed, and then the supervisor fines 
the owner of the property. To create a proof, an official note is made in such steps:  
1. A mobile device calculates GPS coordinates of the area. 
2. Puts the GPS coordinates into the note. 
3. The officer signs the note digitally. 
4. Furthermore, asks for an authentic time stamp. 
With the steps mentioned above, the identity of the supervisor, and the maker of 
the note is proven.  
If a legal procedure is necessary in any of the above cases, then neither the penalized 
driver nor the supervisor can prove that their GPS coordinates match the place 
where they made it, despite the fact, that the supervisor certified the location 
information by his digital signature. They cannot prove that the location information 
is correct because not a single person or device is fully trusted too. Electronically 
saved or transmitted data can be changed easily, thus without any kind of provable 
signature, the reliability of data is always questionable.  
In this dissertation, the focus is on those types of applications where the received 
GPS coordinates have probative value in a legal procedure or dispute. The Police 
Service makes such an application of Northern Ireland, called the Noise App [47], 
which, as the developers state, can be used to record nuisance at a precise moment 
it is occurring. It promises to provide evidence in cases when a legal procedure is 
needed to resolve the situation. Typically, to create a record about such an event, a 
policeman’s contribution is necessary. Nevertheless, if the Noise App is used, then it 
allows you to file the problems without any help of an investigating officer. The 
application notes not only the recordings you have made but the exact time and 
location information provided by the GNSS.  
Another example can be taken from the field of logistics. For the shipping companies, 
it is crucial to be able to prove that the delivery has been completed in the right 
condition, at the right time, to the right location. Usually, shipping companies use 
some tracking applications based on the GNSS to provide proof of delivery, but when 
they try to prove that the packages are intact and unharmed in the time of shipment 
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some additional information is necessary, like a photo, which is one of the many 
available features that myGeoTracking [48] provides. With the help of 
myGeoTracking, a GPS tagged photo is captured for the proof of delivery. The GPS 
tagged photo holds the time and the location information of the delivery and the 
condition of the package at that exact time and location. Later, as the developers 
promise, these photos can be used as evidence in the case of customer complaints. 
The following compelling example is connected to the field of law enforcement. 
There exists an application named Alibi [49], which can confirm your location with 
the help of some biometric data and GNSS. Alibi, as the developers state it, is capable 
of saving and authenticating the exact location and time information of the user 
arriving at a specified destination at a specific time, based on a biometric data, 
especially the fingerprint. The fingerprint is added with the help of Apple’s TouchID 
tool of the device. Although, it seems a little bit odd to think ahead so far, but if you 
need an alibi, in the case of any accusation – which can be made by for example your 
boss, your spouse or in the worst scenario by the police –  it can be accommodating 
to prove your innocence.  
The example below is presenting the situation which tries to be solved by the 
protocols introduced in this dissertation. Imagine that you are driving home after an 
exhausting workday, and you are not noticing the traffic sign, which shows that the 
speed limit has changed to 70 km/hour. You are driving through without slowing 
down, but unfortunately after the next turn of the road, from the cover of a bush, a 
policeman appears with a radar. Furthermore, a few days later you get a speed ticket 
– usually a photo as you are exceeding the speed limit – with exact time and location 
information about the event, and then you have to pay the penalty, without any 
excuse. Using an authenticated device, with a built-in GPS receiver, the police officer 
has the authority to penalize you since it proves that you were at that certain location 
at that certain time.    
All the applications mentioned above provide data to prove something undeniable 
to another party, like nuisance recordings provided in the case of Noise App or 
speeding with the help of speed radars, or completed shipping regarding 
myGeoTracking application, or alibi applying the application Alibi. As it can be seen 
the common part in all examples presented above, is that a GNSS provides the 
authenticity of the time and location information. GNSS data are considered reliable 
and valid by all the applications.  However, it has to be emphasized that none of the 
GNSS ever promises that all the receivers will work fine, without any mistake or 
miscalculation, or malicious intervention by an attacker. The NAV is the only 
information, which can be guaranteed to be accurate. In the next section, all the 
related weaknesses of the GNSS are discussed. 
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3.2 OWN RESEARCH 
3.2.1 REVEALED WEAKNESSES 
Even though the number of GNSS based services, especially the GPS based ones has 
been increased remarkably in the last decades, only a small part of the system’s 
security issues got enough attention in the related scientific literature. Through 
these years the GNSS technology has gained a considerable portion in the civil, 
scientific, industrial, governmental or military sectors, and the list is not complete at 
all. As can be seen in Table 4. the applications are providing solutions for many types 
of problems, but if the consequences of the lack of cryptographic and physical safety 
are not considered sufficiently, it could lead to severe problems. The occurring 
security issues or vulnerabilities are mostly related to the stable operation of the 
GNSS itself, such as guaranteeing uninterrupted service or providing more authentic 
geographic data, and obviously, the malicious attackers should not be forgotten as 
well.  
Table. 4. Applications of GNSS/GPS 
Type of application Field of application Examples 
Civil  Navigation 
Location-based 
applications 
guided tours, geocaching 
exercising, dating, gaming, marketin, 
etc. 
Scientific Surveying 
 
Wildlife tracking 
Seismic research 
mapping seafloors 
determining land boundaries 
tracking the movement of wild animals 
measuring the motion of plates related 
to each other 
Industrial Agriculture 
Power grid 
Transportation and 
navigation 
precise farming, auto-driving tractors 
phase synchronization 
car, railway, marine, aviation 
Governmental  Emergency services 
Legal and Law 
Enforcement 
Timestamp 
enhanced 911 
geo-fencing, fishing zone, taxation, 
penalty 
financial, clerical, legal 
Military Defence 
Search and rescue 
Unmanned vehicle 
 
munition guidance 
The original aim of the GNSS was clearly military, and in the time when the first GNSS, 
the GPS was launched the only security issue that was attractive to the developers 
was to protect the geodetically authenticate position data from the unauthorized 
users and keep the service stable and reliable to provide position, navigation and 
time information that can be used safely for military operations. The problem of 
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unauthorized access has been solved, with the help of the Precise Positioning 
Service, which used an encryption method on the broadcasted signal to prevent the 
unbidden access. Precise Positioning Service was transmitted the P(Y) code on both 
the L1 and L2 carrier signals of the GPS. The so-called Selective Availability which 
hides the precise position data from non-military users was discontinued in 2000, 
and when the termination of it came into effect, the only cryptographical security 
was disappeared from the SPS. Based on the technical literature available [39], [41], 
[42], [44], [43], the communication between the User and Space Segment has no 
other cryptographically secured part. The vulnerability of the GNSS was examined 
continuously through the last twenty years, by several research groups and official 
departments [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57]. The reliability of the system 
is based on two factors; the underlying technology, and the communication 
methods, so the obvious thing is to supervise these two factors. The technology 
underlying the GNSS/GPS has developed a lot through the last half a century. A 
significant change can be realized at the satellites if the technical parameters are 
compared. There are differences in the type of the used batteries, onboard clocks, 
electric power of the solar panels, weight, length of the predicted and actual lifetime. 
However, not only the design of the satellites and the inbuilt accessories has 
changed, but the used radio frequency, the broadcasted signals and the way of 
communication have undergone fundamental changes too. The improvement in the 
degree of geodesic authenticity was an important factor as well. In Table 5, the 
evolution of the used satellites can be seen in the case of GPS and Galileo.  The 
development aimed to improve the lifetime of the satellites, create such devices 
which maintenance is more comfortable, cheaper and form a solid base for the 
positioning service, and finally make the service more resistant to the known 
weaknesses of the system. 
Table. 5. Satellite specifications 
 Launch 
date 
Solar panel Onboard 
clock 
Design 
lifespan 
Weight 
GPS      
Block I 1978-1985 800 W  1Cs   
3Rb 
 
4.5 years 759 kg 
Block II 1989-1990 800 W 2Cs   
2Rb 
7.5 years 840 kg 
Block IIA 1990-1997 800 W  2Cs   
2Rb 
7.5 years 1500 kg 
Block IIR 1997-2009 800 W 3Rb 7.5 years 2000 kg 
Block IIR-M 2005-2009 800 W  3Rb 10 years 2032 kg 
Block IIF 2010-2016 1952 W 1Cs 
2Rb 
12 years 1633 kg 
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 Launch 
date 
Solar panel Onboard 
clock 
Design 
lifespan 
Weight 
Block III 2018- 4480 W 3Rb 
1H 
15 years 3880 kg 
Galileo      
 2011 1.9 KW 2H   
2Rb 
12 years 700 kg 
3.2.1.1 WEAKNESSES OF GPS RELATED TO GEODESIC PROPERTIES 
To be able to define the concept of geodetic authenticity, the concept of accuracy 
and precision have to be defined first. “The accuracy of a measurement is how close 
a result comes to the true value. Systematic error or inaccuracy is quantified by the 
average difference (bias) between a set of measurements obtained with the test 
method with a reference value or values obtained with a reference method. 
Precision refers to how well measurements agree with each other in multiple tests. 
Random error or imprecision is usually quantified by calculating the coefficient of 
variation from the results of a set of duplicate measurements” [58]. Difference 
between precision and accuracy can be seen in Figure 13. 
 
 Difference between precision and accuracy [58] 
Based on the definition of precision and accuracy, the geodetic authenticity can be 
defined in the following way. A GPS coordinate is defined to be geodetically 
authentic if it is precise (the calculation can be repeated with almost the same 
results) and accurate (the calculated position is the one, where the receiver is in the 
time of the positioning). 
Generally, there are two main types of the weaknesses of the GPS, the one which is 
occurring because of the technical shortcomings or failures of the system, and the 
other which is caused intentionally and maliciously by an attacker.  The table below 
lists the most critical vulnerabilities of GPS. 
28 
 
Table. 6. Weaknesses of GPS respect to geodesic authenticity 
Vulnerabilities caused by a technical 
problem 
Threats caused by a malicious attacker 
Onboard atomic clock drift Jamming 
Satellite orbit change Spoofing 
Atmospheric effect  
(ionospheric/tropospheric delay) 
 
Multipath  
Interference  
 
Source of vulnerabilities occurred by technical problems can be found in the space, 
or the user segment of the GNSS/GPS. Nevertheless, most of the errors listed above 
induced by the space segment, such as the tiny drift of the extremely accurate atomic 
clocks on the satellites, where even a ten ns difference in the time can occur three 
meters positioning error on the ground. Alternatively, the subtle changes in the 
orbits of the satellites with incorrect ephemeris can cause two and a half meters 
difference in the position too. Atmospheric effects like ionospheric and tropospheric 
delay caused by the varying amount of electrically charged particles, and the never 
permanent humidity, pressure, and temperature, results in around 5 m error in the 
calculated position. Multipath and interference problems are caused by the wrong 
placement of the ground antennas and other radio sources transmitting signals 
because near the surface of Earth the GPS signal is extremely weak.  
Threats made by intentional and malicious attackers are jamming, spoofing and 
meaconing as a subtype of spoofing. In some cases, meaconing is mentioned as a 
distinct attack, but most of the literature considers it as a subtype of a spoofing 
attack. In this dissertation, meaconing is considered as a subtype of spoofing too. 
These attacks result in inaccuracy or even total failure in the determined position, 
which therefore can threaten all the users of the system, like civil, military and critical 
infrastructures. 
Jamming 
According to Dovis [59], jamming is “blocking reception of the GNSS signal by 
deliberately emitting electromagnetic radiation (i.e., radio-frequency interference) 
to disrupt user receivers by reducing the signal-to-noise level.” So, the scenario is the 
following: the attacker tries to interrupt the connection between GPS satellites and 
GPS receivers, aiming the service entirely inaccessible, i.e. lost the connection or just 
disrupted it. In the case of jamming the aim is to prevent successful localization, 
navigation, and timing. It is somewhat an easy task, considering that the GPS 
satellites are orbiting in space 20.000 km far from Earth, and the signals are really 
weak when arriving the surface of Earth and the communication is happening over a 
wireless connection via radio. These weak signals are sensitive to the radio frequency 
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interference (RFI). Based on [60], [61], [62] jamming attack can be classified by two 
aspects; first is the cause of the attack, second is the used methods and technology. 
Jamming can occur because of two fundamental causes; the first one is a malicious 
attack; the second is protecting someone’s privacy. In order to achieve any of the 
abovementioned goals, the attacker has to produce intentionally or accidentally an 
obstruction into the connection. The obstruction is usually some kind of device which 
can cause RFI. It can be done intentionally by GPS jamming gadgets, like “Personal 
Privacy Devices”, or bigger transmitters - which induce radio frequency noise with a 
much wider working range or accidentally by using reserved radio frequencies or 
frequencies which are too close to the ones used by GPS. A wide range of hardware 
and software components is available to jam the GPS signals even though in many 
countries it is forbidden to use GPS jammers like in the USA or Hungary. Assuming 
the second classification aspect, jamming attacks are divided into two main groups 
too, blanket jamming and deception jamming. In the case of blanket jamming, the 
jammer generates such a strong radio signal resulting in a complete loss of GPS 
signals in receivers. Speaking of deception jamming the jammer broadcasts similar 
signals like GPS satellites transmit, but changing some critical parts of it to cause 
error decoding or error positioning. Both blanket and deception jamming attacks can 
be divided into subcategories; interested readers can look for more detailed 
information [60] and [62], while Table 7.also gives some insight. 
Table. 7. Classification of jamming attacks 
Cause of the attack 
 Harm someone maliciously 
 Harm someone unintendingly 
Technology 
 Blanket jamming 
 Deception jamming 
Spoofing 
Spoofing is “transmission of counterfeit GNSS-like signals, with the intent to produce 
a false position within the victim receiver without disrupting GNSS operations” and 
“rebroadcasting of delayed GNSS signals without any distinction between the signal 
in space from different satellites” based on [59]. So, in contrast with jamming, at 
spoofing the connection is working correctly between satellites and receivers, 
sometimes a tiny gap or delay can be encountered only, so the users hardly or never 
detect that something went wrong. Spoofing can cause more dangerous or serious 
situations, because as the former president of the United Kingdom’s Royal Institute 
of Navigation said: “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the 
receiver to lie” [63]. The situation is usually the following: the attacker transmits a 
more powerful signal than the signal broadcasted by the GNSS satellites, or in the 
receiver falsifies the signal without even transmit a modified one. To be known that 
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an attack is in progress can be detected with different levels of success in the 
previous cases. If the attack is successful, then, the receiver will use the maliciously 
modified signal as it was the original one coming from the satellites without noticing 
the falsification. Spoofing attacks can be classified by several aspects, based on the 
comprehensive studies of van der Merwe et al. [64] and Jafarnia-Jahromi et al. [65]. 
The primary grouping property is the need or lack of signal transmission during the 
attack. Radiofrequency (RF) based / GPS signal simulators and interface/receiver 
based spoofing attacks can be distinguished. RF-based attacks using equipment, 
which transmits a falsified or an earlier recorded signal. Interface based attacks are 
using a module installed in the receiver, which modifies the incoming GPS signal or 
bypasses a modified signal. RF-based attacks can be classified by the number of used 
transmitters during the attack; single or multiple modes are available. Alternatively, 
by the method how the GPS signal simulators take over the place of the original GPS 
satellites in the communication, in this case, asynchronous or hard-take-over and 
synchronous or soft-take-over modes are distinguished. In the hard-take-over mode 
is not necessary to be aware of any information about the target. The attacker just 
generates a strong signal and suppress the original GPS signal with that stronger one. 
The hard-take-over attack is a brute-force attack. In soft-take-over mode, the 
attacker must have some information about the location of the target and transmits 
a signal with a continuously increasing power. The overlapping correlation peak and 
the increasing signal power makes the detection of this attack harder. 
Furthermore, the aim of the spoofing can be served as a classification aspect; the 
aim can be the altering of the calculated position, time or other information – like 
any part of the NAV message – broadcasted by the GPS satellites. On the contrary, 
the interface-based attacks are altering or overwriting the already calculated 
position, velocity and time information with the help of a GPS module emulator 
inserted in the hardware level of the receiver, or malicious software installed on a 
higher level of the receiver.  Table 8. displays the different types of spoofing attacks. 
Table. 8. Classification of jamming attacks 
Radiofrequency based - GPS signal simulator 
 Number of transmitters Single 
  Multiple 
Take-over method Asynchronous 
Hard-take-over 
 Synchronous 
Soft-take-over 
Aim Position altering 
  Timing and information 
altering 
Interface or receiver-based   Application                               GPS bypass 
  Interface spoof 
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3.2.1.2  WEAKNESSES OF GPS RELATED TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES 
Only some information was available at the time of my research in the related 
scientific literature about the cryptographic reliability of the entire GNSS/GPS. On 
the other hand, this approach is an essential part of the system, because several 
GNSS based service exsists which has to provide cryptographically authenticated 
data – such as the Noise App, myGeoTracking, Alibi applications mentioned in 
Section 3.1.2 – so it would be essential to make location determination 
cryptographically secure and reliable. Communication always requires a channel on 
which the information can flow, speaking about GNSS the information is carried 
across space using radio waves. In Figure 14. the Shannon-Weaver communication 
model (cf. Section 2) can be seen with some extended information related to the 
communication in GPS.  
 
 Extended Shannon-Weaver model of communication 
The concept of the sender and receiver is used in the means of the Shannon-Weaver 
communication model. In the case of the communication between Space and User 
Segment of GPS, the information flow is one way, and there is no cryptographic 
protection installed on the channel at all. To be able to provide reliable information 
exchange, a secure communication channel is necessary, although such a channel 
will not guarantee, that the messages are ever received [10]. As it is explained in 
Section 2. a communication channel is considered secure if it provides the following 
properties between the GPS satellite and the GPS receiver during the transmission 
of the messages: confidentiality, authenticity, data integrity and freshness. Based on 
the related scientific literature the main problems of the GPS if we consider the space 
segment and user segment connection, is the lack of critical cryptographic 
properties, thus no secure channel can be provided, so confidentiality, authenticity, 
data integrity and freshness are not guaranteed parameters of the system. The 
following table summarizes what the following figure shows, namely the security 
breaches of the satellite-receiver communication of GPS. 
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Table. 9. Cryptographic vulnerabilities 
Cryptographic vulnerabilities 
Lack of confidentiality 
Lack of authenticity 
Lack of data integrity 
Lack of freshness 
  
 
 Security breaches of GPS 
 
Communication between the user segment and the space segment in the GPS is one 
way, as it is mentioned before, the satellites cannot receive any message from the 
users, only transmit information predefined and refreshed by the control segment, 
and receivers are only able to listen to the signals transmitted by the satellites. An 
important consequence of that property of the communication is that the receiver 
cannot check the identity of the satellites and this is true in the other direction as 
well, so the authentication of any participant is not provided in the system, because 
none of the participants is in the knowledge of the identity of the other party. Lack 
of entity and message authentication in the GPS can threaten all the users of the 
system, like civil, military and or critical infrastructures.  Speaking of the SPS the 
messages transmitted over radio waves without any encryption method applied. It 
means that anybody can access the content of the messages; only a GPS receiver is 
necessary. The lack of the encryption of the messages resulted that confidentiality is 
not provided by the system either, because the content of the messages is not 
hidden from the unauthorized users. Although in the case of legacy NAV Hamming 
codes are applied to detect errors in the message, and for modern LNAV Cyclic 
Redundancy Check codes are used, no method is available to check if the content of 
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the messages is the same at the time of the dispatch and the arrival. So, data integrity 
is not provided either, because it cannot be checked that the messages are modified 
during the communication or not.   
3.2.2 EXISTING SOLUTIONS FOR THE REVEALED WEAKNESSES 
3.2.2.1 SOLUTIONS FOR THE GEODETIC PROBLEMS 
Geodetic weaknesses like jamming and spoofing are exhaustively examined in the 
related literature, and several solutions are performed. Reviews of antijamming 
[66], [67] and antispoofing [65] techniques are overviewed in this section.  
Speaking of spoofing, two main types of antispoofing methods are distinguished, the 
spoofing detection and the spoofing mitigation. In the case of spoofing detection, 
the provided solution only helps to discriminate against the spoofing signal but does 
not do anything to eliminate it.  Several spoofing detection methods are available, in 
this section the methods collected by Jafarnia-Jahromi et al. [65] are examined, Table 
10. contains a non-completed list about existing spoofing detection methods, in this 
section a part of those methods s explained, a detailed explanation can be found in 
[65].  
Table. 10. Spoofing detection methods 
Type of spoofing detection Method 
Signal Power Monitoring 𝐶/𝑁0 Monitoring 
Absolute Power Monitoring 
Received Power Variations versus Receiver 
Movement 
L1/L2 Power Level Comparison 
Spoofing Discrimination Using Spatial 
Processing 
Multiantenna Spoofing Discrimination 
Synthetic Array Spoofing Discrimination 
Time of Arrival Discrimination PRN Code and Data Bit Latency 
L1/L2 Signal Relative Delay 
Consistency Check with other Navigation 
and positioning Technologies 
 
 
The most obvious solution is to monitor the intensity of the received signal, or some 
parameter of it, because if the spoofer is not sophisticated enough, then the spoofing 
signal is much stronger than the GPS signal, methods like this called Signal Power 
Monitoring. The first method of this kind is the 𝑪/𝑵𝟎 (carrier to noise density) 
Monitoring, where the value of the  𝐶/𝑁0  is observed. 𝐶/𝑁0 is “an indication of the 
signal power of the tracked satellite and the noise density as seen by the receiver's 
front-end” [68]. A sudden change – in that particular parameter of the system – can 
quickly reveal the presence of a spoofing signal.  Absolute Power Monitoring 
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method is measuring the power of the received signal in a general manner. If the 
amplitude of the received signal is higher than usual, the spoofer is revealed.  For 
constantly moving GPS receivers the 𝐶/𝑁0  can be observed too, because if the 
system is working well, this parameter does not change during movement. But if the 
spoofer uses a single fixed antenna, then the increasing or decreasing distance 
between that antenna and the target receiver will cause a continuously varying value 
of 𝐶/𝑁0 , which may indicate that a spoofing signal is received. The method 
explained before named Received Power Variations versus Receiver Movement 
method. If the receiver is able to listen to multiple frequencies in parallel, e.g. L1 and 
L2, then the L1/L2 Power Level Comparison can be used. Which is with checking the 
phase difference between the two carrier frequencies can detect a spoofer, because 
that difference value is well-known and constant.  
It often happens that an antenna is broadcasting more than one spoofing signal, so 
the origin of these signals is the same, unlike in the case of GPS signal, where the 
signal is coming from different satellites from different directions. Spatial processing 
methods are taking advantage of the previous limitations. Two types of spatial 
processing techniques are mentioned in [65], the Multiantenna Spoofing 
Discrimination and the Synthetic Array Spoofing Discrimination. In the case of 
Multiantenna Spoofing Discrimination, two fixed antennas are used in a single 
receiver. A theoretical phase difference is calculated between the two antennas, and 
then during the processing of GPS signals, a practical phase difference is calculated 
continuously. If a spoofing signal is present, then the theoretical difference and the 
practical difference will be completely different. Synthetic Array Spoofing method 
does the same, without using multiple antennas. A single GPS receiver is moving 
around a random path, and the phase of the received signal is calculated at some 
random points. If the phase values – calculated at those different points – are not 
correlated, then a spoofing signal can be guessed.  
Time of Arrival Discrimination technics are available too, in the PRN Code and Data 
Bit Latency method a delay in the received signal is watched, if it is greater than 20 
ms, then a spoofer signal can be guessed. This discrimination method provides a 
solution against receiver-based spoofers, where the attacker first receives the 
original GPS signal, and only sends it towards after modifying it. Receivers which are 
capable of receiving more than one signal at the same time can use the L1/L2 Signal 
Relative Delay method, which is based on the fact, that because of ionospheric and 
tropospheric effect there is a tiny delay in the transmission time of the P(Y) code on 
both of the carrier signals mentioned above. 
The Consistency Check with other Navigation and Positioning technologies are 
using the help of a cellular or Wi-Fi network to monitor the proper working of the 
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GPS receiver. However, geodetic authenticity of location information provided by 
Wi-Fi and cellular networks always has a lower degree than the GPS. Differences 
between the location information provided by the GPS and the Wi-Fi or cellular 
network can reveal a spoofing signal. 
In the case of signal mitigation, the main aim is to eliminate the spoofing signals. 
There are technics – namely the Vestigial Signal Detection methods – which try to 
find some trace of the original GPS signal. One solution is to record the incoming data 
into a buffer, then remove that part of the data, which is coming from a particular 
GPS satellite. After deleting that part from the buffer, start a new search for the same 
GPS satellite signal and what remained is the original unmodified signal. Regarding 
to Multiantenna Beam Forming and Null Steering methods, a spatial spoofing 
detection method is applied to find the direction of the spoofing signal, and then 
with a radio wave, which amplitude and frequency is the same but antiphased cancel 
out the spoofing signal in that particular receiver. Sometimes it is easier to observe 
the output of the location determination than the received signal. The Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) method is applying an integrity checking 
– which is based on statistical methods – in the measurement of the receiver, during 
the calculation to remove the wrong location information. 
Table. 11. Spoofing detection methods 
Spoofing mitigation method 
Vestigial Signal Detection 
Multiantenna Beam Forming and Null Steering 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
 
Regarding to jamming, it is only necessary to pay attention to the jamming 
mitigation, because detection of the jamming attack is easy, if the signal is lost, then 
a jamming attack is in progress. Mitigation methods listed above in the case of 
spoofing can be used to mitigate the jamming attacks as well but based on the open 
literature, the most commonly applied technologies are the anti-jam antennas. Anti-
jam antennas have the advantage that no changes have to be made neither in the 
GPS service nor in the receiver. Anti-jam antennas are easily applicable antenna 
enhancements for the GPS receivers. Anti-jam antennas are Controlled Reception 
Pattern Antennas (CRPA) [69] which using spatial methods to identify the direction 
of the broadcasted jamming signal and then eliminate the interference with 
generating a phase-destructive sum of the interference [70].  
3.2.2.2 SOLUTIONS FOR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS 
At the beginning of the 2000s, because of the widespread usage of GPS, several 
researchers started to design solutions for the authentication shortcomings of the 
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system, mentioned above. A lot of possible methods were made through the early 
years of the 2000s. Cryptographical GPS signal authentication came in mind 
regarding spoofing and meaconing attack as an alternative countermeasure.  
Although a proper cryptographically authenticated signal can provide a solution for 
legal problems in the case of applications presented in Section 3.1.2 too. As it is 
mentioned before in this dissertation, the focus is on those types of applications 
where the received GPS coordinates have probative value in a legal procedure or 
dispute. 
It is well known that electronically saved, and transmitted data without a secure 
channel can be modified easily. Hence, it is necessary to have a method which is able 
to prove that the origin and the destination (authenticity), the content (data 
integrity), and the freshness of data provided by the GPS is not altered. Thus, in this 
section, the related scientific literature is overviewed to get an insight into the 
already existing cryptographical methods for authenticating GPS signals. 
In cryptography when a communication channel has to be secured, the following 
methods are available: symmetric or asymmetric (or public) key algorithms and 
cryptographical hash functions (from now on hash functions). In Section 2, a brief 
explanation can be found about the cryptographic algorithms mentioned above, for 
more detailed information see [12] and [17].  
In symmetric-key cryptography, as it is mentioned in Section 2, a shared secret key 
is used between the two parties of the communication, and with this common key, 
the messages can be encrypted and decrypted on a channel. If the shared key cannot 
be revealed, then the confidentiality and the data integrity properties of the secure 
channel are provided. However, these methods cannot assure the authenticity of the 
messages or the entities and the freshness of the messages. Another problem is that 
considering the fact that millions or billions of GPS receivers are used all around the 
world, and every GPS satellite should share a secret key with all those receivers and 
should use that particular secret key in that particular communication. Thus, it can 
be stated that symmetric key cryptography is not the right choice for GPS signal 
authentication.  
In the case of asymmetric key algorithms, as it is described in Section 2 a pair of a 
secret/private and a public key is used to ensure the confidentiality, the data 
integrity, and the entity authentication during the communication. Only the private 
key must be kept secret, and there is no need for key exchange via a secure channel. 
The digital signature algorithm is used in existing solutions. In the case of digital 
signature, the sender entity – the satellite –, that has to be authenticated in the 
communication using its private key signs the message, and on the other side the 
receiver entity using the public key – paired to the private key of the to be 
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authenticated sender entity – verifies the message. Although digital signature 
requires less effort when the secrecy of the keys is under observation, but the 
underlying mathematical methods and its implementation take much more time. 
Modern GNSS, like GALILEO, uses an asymmetric cryptographical method to digitally 
sign the NAV messages [71]. 
Hash functions as the third option, are one-way functions with an arbitrary length 
input and a fixed-length output. Hash functions are in possession of the properties 
such, the output is easy to compute for any given input, it gives the same output for 
one particular input (deterministic), the output is not revealing any information 
about the input (preimage resistance), and it is practically impossible to find two 
different inputs to get the same output (collision resistance). Keyed hash functions 
are able to provide not just data integrity but also message authentication; unkeyed 
hash functions provide message authentication beside message integrity, that is the 
reason why it serves as a basis of several solutions.  
Based on [59] and [72], the cryptographic signal authentication methods can be 
divided into four categories, like Navigation Message Authentication (NMA), 
Spreading Code Authentication (SCA), Navigation Message Encryption (NME), and 
Spreading Code Encryption (SCE) as it can be seen in Figure 16. 
 
 Classification of cryptographic signal authentication 
NMA “denotes the authentication of satellite navigation message by means of 
digitally signing the navigation message data and thus keeping the navigation 
message clear (i.e. unencrypted)” [59].  The aforementioned statement is true only 
in the case of NMA designed for GPS, because for example, in the case of GALILEO, 
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the NMA is based on a symmetric cryptographic algorithm. In the case of NMA 
technics, the whole NAV/CNAV/CNAV2 or some part of it is digitally signed by the 
GPS satellites. All satellites have a private-public key pair to be able to perform the 
digital signing, which as it is mentioned before an asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithm. The digital signature of the data is broadcasted standalone or in the 
message itself. Legacy GPS does not have a suitable structure to allow the signature 
encapsulation into the message, but modern navigational messages have additional 
places in its frame to bear such extra information. After receiving the original 
navigational message and the digitally signed version of it, the receiver is able to 
verify the validity of the signature. The main disadvantage of the NMA that a delay 
is occurring during the authentication, because the receiver has to wait until the 
whole navigational message and the signed message arrives, before the verification. 
So, the NMA does not authenticate the entity, only the actual message. There can 
be presented several solutions according to what amount of data is signed digitally, 
or the applied digital signature method, the key generation, and the process of the 
key publishing. Another disadvantage of the NMA that a major change is required in 
the structure of the signal and the receivers as well. NMA first was proposed by S. 
Logan in [73], as a basic level authentication technic for L2C and L5 GPS signals. In 
[74], [75], [76], [77], [78], other possible solutions are proposed for future NMA. 
SCA “embeds short encryption code segments within the nominal (unencrypted) 
spreading code sequence” [59]. The SCA method is first mentioned by Logan in [73] 
as an intermediate level of an authentication method for GPS signals. The SCA 
extends the NMA method by inserting extra parts into the spreading code, so into 
the C/A and Y code itself, before it is modulated onto the carrier frequency. The code 
period has become longer because of the extra chips. The SCA takes advantage of 
the low transmission power of the spreading code because it is transmitted 20 dB 
below the background noise level, so ordinary receivers cannot observe those codes. 
The receivers are only able to cross-correlate a known spreading code sequence with 
the transmitted ones. “The SCA chips are therefore obscured by the thermal noise in 
a similar way as a message written by invisible ink” [72]. Encrypted spread sequences 
have to be known by the receivers to be able to determine the position.  Several 
methods are existing, to determine the spreading code sequence. One is when the 
spreading code sequences are extended by a secret key, which then used to encrypt 
the transmitted navigational message, mentioned in [79]. In that solution, it is not 
necessary to store the secret key in the receiver side, only a seed value and the key 
generating method are the information what has to be known. Another solution is 
when the unsent digitally signed navigational message is served as a seed for the 
spreading code sequence, proposed in [73]. Both methods have the advantages of 
what NMA methods are provided and the extra benefits provided by the SCA. 
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Methods like this usually called hybrid systems, in the related scientific literature, 
several methods are published like Chimera in [79], or Private SCA and Public SCA in 
[73]. The new authenticated signal of the European GNSS Galileo is protected by an 
NMA SCA hybrid system presented in [80]. 
NME “refers to the encryption of the whole navigation message, which is then 
modulated on the spreading code” [59]. In the case of NME, usually, symmetric 
cryptographic algorithms are in use, so a single secret key is helping to encrypt and 
decrypt the whole navigation message. It is explained above, that symmetric 
cryptographic algorithms have several disadvantages in usage for signal 
authentication purposes, mainly in the case of civil GPS, because of the vast number 
of users. The distribution of the secret key can be hard to realize, and tamper-
resistant devices have to be applied, to keep the key in secret. Any type of receiver 
is able to receive the broadcasted encrypted navigational message, but only the 
authorized ones are able to understand the content of it. In the related scientific 
literature, only a few proposals for NME can be found, for example, the one in [77]. 
SCE “denotes the encryption of the whole spreading code sequence transmitted by 
each satellite” [59]. In the case of SCE symmetric cryptographic algorithms are used 
like NME, especially stream ciphers. SCE is most commonly used in military 
applications, where the number of users is significantly less. The military P(Y) code is 
secured with SCE technics. P-code encryption and Y code decryption are solved by 
using three different secret keys, the Group Unique Variable (GUV), the 
Cryptovariable Weekly (CVw) and the Cryptovariable Daily (CVd). CVd is the key 
that is used to encrypt the P-code to get Y-code, so every satellite has the CVd key. 
Y code and encrypted CVd (with GUV) are transmitted by the satellites. To decrypt 
the Y code and get the P-code, the receivers need the CVd key. If the receiver is in 
possession of the annual GUV, then with the help of it the CVd can be decrypted 
from the transmitted message although this solution causes a delay in the position 
determination because the whole Y code and the encrypted CVd have to arrive 
before decryption. The other method provides a faster position determination. If the 
receiver has the CVw, then it can generate the actual CVd, like the satellite, and does 
not have to wait till the whole encrypted section arrives. SCE methods are not 
common, and it is usually mentioned in the literature in connection with GPS P(Y) 
code [77] , [81]. 
It is essential to mention that all the above presented solutions require fundamental 
changes in the structure of the GPS signals, so without the evolution of the system 
they cannot be applied.  
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3.2.3 OWN SOLUTIONS: GENERATING CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY AUTHENTIC LOCATION 
INFORMATION 
3.2.3.1 DESCRIPTION OF OUR PROTOCOLS  
In order to solve the problems formulated in Section 3.2.1, and provide 
cryptographically authentic location information, two stamping protocols were 
made by my co-author and me in 2013 [82].  The developed protocols can provide 
authentic location and time information for any device which has a GPS receiver built 
in it. In this section, both protocols are presented, one with a higher safety solution, 
which was designed to be installed at the hardware-level of the host devices, and 
the other one – that provides lower safety –  was designed to be installed at the 
software-level of the host devices.  
During the design of communication protocols, several rules have to be applied while 
the desired properties of the protocol are considered. The primary aim of the design 
process to eliminate all the known security breaches/attacks as far as possible. In the 
case of cryptographic protocols, it is even more important to be cautious, because it 
is not enough to pay attention to the proper working of the underlying transmission 
channel – which is essential –, like that the channel is available, stable, and there is 
no loss of information though it.  Nevertheless, such a protocol has to provide a 
secure channel with its special properties as it is defined in Section 2., namely 
confidentiality, authenticity, data integrity, and freshness. To achieve a protocol with 
an appropriate safety level, proper cryptographic primitives have to be used as 
building blocks during designing. However, using the right primitives will not ensure 
automatically the same level of security for the protocol. 
Before, the two protocols are explained in detail, the starting point of our research 
is presented. In 2001 Alf Zugenmaier and Matthias Kabatnik [83]  introduced a 
„location-stamp” service for mobile telephone networks. The solution of theirs 
provides authenticated cell information, calculated previously by the method of 
trilateration from three different cell towers. They “propose a service that provides 
certified location information. Integrated with cryptographic digital signatures, this 
service enables the determination of the current position of the signer in a provable 
way. The „location-stamp” service (LSS) provides a „location-stamp” that certifies at 
which position the subscriber is located when making a signature—or rather, at 
which position the subscriber‘s mobile station is visible to the network. This 
„location-stamp” can be verified by any third party using the public key assigned to 
the LSS, and it can be used as a proof of the location information” [83]. Their protocol 
served as a basis of our solutions. However, the method presented by them is 
impossible in its original form to use in the case of authenticating GPS coordinates, 
because of the two-way communication between the trusted third party – for 
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example, the Certification Authority – and the Location Measurement System – for 
example a mobile service provider –, when cell information authenticated. In our 
case, the Location Measurement System is the GPS, not the cell towers of any mobile 
service provider, where the communication is one-way. Because the GPS satellites – 
as it is thoroughly explained in Section 3.1.1 – only can send the information but 
cannot receive it.  
Here two solutions for the cryptographic authentication of the GPS coordinates are 
suggested. The basic idea is that the data received and/or computed by a GPS 
receiver, or by a mobile phone, tablet, laptop, smartwatch along with others that has 
a GPS receiver built-in it (from now on device), are sent to a trusted organization, 
which can be for example a Certification Authority. The device has to use digital 
signing, and if the information is consistent with information available by the 
organization, then the organization confirms the validity of the GPS coordinates with 
signing it digitally.  
The basic difference between the two solutions is that in the first case it is assumed 
that the navigational message and additional information (from now on raw data) – 
explained in Section 3.1.1 – transmitted by the satellites and received by the device 
– is accessible; thus it can be signed. Differently, in the second case, only the 
computed GPS coordinates are accessible. So, the first protocol is more promising, 
although the safety level of the second one can be satisfactory in the case of most of 
the applications.  
Working with the GPS requires processing a large amount of data, such as the raw 
data arriving from the satellites, time information or the calculated coordinates. The 
task of cryptography is to prevent these data from changing during the process of 
the calculations. The changes can be made, for example by a malicious person, a 
virus, a modified receiver, or modified software and sometimes it may happen by 
chance. As for the precision of the device, there are several options for the reliability: 
• First, the person and the device are both considered trusted in all cases. The 
measured coordinates and the time provided by the device are accepted.  
• Second, the person and the device are both considered trusted, but the time 
information of the device is not acceptable. The measured coordinates are 
accepted, but the time provided by the device is not. 
• Third, the person and the receiver are both considered unreliable.  Neither 
the measured coordinates nor the time provided by the device is accepted. 
In this thesis, the third option is considered, and two solutions are suggested to solve 
it. The first solution provides higher safety, with the creation of an authenticated 
„location-stamp” based on the hardware-level of the device. The second solution is 
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using the data preprocessed by the software of the Mobile Device to generate the 
authenticated „location-stamp”, and the second method provides lower safety. The 
differences between the abovementioned two solutions are the following: In the 
first case, the Authentic Software is built in the hardware level of a Mobile Device. 
The data are signed immediately as the device received it. Thus, the provided 
security is hardware dependent. In the second case, the Authentic Software is on the 
level of the operating system, so the provided security is software dependent. Thus, 
the second solution security is improved with trilateration for the Mobile Device, 
between the cell towers. 
The following cryptographic primitives are used during the operation of the 
protocols: 
• digital signature 
• hash function  
• timestamp 
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3.2.3.2 High-safety solution: Hardware-level 
 
In this solution, the main goal is to take the raw data before anybody could modify 
it. The Authentic Software developed by us is intended to build in a very deep and 
hidden layer of the device; thus, it is built in the hardware level of the Mobile Device. 
Figure 17. displays the protocol. 
 
 
  Protocol for hardware- level solution 
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Table. 12. Participants and Notations 
Denotation Explanation 
𝑮𝑷𝑺 The Global Positioning System. The satellites of this system provide the 
data from which the GPS receiver calculates the coordinates of the 
actual position. 
𝑴𝑫 The Mobile Device. The device with a GPS receiver, with the help of which 
the positioning and authentication can be made.  
𝑪𝑨 The Certification Authority. It provides the authentic time and „location-
stamp”; this is an organization, which is independent of the 
measurement and can guarantee that nobody modified the results. 
𝑨𝑺 Authentic Software. This software makes the authentication of the raw 
data (which comes from the satellites) and of the calculated GPS 
coordinates. 
𝑪𝑺 The Calculator Software. This software calculates the GPS coordinates 
belonging to the actual position from the raw data come from the 
satellites. 
𝑴 The text or photo or some other data that we want to authenticate with 
a „location-stamp”. 
𝒉(… ) The hash function.  
𝑯 The hash value of 𝑀. 
𝒄(… ) The calculator function, which calculates the current position from the 
raw data that come from the satellites. 
𝑹𝑫 The raw data come from one of the satellites of the Global Positioning 
System. 
𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄 The GPS coordinate calculated by the Calculator Software. 
𝑺𝑨𝑺(… ) The signature of the data in parentheses with the private key of the 
Authentic Software. 
𝑺𝑪𝑨(… ) The signature of the data in parentheses with the private key of the 
Certification Authority. 
𝑽𝑨𝑺(… ) The verification of the data in parentheses with the public key of the 
Authentic Software.  
𝑽𝑪𝑨(… ) The verification of the data in parentheses with the public key of the 
Certification Authority. 
𝒔𝒊 The i-th signed data. 
𝑻𝑰𝑴𝑬 The time information. 
𝒏 The nonce value 
𝑨𝑳𝑺 The authentic „location-stamp” generated by the Certification Authority. 
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Below the detailed steps of the higher-safety protocol can be seen. 
1. 𝑀𝐷 calculates the hash value of  
𝑴 ∶  𝑯 =  𝒉(𝑴) 
2. 𝑴𝑫 → 𝑨𝑺: 𝑯||𝑴 
3. 𝐴𝑆 digitally signs 𝐻 with its private key:  
𝒔𝟏  =  𝑺𝑨𝑺(𝑯) 
4. 𝑮𝑷𝑺 → 𝑨𝑺: 𝑹𝑫 
5. 𝐴𝑆 digitally signs the hash value of 𝑅𝐷 with its private key:  
𝒔𝟐  =  𝑺𝑨𝑺(𝒉(𝑹𝑫)) 
6. 𝑨𝑺 → 𝑪𝑺: 𝑹𝑫 
7. 𝐶𝑆 calculates the actual position from  
𝑹𝑫:  𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄 =  𝒄(𝑹𝑫) 
8. 𝑨𝑺 ← 𝑪𝑺: 𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄 
9. 𝐴𝑆 digitally signs the hash value of 𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑐 with its private key:  
𝒔𝟑  =  𝑺𝑨𝑺(𝒉(𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄)) 
10. 𝐴𝑆 concatenates 𝐻, 𝑠1, 𝑅𝐷, 𝑠2, 𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑐 and 𝑠3 and takes its hash value and then 
digitally signs this hash value with its private key:  
𝒔𝟒  =  𝑺𝑨𝑺 (𝒉(𝑯||𝑹𝑫||𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄|| 𝒔𝟏||𝒔𝟐||𝒔𝟑)) 
11. 𝑨𝑺 → 𝑪𝑨: 𝑯||𝑹𝑫||𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄||𝒔𝟏||𝒔𝟐||𝒔𝟑||𝒔𝟒 
12. 𝐶𝐴 verifies that the raw data were signed by 𝐴𝑆 and 𝐶𝐴 verifies that 𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑐 can 
be computed from 𝑅𝐷, and checks the freshness of 𝑡. 
𝑽𝑨𝑺(𝒔𝟐) 
𝒄(𝑹𝑫)  =?  𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄  
𝒇(𝒕) 
12.1. if the answer is true for all questions, then 𝐶𝐴 makes the authentic 
„location-stamp”: 
𝑨𝑳𝑺 
=  𝑻𝑰𝑴𝑬 ||𝑺𝑪𝑨 (𝒉(𝑯||𝑹𝑫||𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄||𝒏||𝒔𝟏||𝒔𝟐||𝒔𝟑||𝒔𝟒||𝒔𝟓||𝒔𝟔||𝑻𝑰𝑴𝑬)) 
𝑨𝑺 ← 𝑪𝑨: 𝑨𝑳𝑺 
12.1.1. 𝐴𝑆 verifies that really the 𝐶𝐴 signed the „location-stamp” that it 
got:   
𝑽𝑪𝑨 (𝑨𝑳𝑺) 
12.1.1.1. if the answer is true, then 𝐴𝑆 accepts the authentic 
„location-stamp” 
12.1.1.2. if the answer is false, then 𝐴𝑆 starts a new „location-stamp” 
request with step 4. 
12.2. if the answer is false, then 𝐶𝐴 rejects to generate the authentic 
„location-stamp” 
𝑨𝑺 ← 𝑪𝑨: 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
 
46 
 
The protocol, described here in detail, has three important participants, these are 
the satellites of the Global Positioning System, the Mobile Device, and the 
Certification Authority. The Mobile Device generates a print of the data, –  which has 
to be stamped with an authentic „location-stamp” – initially with an eligible hash 
function. Applying a hash function is necessary because of the digital signing. In the 
next step the Authentic Software, which is built in the hardware of the Mobile 
Device, gets the data from the three GPS satellites, and then it digitally signs these 
data with its private key immediately. Digitally signing the raw data, that is arriving 
from the satellites, is required in order to nobody falsify them during the 
computational process. The Authentic Software located in the hardware of the 
Mobile Device so that it can protect the data from the attack of any 
software/application installed on the operation system of the Mobile Device. Once 
the Authentic Software digitally signed and stored the raw data, it sends them to the 
Calculator Software. The Calculator Software calculates the current GPS coordinates 
from the actual raw data and sends back the result to the Authentic Software. The 
Authentic Software digitally signs these data too. Now we arrived at the point where 
the Authentic Software can ask – if it has all the information which is necessary – for 
an authentic time stamp from the Certification Authority. So, the Authentic Software 
sends a request to the Certification Authority. This request contains the hash value 
of all the data, the raw data and the calculated coordinates concatenated and 
digitally signed with its private key. Then the Certification Authority generates a 
nonce value in order to ensure the freshness of the protocol finally gives it back to 
the software. The Authentic Software appends the nonce to the previous request 
and turns it back to the Certification Authority, which checks if it is true that the 
Authentic Software sent the request. If the result of the verification is right, then the 
Certification Authority checks that the calculated GPS coordinates can be or cannot 
be computed from the raw data. If the answer is yes, then it generates the „location-
stamp”, which includes a time stamp too. 
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3.2.3.3 Lower-safety solution: Software-level 
The protocol of the previous section strongly depends on the available hardware, 
because the raw data – received by the GPS device from the satellites – is signed 
immediately after the device got it and it can be done only on a very low level of the 
Mobile Device. A further aim with the second protocol is to develop a solution, that 
is less hardware dependent because it is much easier to access the calculated GPS 
coordinates as the raw data. In order to authenticate the GPS information of the 
Mobile Device, a trusted organization is necessary, that has its own data which can 
be compared to the ones received by the Mobile Device. One option to get suitable 
data is using mobile phone services, which have cell information, but cell information 
is usually not accurate enough to specify the location of the Mobile Device. It seems 
to be a proper solution if the mobile network coverage is broad enough. In the above 
situation, the mobile phone service has independent information on the location of 
the Mobile Device, which can be compared to the data that the Mobile Device sends 
to the trusted organization. The second protocol is only applicable if the above 
assumptions hold. In the next, the details of the protocol are presented. Table 13. 
contains the participants of the protocol and the important notations. Only those 
symbols are presented, which differs from participants or notations in the case of 
the previous protocol; other symbols are used in the same manner as above. 
Table. 13. Participants and Notations 
Denotation Explanation 
𝑴𝑷𝑺𝑷 The Mobile Phone Service Provider provides the cell information for a 
mobile identifier. 
𝑨𝑺 Authentic Software. This software makes the authentication for the 
calculated GPS coordinates. 
𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫 The Mobil identifier, a number from which the MPSP can identify the 
current Mobile Device. 
𝑪𝑰 The cell information from the MPSP. 
𝒕(… ) The trilateration function, it trilaterates the CI from the MoID. 
𝒄𝒌(… ) The checking function, which checks if GPS coordinates are in the area 
which is defined by the cell information. 
𝑺𝑴𝑷𝑺𝑷(… ) The signature of the data in parenthesis with the private key of the 
Mobile Phone Service Provider. 
𝑽𝑴𝑷𝑺𝑷(… ) The verification of the data in parenthesis with the public key of the 
Mobile Phone Service Provider. 
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Figure 18. displays the protocol. 
 
 
  Protocol for software - level solution 
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Below the detailed steps of the software-safety protocol can be seen. 
1. 𝑀𝐷 calculates the hash value of   
𝑴 ∶  𝑯 =  𝒉(𝑴) 
2. 𝑴𝑫 → 𝑨𝑺: 𝑯||𝑴 
3. 𝑮𝑷𝑺 → 𝑨𝑺: 𝑹𝑫 
4. 𝐴𝑆 calculates the actual position from  
𝑹𝑫: 𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄 =  𝒄(𝑹𝑫) 
5. 𝐴𝑆 concatenates 𝑀𝑜𝐼𝐷, 𝐻, 𝑅𝐷 and 𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑐 and digitally signs its hash value with 
its private key: 𝒔𝟏 =  𝑺𝑨𝑺(𝒉(𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫||𝑯||𝑹𝑫||𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄)) 
6. 𝑨𝑺 → 𝑪𝑨: 𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫||𝑯||𝑹𝑫||𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄||𝒔𝟏 
7. 𝐶𝐴 verifies that the raw data were signed by 𝐴𝑆 and 𝐶𝐴 verifies that 𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑐 can 
be computed from 𝑅𝐷 and checks the freshness of 𝑡. 
𝑽𝑨𝑺(𝒔𝟏) 
𝒄(𝑹𝑫)  =?  𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄 
𝒇(𝒕)  
7.1. if the answer is true then:  
𝑪𝑨 → 𝑴𝑷𝑺𝑷: 𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫 and asks for a cell information 
7.1.1. 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑃 trilaterates 𝐶𝐼 from the 𝑀𝑜𝐼𝐷:   
𝒕(𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫)  =  𝑪𝑰 
𝒔𝟐   =  𝑺𝑴𝑷𝑺𝑷(𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫||𝑪𝑰) 
𝑪𝑨 ← 𝑴𝑷𝑺𝑷: 𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫||𝑪𝑰|| 𝒔𝟐 
7.1.2. 𝐶𝐴 verifies that really the 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑃 signed the data, which it got, and, 
that the 𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑐 matches to the 𝐶𝐼:   
𝑽𝑴𝑷𝑺𝑷(𝒔𝟐)  
𝒄𝒌(𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄, 𝑪𝑰)  =  𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒆 
7.1.2.1. if the answer is true, then 𝐶𝐴 makes the authentic „location-
stamp”:  
 𝑨𝑳𝑺 =
 𝑻𝑰𝑴𝑬||𝑺𝑪𝑨(𝒉(𝑴𝒐𝑰𝑫||𝑯||𝑹𝑫||𝑮𝑷𝑺𝒄||𝒔𝟏||𝒔𝟐||𝑪𝑰||𝑻𝑰𝑴𝑬)) 
 𝑨𝑺 ← 𝑪𝑨: 𝑨𝑳𝑺 
7.1.2.1.1. 𝐴𝑆 verifies that really the 𝐶𝐴 signed the „location-
stamp” that it got:   
 𝑽𝑪𝑨(𝑨𝑳𝑺) 
7.1.2.1.1.1. if the answer is true, then 𝐴𝑆 accepts the authentic 
„location-stamp” 
7.1.2.1.1.2. if the answer is false then 𝐴𝑆 starts a new 
„location-stamp” request 
   with the step 3. 
7.1.2.2. if the answer it false then 𝐶𝐴 asks a new cell information with 
the step  
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7.2. if the answer is false, then 𝐶𝐴 rejects to generate the authentic „location-
stamp” 
𝑨𝑺 ← 𝑪𝑨: 𝒓𝒆𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
Unlike the other method, described in Section 3.2.3.2, here the protocol has four 
important participants, the satellites of the Global Positioning System, the Mobile 
Device, the Certification Authority, and the Mobile Phone Service Provider of the 
actual Mobile Device.  There are some other differences between the two protocols: 
in the case of the protocol presented in Section 3.2.3.2 the Authentic Software is 
built in the hardware level of the Mobile Device, here the software is installed in the 
operation system of the Mobile Device. The Mobile Device initially generates a print 
of the data with a hash function the same way as it happens in the previous case. 
After this, the Authentic Software, which is installed in the Mobile Device, gets the 
data from three GPS satellites and calculates the current GPS coordinates incoming 
from the raw data. Then it concatenates these two values, the document hash value, 
and the Mobile Device identifier and digitally signs it with its private key. As a next 
step, the Authentic Software asks for an authentic time stamp from the Certification 
Authority with the help of the digitally signed data. The Certification Authority 
generates a nonce value in order to ensure the freshness of the protocol and sends 
it back to the software. The Authentic Software appends the nonce to the previous 
request and sends it back to the Certification Authority, which checks that the 
Authentic Software sent the request. Now the Certification Authority sends the 
identifier of the Mobile Device to the Mobile Phone Service Provider, which 
trilaterates the cell information for the device and gives it back. At this point, only 
the verification remains behind.  If the result of the verification is right, namely the 
calculated GPS coordinates match to the cell information, and the private key 
belongs to the authentication software. The Certification Authority generates the 
„location-stamp”, which also includes a timestamp too. 
3.2.3.4 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR PROTOCOLS  
Proving that a cryptographic communication protocol is working as it is promised is 
crucial. To be able to check if a security property is holding in a communication 
protocol, first, the protocol has to be modelled mathematically. In this section, the 
comprehensive survey of Blanchet [84] is overviewed, and I publish the content of 
the section in [85]. Several methods are proposed in the related scientific literature, 
and two main approaches of modelling are distinguished the symbolic (Dolev-Yao) 
and the computational one. Dolev-Yao model is highly abstract, while the 
computational model is more realistic. Dolev-Yao model represents cryptographic 
primitives by function symbols – it cannot be known, what is happening in the 
primitive –, and the messages in a communication flow are terms of the 
beforementioned function symbols. The attacker is able to compute with the defined 
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cryptographic primitives only. On the contrary, in the computational model, the 
cryptographic primitives are represented with the function of bitstrings, where the 
messages are the bitstrings themselves. The attacker is a probabilistic Turing 
machine, so the next step of the attacker is randomly restricted to some probabilistic 
value. Models such as the Dolev-Yao or the computational are made with the 
promise to prove security properties, like confidentiality, authenticity, data integrity 
or freshness provided by such protocols described above. To simplify the verification, 
automatic verification tools are designed for both models. The verification methods 
can be classified into four groups based on [86]. The general-purpose verification 
tools are “modelling and verifying the protocol using specification languages and 
verification tools not specifically developed for the analysis of cryptographic 
protocols” [87].  In the developing expert systems approach, unique systems for the 
actual protocols are created “that a protocol designer can use to investigate different 
scenarios” [87]. The modal logic approach is “modelling and verifying the protocol 
using modal logics developed for the analysis of knowledge and belief” [87]. 
Furthermore, the algebraic approach, which is “developing a formal model based on 
the algebraic term-rewriting properties of cryptographic systems” [87]. 
In this dissertation, the Applied-π calculus is used for modelling, and the ProVerif 
software is for automatic verification of the designed protocol, presented in Section 
3.2.3.2. Applied-π calculus is a Dolev-Yao type model, and ProVerif is an algebraic 
verifier. A brief introduction to the Applied-π calculus and ProVerif software tool is 
given in this section.  
The Applied-π calculus is a particular quasi-programming language, which was made 
for modelling cryptographic communication protocols and checking security 
properties, by Abadi and Fournet and introduced in [88]. Applied-π calculus is the 
extension of the π-calculus [89] and is close to the spi-calculus [90]. Adding a rich 
term algebra to the original π-calculus – which was made to model concurrent 
processes – gives the advantages to the applied-π calculus to be able to formalize 
cryptographic primitives. Applied-π calculus offers comprehensive collections of 
complex cryptographic primitives, like digital signatures, hash functions and proofs 
of knowledge. The calculus has been used in the analysis of several types of 
protocols, like certified email [91], electronic voting [92] or authentication protocols 
[93].  In this model, the terms represent messages of the protocol, function symbols 
represent cryptographic primitives, and the properties of the primitives are 
modelled by equations [87]. In Table 14. the necessary notations of the calculus are 
summarized, for detailed information see [88]. 
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Table. 14. Basic notations in Applied-π calculus 
Denotation Explanation 
𝑳,𝑴,𝑵, 𝑻, 𝑼, 𝑽 ∶: = Terms 
𝒂, 𝒃, 𝒄, . . . , 𝒌, . . . ,𝒎, 𝒏, . . . , 𝒔 Names 
𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒛 Variables 
𝒇(𝑴𝟏, . . . , 𝑴𝒍) Function application 
𝑷,𝑸, 𝑹 ∶: = Processes (or plain processes) 
𝟎 Null process 
𝑷 | 𝑸 Parallel composition 
! 𝑷 Replication (infinite number of copies of P running 
parallel) 
𝝂𝒏. 𝑷 
Name restriction (“new”) (makes a new, private 
name n then behaves as P) 
𝒊𝒇 𝑴 =  𝑵 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝑷 𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆 𝑸 Conditional 
𝒖(𝒙). 𝑷 Message input 
?̅?〈𝑵〉. 𝑷 Message output 
 
ProVerif is a software tool, which is based on the Applied-π calculus, the syntax is 
really close to it. ProVerif can analyze properties' reachability, correspondence 
assertions, and observational equivalences automatically. With the help of ProVerif, 
it is possible to formalize different cryptographic primitives, like encryption and 
decryption functions, digital signatures or hash functions.  If ProVerif results that a 
property is satisfied, then the model guarantees the property, but ProVerif may not 
be able to prove a property that holds. For security evaluations, ProVerif uses queries 
that might be a fact or a correspondence.  
In the implementation of the designed „location-stamping” protocol events are 
defined to mark the examined stages of the process, and then the relation between 
those events is tested. Like for example, whether an event 𝑎 has been executed, then 
event 𝑏 has been executed previously. In this section, security requirements, 
authenticity and data integrity are examined. Hereunder in Table 15. the necessary 
notations of the ProVerif can be seen, for detailed information consider examining 
[94]. 
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Table. 15. Basic notations in ProVerif  
Denotation Explanation 
𝒂, 𝒃, 𝒄, 𝒌,𝒎, 𝒏, 𝒔 Names (a, b, c usually denotes channels) 
𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒛 Variables 
𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕 𝒄. Constant (c is the name of the constant) 
𝒇𝒖𝒏 𝒇/𝒏 . Constructor (f is the name the constructor, n is the 
number of its arguments) 
𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄 𝒈(𝒇(𝒎), 𝒌)  =  𝒎. Destructor (g is the name of the destructor; m is the 
argument of the constructor and k is the argument of 
the destructor) 
𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒂 Channel 
𝒍𝒆𝒕 Keyword to create processes 
𝒏𝒆𝒘 Keyword to generate new value to variables 
𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆(𝒙) Event (e is the name and x is the argument of the 
event) 
𝒊𝒏(𝒂,𝒎) Replication (infinite number of copies of P running 
parallel) 
 𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗: 𝒆𝟏(𝒙) ⟹ 𝒆𝒗: 𝒆𝟐(𝒚) Correspondence assertion (for each occurrence of 
e1(x), there is a previous occurrence of e2(y) for some 
y, where e1(x), e2(y) are events) 
𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒋: 𝒆𝟏(𝒙)
⟹  𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒏𝒋: 𝒆𝟐(𝒚) 
Injective correspondence (correspondence assertion 
for one to one relationship) 
 
Below the code of the higher safety „location-stamping” protocol can be seen 
implemented in ProVerif. First, it is necessary to declare the used channels, 
cryptographic primitives and other calculator functions of the protocol. As you can 
see the channel a is declared as a free channel, which means it is lack of any security. 
So, any attacker is able to get or maliciously modify the messages that goes through 
it. A few functions are declared here, like a hash function h, a digital signature key 
generating function pk, a digital signing function sign, a digital signature verifier 
function checkSign and getMess, and two functions in order to calculate the actual 
GPS coordinates from the received raw data the calc and its verifier the checkCalc 
functions.  
Declarations  
(*Channel*) 
free a. 
(*Hash function*) 
fun h/1. 
(*Digital signature*) 
fun pk/1. 
fun sign/2. 
reduc checkSign(sign(m,k),pk(k)) = m. 
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private reduc getMess(sign(m,k)) = m. 
(*Coordinate calculator function*) 
fun calc/1. 
reduc checkCalc(calc(RD)) = RD. 
So, in the implementation of the task done by the two participants – Mobile Device 
and Certification Authority – a is a public communication channel on which the 
participants can communicate, h is the hash function, which is used to shorten the 
input messages. The pk method is defined to generate a public key for a digital 
signature process, with a secret key as an input parameter. The digital signature 
process is denoted by sign. To be able to check the correctness of the digital 
signatures, the checkSign function is created and to get back the original message 
from the signed message, the getMess function is used. The calc function can 
calculate accurate GPS coordinates from the raw data given by the satellites, and 
checkCalc is able to verify the result of the calculation of the GPS coordinates. One 
main process and two subprocesses – one for each participant – have to be created. 
In this proof, a reliable Mobile Device is considered.  
Mobile Device Process  
let processMD =  
    new m; 
      event startedMD(sskMD); 
    let h1 = h(m) in  
    let s1 = sign(h1,sskMD) in 
    new RD; 
    let h2 = h(RD) in 
    let s2 = sign(h2,sskMD) in 
    let GPSc = calc(RD) in 
    let h3 = h(GPSc) in 
    let s3 = sign(h3, sskMD) in 
    let h4 = h((h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3)) in 
    let s4 = sign(h4,sskMD) in  
    out(a,m); 
    out(a,(h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3,s4)); 
     event requestMD(h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3,s4); 
    in(a,(ALS,t2)); 
            event getALS(ALS,spkCA); 
    if getMess(ALS) = (h((h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3,s4)),t2) then 
     event DataTheSameMD();   
          if checkSign(ALS,spkCA) = (h((h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3,s4)),t2) then 
   event AcceptSignatureMD(spkCA). 
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Mobile Device Process starts with creating a new message and then follows the 
process of the higher safety level protocol explained earlier in Section 3.2.3.2. In the 
Mobile Device Process five events are defined, the following table shows the purpose 
of it. 
 
Table. 16. Events in the Mobile Device Process 
Name Parameter Explanation 
startedMD/1 The secret key of the Mobile 
Device 
Marks that the Mobile Device 
gets a new message to create a 
„location-stamp”. 
requestMD/7 Hash and original values of 
the signed message, raw 
data, and GPS data. 
Marks that the Mobile Device 
asked for a new „location-
stamp” for the Certification 
Authority. 
getALS/2 
 
Authenticated „location-
stamp” and the public key 
of the Certification 
Authority. 
Marks that the Mobile Device 
gets the Authenticated 
„location-stamp” from the 
Certification Authority. 
DataTheSameMD/0  Marks that the „location-
stamped” message is identical 
to the original one. 
AcceptSignatureMD/1 
 
The private key of the 
Certification Authority. 
Marks that the Certification 
Authority made the signature. 
 
Certification Authority Process  
let processCA = 
 in(a,m); 
  event startedCA(spkCA);  
 in(a,(h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3,s4)); 
  event getRequest(h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3,s4); 
 if getMess(s1) = h1 then 
  if getMess(s2) = h(RD) then 
   if getMess(s3) = h(GPSc) then 
    event DataTheSameCA(); 
if checkSign(s2,spkMD) = h(RD) then 
  event AcceptSignatureCA(sskMD); 
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  if checkCalc(GPSc) = RD then 
   event AcceptCoordinateCA(RD); 
let h5 = h((h1,RD,GPSc,s1,s2,s3,s4)) in 
 let ALS = (sign((h5,t2),sskCA)) in 
 out(a,(ALS,t2)); 
  event sendALS(ALS,sskCA). 
 
Certification Authority Process goes through the steps of the higher safety level 
protocol explained in Section 3.2.3.2. Events of the Certification Authority Process 
explained below. 
 
Table. 17. Events in the Certification Authority Process 
Name Parameter Explanation 
startedCA/1  The secret key of the 
Certification Authority 
Marks that the Certification 
Authority gets a new message 
from the Mobile Device to 
create a „location-stamp” on it. 
getRequest/7 Hash and original values of 
the signed message, raw 
data, and GPS data. 
Marks that the Certification 
Authority gets the request with 
the right properties. 
DataTheSameCA/0  Marks that the message sent by 
the Mobile Device is the same, 
which is in the request. 
AcceptSignatureCA/1 The private key of the 
Mobile Device. 
Marks that the message sent in 
the request is identical as the 
original one. 
AcceptCoordinateCA/1 
 
Raw satellite data. Marks that the GPS coordinate 
sent in the request can be 
calculated from the raw data 
sent in the request. 
 
  
57 
 
Main Process  
process 
    new sskMD; 
    new sskCA; 
    let spkMD = pk(sskMD) in 
    out(a,spkMD); 
    let spkCA = pk(sskCA) in 
    out(a,spkCA); 
    ((!processCA)| (!processMD)) 
 
Implementing the two processes for the participants makes it possible to create the 
main process. The protocol starts to run in the main process; the Mobile Device and 
the Certification Authority processes are called here. To be able to start running two 
secret keys have to be generated, sskMD is the secret key for the Mobile Device 
process, and sskCA is the secret key for the Certification Authority process. 
Corresponding public keys – spkMD and spkCA – then generated with the use of the 
pk function. Both public keys are published on the free channel a, allowing the 
opportunity to both participants to verify the source of the message, by verifying the 
digital signature made with the secret keys generated in this main process. The 
Certification Authority and the Mobile Device processes are called as parallel 
processes and repeat continuously. 
Proved properties  
Correctness proof with Applied-π, and ProVerif based on the declared events in the 
processes, here the correspondence between the earlier declared events are 
investigated.  Two types of relations can be examined, the correspondence assertion 
and the injective correspondence. Correspondence assertion is a 1:N (one to many) 
relation, while injective correspondence is 1:1 (one to one). The fundamental 
difference between the two types of correspondence that the injective one can 
prove only if an event occurred then the other event occurred too, correspondence 
assertion on another hand is able to prove how many times are one of the events 
occurred if the other one has occurred. To prove authenticity and data integrity 
correspondence assertions and injective correspondence are checked for events 
declared in the subprocesses of the participants.  
Authenticity is the property that proves that the origin of some information is the 
one who claims it to be as it is defined in Section 2.  
Definition 1.  
Let us state that our protocol fulfils authenticity if the following conditions hold: The 
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Mobile Device successfully authenticates the Certification Authority and the 
Certification Authority successfully authenticates the Mobile Device. 
 
Theorem  
Higher safety „location-stamping” protocol accomplishes the authenticity property 
defined above. 
 
Proof  
CA and MD authentication are achieved because the following queries return the 
logical value true: 
(*Proof of the authentication of MD to CA*)   
query ev:AcceptSignatureCA(x) ==> ev:startedMD(x). 
(*Proof of the authentication of CA to MD*)   
query ev:AcceptSignatureMD(x) ==> ev:startedCA(x). 
 
Data Integrity is a property that provides that a message is not altered through any 
process as it is defined in Section 2. 
 
Definition  
Let us state that our protocol fulfils Data Integrity if the following conditions hold: 
The M(message), RD(raw data) and the GPSc(GPS coordinate) sent by the MD has 
not been tampered through the transmission, and the ALS(authentic „location-
stamp”) sent by the CA has not been tampered through the transmission. 
 
Theorem 
Higher safety „„location-stamping”” protocol accomplishes the Data Integrity 
property. 
 
Proof 
Data Integrity is achieved because the following queries return the logical value 
true: 
(*Proof of data integrity for CA*) 
query ev: DataTheSameCA(). 
(*Proof of data integrity for MD*) 
query ev: DataTheSameMD(). 
Complexity 
Determining the computational complexity of a „location-stamping” protocol 
requires examination of one single run of the protocol according to the number of 
the performed operations. Six hash prints, seven digital signings, three digital 
signature verifications, and two GPS coordinates determination from raw data are 
required to generate a „location-stamp”. Furthermore, it is necessary to know the 
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computational complexity of the used cryptographic primitives, so it has to be 
considered which hash function and digital signature scheme have the least 
computational complexity. Based on [95] the computational complexity of the RSA 
digital signature is 𝑂(𝑛3) and ElGamal digital signature is 𝑂(𝑛3) also, where n is the 
size of the binary representation of the modulus, which is also the size of the key.  
The computational complexity of the determination of GPS coordinates from the raw 
data can be ignored, because the size of the raw input data is always the same, nor 
the size of the message that has to be „location-stamped” nor the type of the 
signature or hash function is affected by it. The computational complexity of the 
different types of hash functions like Message Digest Algorithm (MD) and Secure 
Hash Algorithm (SHA) is 𝑂(𝑛). That means, the complexity of our algorithm is based 
only on the type of the digital signature. So, higher safety solution „location-
stamping” protocol has an 𝑂(𝑛3) computational complexity with wether the RSA 
digital signature or the ElGamal signature scheme is used. 
3.2.3.5 APPLICATION OF THE PROTOCOL 
The higher-level protocol is built in a portable electronic device, which has been 
patented by the University of Debrecen in the US, with the name of “Portable 
electronic device, system, and method for authenticating a document associated 
with a geographical location”. A summary of the patent application is given here, in 
detail the technical description can be found in [96]. In a portable electronic device, 
a method of authenticating a document associated with a geographical location is 
disclosed. A document is provided in the form of digital data, and a hash value is 
generated from the digital data of the said document. Raw GPS data are received 
from at least one GPS satellite, and then digitally signed by a first private key of the 
portable electronic device. From the raw GPS data, exact GPS coordinates are 
calculated. A request for an authentic „location-stamp” is sent to a certification unit, 
the request containing at least the hash value of the document, the raw GPS data, 
and the exact GPS coordinates, wherein said request is digitally signed by a private 
key of the portable electronic device. In response to said „location-stamp” request, 
a nonce value from the certification unit is received, said nonce value is digitally 
signed by a private key of the certification unit. A certification request is then sent 
to the certification unit, said request containing at least the hash value of the 
document, the raw GPS data, the exact GPS coordinates and the nonce value, 
wherein the certification request is digitally signed with said private key of the 
portable electronic device. In response to said certification request, a certified 
„location-stamp” containing said certification request and a piece of time 
information is received, said „location-stamp” being digitally signed by a private key 
of the certification unit. The certified „location-stamp” is verified by using the 
corresponding public key of the certification unit, and if it is determined that the 
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certification unit signs the certified „location-stamp”, the certified „location-stamp” 
will be assigned to the document. The basic structure of the system and the 
operation flow of the algorithm is displayed in Figures 19., 20. and 21. 
 
 Structure of the system 
 
 Structure of the Portable Electronic Device 
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 The operation flow of the system 
   
RD RD 
GPSc 
SAS(H,RD,GPSc) 
SCA(n) 
REJECT 
SAS(H,RD,GPSc,n) 
SCA(SAS(H,RD,GPSc,n),TIME) 
REJECT 
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3 MODBUS PROTOCOL 
In this section, the security breaches of critical infrastructures – the infrastructures 
that are crucial for the regular operation of any country –  are investigated. Critical 
infrastructures are supervised with SCADA systems and here one fundamental 
building block of such SCADA systems, namely the Modbus RTU industrial 
communication protocol, is overviewed. The section is focusing on the security 
problems, and lack of security of Modbus protocols and a secure Modbus RTU 
protocol is presented.  
4.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND APPLICATIONS 
4.1.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
“The Modbus serial communications protocol is a de facto standard designed to 
integrate PLCs (Programmable Logic Controller), computers, terminals, sensors, and 
actuators” [97]. 
Modbus was initially designed and made by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 
1979 to “establish master-slave/client-server communication between intelligent 
devices” [98]. Modbus is used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS), where different 
processes run in parallel, like reading sensors, controlling actuators, transferring data 
to operate or automate industrial processes.  NIST defines the ICS in [99] like it is “an 
information system used to control industrial processes such as manufacturing, 
product handling, production, and distribution. Industrial control systems include 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) used to control 
geographically dispersed assets, as well as Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and 
smaller control systems using Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) to control 
localized processes.” ICS can be classified by the functionality, the size and the level 
of automation. The four main types of ICSs are the PLC, DCS, SCADA and the 
Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS). In this dissertation, the focus is 
on the SCADA systems, more precisely on those SCADA systems which control 
processes of Critical Infrastructures (CIS). In 2019 sixteen sectors were marked by 
the Department of Homeland Security of the USA as critical infrastructures, such as 
the communication sector, the emergency services sector, the energy sector, the 
healthcare, and public health sector, the transportation sector, the information 
technology sector or the water and wastewater systems sector [100]. 
In 1976 the first distributed loop controller the TDC-2000 controller was introduced 
by Honeywell, which resulted in the rapid spread of ICSs and started the history of 
such communication protocols like Modbus. Communication between devices made 
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by different manufacturers, like sensors, actuators, or terminals in any ICS system 
requires converters between different physical implementations, agreements on the 
data encoding, error checking, type of channels and on many other essential 
properties of the network and indeed a common language for the communication. 
The ISO (International Organization of Standardization) in 1984 made a model to 
standardize the communication between different digital devices, namely the OSI 
(Open System Interconnection) reference model [101]. The recommendation of the 
reference model is overviewed in the following introduction. The model contains 
seven different layers, where every layer is served by the layer underlying, and every 
layer is responsible for different aspects of the communication process. A common 
framework is given by the model to the network designers to unify the architecture 
of the communication.  In Figure 22. the layers of the ISO/OSI model can be seen. 
 
 ISO/OSI model 
The lowermost layer is responsible for the physical connection, precise parameters 
of the used physical media; the structure of the network is defined and realized here.  
It provides mechanical, electrical, functional and procedural methods. The stability 
of the network is based on this layer because the physical connection is activated, 
maintained and deactivated here. Two more layers are responsible for physical 
aspects aka hardware of the network, the data link, and the network layer. The data 
link layer provides error and access control over the physical layer. Routers and 
gateways are set up by the network layer, and several configuration parameters are 
defined here. Transport, session, presentation and application layers deal with the 
software structure of the network. The transport layer protocol provides 
optimization of the available services. The session layer synchronizes and manages 
the data exchange, while the purpose of the presentation layer is to provide a 
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common representation of the data transferred by the applications. Application is 
the uppermost layer of the ISO/OSI reference model and deals with the data 
exchange between applications directly. 
A certain number of communication protocols were designed during the past half-
decade to solve the communication between different devices in ICSs.  At the time 
of the spreading ICSs, the communication protocols which standardized the 
communication in the abovementioned network started to appear. In the beginning 
serial bus connection was used as an underlying physical media, and the early 
protocols mostly give recommendations only for the physical and data link layer of 
the ISO/OSI reference model. Later the Ethernet protocol [102] was made as a 
standard for the two lowermost layers of the ISO/OSI reference model. The 
recommended underlying physical media has changed, and both parallel and serial 
connections can be realized with the use of Ethernet. Based on [103] in 2017, serial 
bus protocols serve 48%, and Ethernet-based protocols serve 46% of the worldwide 
industrial network usage. The most important and widely used serial protocols are 
chronologically the Modbus RTU (1979), the Profibus (1987), the DeviceNet (1994) 
and the CANopen (1995). All the beforementioned protocols adapted to the changes 
and can be used based on Ethernet standard too; these protocols called Modbus 
TCP/IP, Profinet, Ethernet/IP and EtherCAT COE respectively. In Figure 23., the 
relative popularity of serial bus and ethernet protocols can be seen. 
 
 The relative popularity of industrial protocols [103] 
The previously mentioned communication protocols realize the layers of the ISO/OSI 
reference model, but usually not all the seven. Serial Modbus collapsed into three 
layers, the physical, the data link, and the application layers are defined only. 
Ethernet itself contains the physical and the data link layer; thus, Ethernet-based 
Modbus defines the two lowermost layers, the network layer, and the application 
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layer. Profibus uses the same three layers like serial Modbus, and Profinet realizes 
the network and the transport layers additionally. DeviceNet implements physical, 
data link, transport, and network layers, upper layers are provided by the CIP 
(Common Industrial Protocols), Ethernet/IP implements all the seven layers. 
CANopen uses the physical, the data link, the transport, and the application layers of 
the ISO/OSI in the case of EtherCAT COE only the presentation and the session layers 
are not implemented.  
As it is mentioned earlier communication protocols as Modbus serve the primary 
basis for the ICS system, especially for SCADA designed to supervise and maintain 
critical infrastructures. In the following, the technical documentation of the Modbus 
protocol is overviewed [104], [105], [106]. The Modbus standard defines three 
modes for digital devices in a SCADA to communicate. The three different Modbus 
standards are the Modbus RTU, the Modbus ASCII, and the Modbus TCP/IP, RTU, 
and ASCII modes are part of the serial line standard, while TCP/IP mode is ethernet 
based. Modbus RTU and Modbus ASCII are referred to as Modbus Over Serial Line 
and Modbus TCP/IP as Modbus Application Protocol in the technical documentation. 
RTU and ASCII modes are defining the data link layer of the ISO/OSI reference model, 
while the TCP/IP mode is defining the application layer of it. The connection between 
Modbus and ISO/OSI reference model can be seen in Figure 24.  
 
 ISO/OSI reference model and Modbus 
4.1.1.1 MODBUS OVER SERIAL LINE 
The serial line Modbus protocol is located on the data link layer of the ISO/OSI 
reference model. Under serial communication, a bit by bit transmission of the data 
is meant, on a single path over a cable.  The underlying physical connection is realized 
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over RS-232 (Recommended Standard 232) [107] or RS-485 (Recommended 
Standard 485) [108] data transmission standards. Data transmission standards such 
as the beforementioned, define important properties, like voltage levels (line 
voltage, received signal voltage, operation voltage), line impedances, baud rate, 
underlying media, or type of connectors. Shielded or unshielded twisted pair cables 
can be applied, and there is no specific connector designed to the standard. Simple, 
half-duplex, and full-duplex connections can be realized. While RS-232 is able to 
bridge at most 15 meters, the RS-485 up to 1200 meters. 
Serial line Modbus is a Master-Slave protocol, thus on a serial bus, a single Master 
node – at a specific time – and up to 247 Slave nodes can be connected. The Master 
node controls communication. Request-response communication pattern is used, 
under what the following communication process is meant. Every connected Slave 
node has a unique address on the bus; it is a number from 1 to 247. Only the Master 
device can initiate a request, two addressing modes can be used, namely unicast and 
broadcast mode. The two addressing modes displayed in the following figure. 
 
 Unicast and broadcast mode in Modbus over Serial Line 
In unicast mode, one individual Slave node is addressed at a time, and in broadcast 
mode, the 0 address is used to address all the Slave nodes at the same time. Every 
Slave node has to be able to recognize the 0 address, which as it is mentioned before, 
reserved for the broadcast mode. Slave nodes cannot initiate requests, only able to 
respond to the request of the Master node, although the response has to be 
addressed to the Master. There is no address assigned to the Master node because 
only one Master can be installed on a network like the above. Slave nodes cannot 
communicate with each other.   
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Modbus protocol is using a specific frame structure to standardize the 
communication over a serial line. The frame contains an address field, a function 
code, the data and an error checking field as it is displayed in Figure 26.  
 
 Modbus Serial Line PDU 
The address field contains the address of the individual Slave node if the Master is 
in unicast mode, or 0 if the Master is in broadcast mode. Function codes determine 
the actions that have to be performed by the Slave node. Function code 01 is, for 
example, force the addressed Slave device to read the ON/OFF status of discrete coils 
or function code 17 returns with a description of the addressed Slave node. Valid 
function codes are in the 1-255 range. The Data field contains parameters that are 
necessary to process the requests or responses. Parameters like, the amount of the 
coils that have to be checked for ON/OFF status or the number of the first coil in the 
case of function code 01. Error checking field provides integrity validation method 
for the Slave nodes and confirmation of message validation for the Master.  
The Modbus data link layer differs in the transmission mode in the case of Modbus 
RTU and Modbus ASCII. The two transmission modes define the content of the 
Modbus Serial Line Protocol Data Unit (PDU) a.k.a. the Modbus frame differently. 
Before sending, transmitted Modbus message is forced into a specific frame by the 
transmitter device. Transmission mode on one serial bus has to be the same for every 
device at a certain time. In the case of Modbus RTU Slave 1 byte is reserved for both 
the address and the function code, 2 bytes for the error checking field and at most 
252 bytes for the data field of the PDU.  In Modbus ASCII 2 characters are reserved 
either for the address, the function code, and the error checking field and up to 
2x256 characters for the data field of the PDU. The frames of the two transmission 
modes are displayed in Figures 27. and 28.  
 
 Modbus RTU frame 
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 Modbus ASCII frame 
 
Either the starting or ending points of a single frame is denoted by at least 3.5-
characters times long silence in the case of Modbus RTU if the silent interval is longer 
than 1.5-characters times during the transmission the frame is considered 
incomplete. Modbus ASCII denotes the start of the frame with one character 
especially the hexadecimal ASCII code of the ‘colon’ and the ending point with two 
special characters, namely the pair of hexadecimal ASCII values of ‘carriage return’ 
and ‘line feed’. If the silent interval is longer than 1 second, then it is considered as 
an error in the actual transmitted frame.  
Transmission mode differs in not just the structure and content of the Modbus frame 
but the method applied for error checking. Cyclical Redundancy Checking (CRC) is 
used in Modbus RTU and Longitudinal Redundancy Checking (LRC) for Modbus 
ASCII. Both CRC and LRC values are calculated and appended to the original message 
by the transmitter and recalculated and compared by the receiver.  Calculated and 
recalculated values have to be the same. CRC field contains a 16-bit binary value, 
which is calculated following the steps below: 
1. Fill the 16–bit long CRC register with ‘1’-s. 
2. XOR the first 8–bit of the message with the first 8-bit of the CRC register, 
then put the result into the CRC register.  
3. Shift the CRC register one bit to the right and add a 0 to the most significant 
bit.  
4. If the just deleted least significant bit was 0, then repeat the third step. 
Otherwise XOR the CRC register with 1010 0000 0000 0001.  
5. Repeat the third and fourth steps until eight shifts have been performed.  
6. Repeat steps second, third, fourth and fifth for the next eight bits of the 
message. Continue doing this until all bytes have been processed.  
7. The final content of the CRC register is the CRC value.  
8. When the CRC is placed into the message, its upper and lower bytes must be 
swapped. [104] 
LRC contains an 8-bit binary value, which is generated by executing the following 
steps: 
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1. Add all successive eight bits in the message into an eight bits field, except 
for the starting and ending characters, and every carrying bit has to be 
discarded.  
2. Calculate the twos–complement of the final eight bits field. [104] 
Data integrity is supposed to be provided by the CRC and LRC between the Master 
and the Slave. Both CRC and LRC are hash values of the message in the sense of 
Section 2. However, without a cryptographically secure channel, the 
beforementioned methods prove only that the content of the message is not altered 
between the claimed Master and the addressed Slave and vice versa. Neither the 
Slave nor the Master can satisfyingly authenticate themselves, and a secure channel 
between the participants cannot be set, because of the lack of security 
considerations in the Modbus over Serial Line Protocol.  
4.1.1.2 MODBUS TCP/ IP 
Modbus TCP/IP is located on the application layer of the ISO/OSI model, and the 
technical specification has stated [105] that it provides communication between 
devices connected over different industrial buses. On the transport layer, the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) on the network layer, the Internet Protocol (IP) 
forms a basis for communication. Physical and data link layers of the ISO/OSI 
reference model can be implemented by the Modbus Serial Line Protocol and by 
Ethernet, although the latter is the recommended and more commonly used. 
Modbus protocol is using a specific frame structure to standardize the 
communication between applications, this frame is independent of the different 
implementations of the lower layers. However, the PDU part of the frame is inherited 
from the Modbus over serial line protocol. That PDU contains only a function code 
and the data as it is displayed in Figure 29.  
 
 Modbus Application Protocol PDU 
Function code is represented on one byte; data field can contain at most 252 bytes. 
The Modbus TCP/IP frame contains several additional information, the transaction 
identifier, the protocol identifier, the length, and the unit identifier in the given 
order. The beforementioned extra fields constitute the Modbus Application Header 
(MBAP). MBAP and the PDU together form the message frame of the Modbus 
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TCP/IP, namely the Modbus TCP/IP Application Data Unit (ADU).  Modbus TCP/IP is 
a client/server protocol, where the communication is set up by the client, and the 
server is only able to respond to those requests until the client closes the connection. 
Multiple transactions are enabled for the client, but servers can communicate with 
only one client at a time, concurrent communication is denied for the servers. 
Modbus ADU is displayed in Figure 30.  
 
 
 Modbus TCP/IP ADU 
In a message, the transaction identifier is used to identify/pair requests and 
responses. The protocol identifier is always 0 – this field identifies the Modbus 
protocol –, the length field contains the number of bytes of the remained part of the 
ADU. The unit identifier identifies slaves on the underlying serial bus network, and 
function code determines the actions that have to be executed on the server-side of 
the communication, while the data field contains information that is indispensable 
to be able to complete the requested actions. For example, the length of the data 
field or the address of the necessary registers, although the data field can be empty 
as well.  
4.1.1.3 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SCADA SYSTEM 
At the beginning of this section, the SCADA system was briefly defined, more 
detailed definitions of SCADA are quoted below. In [109], Boyer defines SCADA as 
“the technology that enables a user to collect data from one or more distant facilities 
and/or send limited control instructions to those facilities.”  In the IEEE standard 
[110] SCADA is “a system operating with coded signals over communication channels 
so as to provide control of RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) equipment.”  Carke et al. in 
[111] state that “SCADA refers to the combination of telemetry and data acquisition. 
SCADA encompasses the collecting of the information via an RTU (Remote Terminal 
Unit), transferring it back to the central site, carrying out any necessary analysis and 
control and then displaying that information on a number of operator screens or 
displays. The required control actions are then conveyed back to the process.” As it 
can be seen from the beforementioned definitions SCADA systems are developed to 
monitor, collect real-time data, to control system performance, detect and handle 
abnormalities, manage different devices in industrial systems. Like the water-, 
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wastewater pipelines, electric power distribution networks, building automation 
systems, industrial process automation systems, manufacturing, and public 
transportation.  
SCADA system consists of different components, such as the Operator, the Human 
Machine Interface (HMI), the Supervisory System, the Communication Network, 
the Remote Terminal Units (RTU), the PLCs, the Sensors, the Actuators and other 
types of equipment based on [112]. The main task of the Operator is to react on the 
system feedbacks via HMI, what is that part of the system which is able to report and 
display the system status and provide functionality for the Operator to intervene. 
The Supervisory System can be one single PC or several servers depending on the 
size of the system, and it behaves as a server between the HMI and the RTU and PLC. 
Under Communication Network, the underlying physical media or wireless 
connection and the applied communication method are meant. RTUs and PLCs 
implement the connection between field devices and HMI. Control signals are sent, 
and the RTU and PLC collect the required data. Sensors and Actuators are field 
devices, which carry out the measurements and required actions. Sensors are 
responsible for measuring different characteristics of the system. Actuators, 
however, are planted into the system to change desired characteristics.  In Figure 31. 
the architecture of a typical SCADA system can be seen. 
 
 Typical SCADA infrastructure adapted from [113] (icons from 
Nounproject.com) 
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4.1.2 APPLICATIONS RELATED TO MY RESEARCH 
Modbus is typically used in SCADA systems, which maintain oil, gas, water-, 
wastewater pipelines, electric power distribution networks, building automation 
systems, industrial process automation systems, manufacturing, public 
transportation systems, and healthcare systems. SCADA systems mentioned above 
vary in size from a low number of participating equipment to large facilities.  
In this section, three different sized SCADA systems are presented. The first example 
is based on an idea published in [114]. This SCADA system is able to supervise the 
drug infusion pump connected to a patient remotely. In this system, a drug infusion 
pump and sensors are connected to the human body, where the pump serves as an 
actuator.  Sensors are there to monitor the health status of the patient, measuring 
different vital signs. Actuators like the drug infusion pump are there to change the 
condition of the patient for example with the injection of the right amount and right 
type of drugs, based on the vital signs measured by the sensors. If such a patient’s 
cure is supported by the pump, who is suffering from diabetes, then the pump is 
responsible for infusion of insulin, and the sensors measure the sugar level of the 
blood, the pulse and the blood oxygen. The amount of injected insulin can be 
changed by the pump automatically, by the patient via a PDA or by the doctor via 
the healthcare system. All options require the analysis of the data collected by the 
sensor, which is displayed by the Health Monitor PDA or by the HMI. A SCADA system 
such as the beforementioned one is designed to simplify and facilitate the healing 
process. The simplified architecture of the SCADA system above is displayed in Figure 
32. Communication between the field devices and the controller is wired, and 
wireless between the controller and the HMI. Modbus RTU and Modbus TCP/IP 
communication standards are applied in the system. In the simplified structure, only 
those connections are labelled where the Modbus protocol is used. 
 
 Simplified architecture of a Healthcare SCADA system 
The second example is a SCADA system which is supervising the automation of a 
smart building of the Mechatronics Research Centre of the Faculty of Engineering of 
the University of Debrecen. The researchers of the Centre have designed and 
constructed an intelligent and sustainable building. The principal aim of this SCADA 
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system is to monitor the energy consumption of the building and keep all the 
properties of it on the desired level to achieve energy efficiency. For the proper 
functioning of a building like this, many different data are needed. To measure the 
inner and outer parameters of the research center, sensors are installed, and a 
comprehensive measurement network is built, which is able to collect and analyze 
the characteristic of the research center and its environment. Installed actuator 
devices are able to modify the operating parameters of the building. The SCADA 
system is consisted of several different sensor and actuator devices, a Sun server to 
manage the collected data and a PC which serves as the HMI in the system. Sensors 
are the following: gas-flow meter, heat-flow meter, thermal zone occupancy meter, 
meteorological station, global solar radiator meter, and an internal wireless sensor 
network. With the listed sensors the amount of the used gas, the amount of the 
transferred heat, the number of people at a given time in a given thermal zone, the 
speed of the wind, the direction of the wind, the duration of the rainfall, the intensity 
of the rainfall, the external air pressure, the radiation of the sun, the inner 
temperature, the inner air pressure, and the humidity can be measured respectively. 
Actuator devices are the rotatable solar collectors, the rotatable solar-cells, the mini 
wind turbine, and the heat pump system [115]. Based on the data provided by the 
sensors, the properties of the actuators – like rotation angles of the solar collectors 
and solar cells, or the amount of electricity generated by the wind turbines – can be 
changed to keep the building in an energy-efficient state. The simplified structure of 
the system is displayed in Figure 33. In the simplified structure, only those 
connections are labelled where the Modbus protocol is used. 
 
 Simplified architecture of the SCADA system of the Building Mechatronics 
Research Center 
The third example is the SCADA system of a water and wastewater plant, which 
supervises and controls the collection of wastewater and distribution of water [116]. 
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“Water distribution and wastewater collection systems often spread out over large 
geographical areas. In such systems, elevated water storage tanks and gravity 
provide most of the energy to create a flow to your faucet through underground 
pipes. Pumps are used to fill the tanks, and may also be needed at strategic points 
to ensure adequate pressure in the water distribution system” [117]. SCADA system 
of this plant contains several HMIs – Central Base Station – which controls or 
monitors the pumps via RTUs or directly. HMIs can connect to the pump via a serial 
connection, telephone network, wifi or radio. The Modbus RTU communication 
protocol realizes serial connection. The presented SCADA system contains several 
layers because of security considerations, firewalls and backup databases are 
installed in the system. In Figure 34. that part of the SCADA system which controls 
the pumps can be seen. 
 
 SCADA system of a water and wastewater collector and distributor plant 
[116] 
4.1.3 ATTACKS AGAINST SCADA AND MODBUS  
Over time SCADA systems among other ICS systems are increasingly exposed to 
cyberattacks, which can maliciously modify the proper operation of the system or 
destroy the entire system. Mostly those SCADA systems were targeted by cyber-
security incidents, which supervise and maintain critical infrastructures. 
Consequences of such cyberattacks can not only be financial loss or devastating 
reputation, but it can be extremely detrimental in health and safety. In this section, 
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a brief historical introduction is given about the reported cyber attacks that have 
happened during the last 50 years based on the corresponding scientific literature 
[118], [119], [120], [121], [122]. 
There is no consensus on the statement given by Reed in [123] that the explosion 
which destroyed some part of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline near Tobolsk in 1982 
was a cyberattack or not but in this dissertation, it is considered as the first 
cyberattack against SCADA systems that was ever reported. The attack based on the 
injection of a Trojan virus into the SCADA system that controlled the gas pipeline and 
resulted in an explosion which was equivalent to three kilotons of TNT.  According to 
Reed, the attack was planned and executed by the CIA during the Cold War. The 
attack was realized through inserting maliciously modified building blocks into the 
SCADA system, thus locally causing the damage. The financial loss was significant. 
In 1992 the emergency alert system of the Chevron Refinery in Richmond California 
was disabled for 10 hours by a former employee hacking into the computers of the 
firm [124]. Thousands of people across the USA and Canada were at risk during the 
outage of the system, because the attack was discovered only when a toxic 
substance was leaked, and the alert was not generated. The attack was realized 
through remote access to the system. The ultimate damage magnitude was slight, 
but lives were threatened.  
SCADA system of the Salt River Project – which maintained and supervised about a 
210 km long canal system – was hacked via a dial-up modem in 1994 in Phoenix USA. 
The hacker gained information about the personnel and financial records of the 
customers and login passwords of employees among many other sensitive data. The 
attack was realized through remote access to the system. Physical damage 
magnitude was negligible, but a significant amount of sensitive data were stolen.  
With the help of an employee, a Trojan virus is infected the SCADA system of the 
Gazprom in Russia and allowed hackers to gain access to the control board of the 
system, which controlled the gas flow in 1999. The system restored quickly, caused 
damage magnitude was negligible. The attack was realized through local and remote 
access to the system.  
In 2000 in Australia, a former employee of the Maroochy Water System hacked into 
the SCADA system, which supervised and maintained the wastewater plant. The 
hacker afterwards released 1 million litres of sewage into a river and a hotel. The 
attack was realized through remote access to the system. Significant environmental 
damage occurred, and the financial and reputational loss was severe too.  
In January of 2003, the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant of Ohio was attacked by a 
worm named “Slammer”. The SCADA system of the plant was disabled. Fortunately, 
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the plant was shut down and was in a “safety defueled condition” [125] because of 
repair. A computer of an employee got infected by a worm via a dial-up modem. The 
attack was realized through remote access to the system, and no significant damage 
occurred.  
In August of 2003, an extensive power outage happened in the northeast part of the 
USA and Ontario. Sixty million inhabitants left without electricity and several critical 
infrastructures cannot operate in the usual and necessary way. According to Eugen 
Kaspersky [126] the head of Kaspersky Lab, hackers used malware to take over the 
control of the SCADA system of the power grid and disabled the warning system. The 
disabled warning system and some too tall trees caused the complete shutdown of 
the power grid. The power blackout resulted in several otherwise avoidable deaths 
and billions of dollars losses. It is not known how the hackers gain access to the 
system, remotely or locally.  
In Poland in 2008, a juvenile hacked the SCADA system of the tram network, with a 
DIY infrared remote control. Due to the attack, four trains were derailed, and 12 
people got injured.  
In 2010 a cyber-attack was planned and executed by the intelligence agencies of the 
US and Israel. The aim of the attack was not only to gain access over a SCADA system 
but to delay or halt the Iranian nuclear weaponization, via ruin the uranium 
centrifuges of the Iranian nuclear plant in Natanz. The worm was planted via a USB 
stick locally. Stuxnet – the worm used in the attack – infected the computers of the 
SCADA system in the nuclear plant, and through the computers, those special 
Siemens PLC-s were connected to the uranium centrifuges. The worm destroyed the 
centrifuges through increasing the operating time and continuously switching 
between low and high frequency of the rotors. As a result, the Iranian atomic 
program was delayed [127], [128]. 
In 2011 a malware called Night Dragon targeted the SCADA systems of numerous 
energy plants in Western Europe and the USA. The pishing activity was detected 
during the attacks, which was originated from China. The attacks were active Chinese 
time between 9 am and 5 pm for several months [129]. The attacks were realized via 
remote access, and a significant amount of specific data and intellectual property 
were stolen.  
The number of cyber-attacks continues to grow, and the above presented cases 
forms only a small portion of the cyberwar. Below the top twelve cyberattacks are 
listed from 2019 based on [130]. 
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Table. 18. Cyberattacks in 2019 
January “US Department of Justice neutralizes a North Korean botnet used to 
target critical infrastructure sector and other essential services. 
March Thousands of employees at over 200 oil-and-gas and heavy machinery 
companies worldwide targeted by Iranian hackers exposing confidential 
corporate data. 
March Saudi Arabian and US Government industry digital infrastructure targeted 
by  Iranian cyberespionage group. 
April Bayer Pharmaceutical company announced an unsuccessful attack by 
Chinese hackers. 
June NERC warns that a suspected Russian hacking group was snooping on the 
electrical utilities’ network. 
July Chinese state-sponsored hackers conduct cyberattacks against employees 
of three major US utility companies. 
September Seventeen US utility companies targeted by a Chinese state-sponsored 
hacking group. 
October North Korean malware found in Indian nuclear power plant networks. 
November Major manufacturers and operators of ICSs employee accounts targeted by 
Iranian hackers” [130]. 
4.2 OWN RESEARCH 
4.2.1 REVEALED WEAKNESSES 
The Modbus RTU protocol does not include any security considerations. During the 
design process, the main features of the Modbus protocol were reliability, speed, 
and accessibility. However, the security of the used channel, thus authentication of 
the participants, confidentiality, data integrity, and freshness of the messages were 
left out, so not provided. Our research addressed to find the vulnerabilities of a 
Modbus RTU based SCADA system. The following table contains the liabilities of 
Modbus RTU, which are revealed from the related scientific literature. 
Table. 19. Vulnerabilities of the Modbus RTU protocol 
Lack of Confidentiality [131] 
Lack of Integrity [131] 
Lack of Authentication [131] 
Sensibility for the Man in the middle (MITM) attack [132] 
Sensibility for the Denial of Service Attack (DoS) [133] 
Possibility of Interception [134] Slave Reconnaissance 
Modbus Network Scanning etc 
Possibility of Interruption [134] Remote Restart 
Baseline Response Replay etc. 
Possibility of Modification [134] Diagnostic Register Attack 
Possibility of Fabrication [134] Direct Slave Control etc. 
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The results of the analysis of the Modbus RTU protocol was summarized with the 
manageable and straightforward ”Attack Tree Method” [135]. “Attack trees provide 
a formal, methodical way of describing the security of systems, based on varying 
attacks. You represent attacks against a system in a tree structure, with the goal as 
the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes” [135]. The 
attack tree consists of AND and OR nodes.  “Each node becomes a subgoal, and 
children of that node are ways to achieve that subgoal. OR nodes are used to 
represent alternatives, and AND nodes are used to represent different steps toward 
achieving the same goal” [136]. AND nodes are in a parent-children relationship with 
each other, OR nodes are siblings to each other. To every node, a specific value is 
assigned, it is ‘P’ (possible) if the attack is possible to realize at the given time, ‘I’ 
(impossible) otherwise.  The value of an OR node is equal to ‘P’ if any of its children 
assigned value is ‘P’, and ‘I’ if all of its children have the value ‘I’. The value of an AND 
node is ’P’ only if all children have the value ‘P’, and ‘I’ otherwise.  
During the construction of the attack-tree, three possible layers are defined to 
determine the level of the possible protection. Any Modbus RTU based SCADA 
system can be protected physically and algorithmically. Under the term physically, 
acts like locked doors, thick walls, security guards, or hidden slaves and masters are 
meant.  
Physical protection can be divided into two separate parts, external physical 
protection, and internal physical protection. External protection provides a 
protected and safe environment for the system. While internal physical protection 
prevents the physical damage, exchange, or modification of the devices that are 
parts of the system.  
Algorithmic protection means the protection of the applied communication and 
measurements in the system. The focus is on the algorithmic security of the Modbus 
RTU protocol, although the attack-tree displays the physical security levels of the 
Modbus RTU based SCADA system but the methods that can realize such events are 
not examined in this dissertation., such as the well-known social engineering. The 
completed attack-tree is presented in Figure 35. 
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 Attack Tree of a Modbus RTU based SCADA system  
With this technique, the system can be examined from several points of view. The 
first viewpoint is to determine the possible purpose of the malicious attacker. The 
goals of the attacker are narrowed down to four types of attacks; these are the root 
elements of the attack tree. First is the interception of data like monitoring the 
channel, then the interruption of the communication - it can be caused by for 
example a DoS attack -, the third one is the modification of the messages, and the 
last one is the fabrication of the data. The second viewpoint is to uncover 
vulnerabilities in the SCADA system, so answering the question, how a malicious 
attacker gains access to any part of it. The branches of the attack-tree symbolize the 
revealed vulnerabilities. Based on the completed attack-tree, the attacks can be 
realized through impacted malicious devices, compromised slaves or masters, all of 
these attacks are different realizations of the Man in the Middle attack. The paths 
from the root to the leaves define all the considered attacks against Modbus RTU 
based SCADA systems, like planting gateways or compromised slave or master 
devices into the SCADA system. The first root element of the tree is the interception 
of the data. During interception, the attacker captures messages sent over the 
network, thus acquiring information about the parameters and operation of the 
system, so the confidentiality of the data and the system is harmed by this attack.  
The interception can be realized in the following ways, the cases given below are 
describing three paths from the attack-tree. 
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• Access to the system physically → Install a gateway between master and slaves  
→ Interception 
• Access to the system physically → Add compromised Slave to the system → 
Interception 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Master to the system → 
Interception 
The second root is the interruption,  the goal of the attacker there is to decrease the 
effectiveness of the system or to manipulate the properties of it, or overload the 
system to shut it down. Compromising the regular operation of the system is 
endangering the data integrity and the authenticity of the participants. The 
interruption can be realized in the following ways, the cases given below are 
describing three paths from the attack-tree. 
• Access to the system physically → Install a gateway between master and slaves  
→ Send modified data to the Master → Interruption 
• Access to the system physically → Install a gateway between master and slaves  
→ Send huge amount of data into the system → Interruption 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Master to the system  → 
Send huge amount of data into the system → Interruption 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Slave to the system  → 
Send huge amount of data into the system → Interruption 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Slave to the system  → 
Send modified data to the Master → Interruption 
The third root is the modification, under what the modification of messages – sent 
over the channel – by any unauthorized person is meant, harming the data integrity 
and confidentiality properties. The modification can be realized in the following 
ways, the cases given below are describing three paths from the attack-tree. 
• Access to the system physically → Install a gateway between master and slaves  
→ Send modified data to the Slave → Modification 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Slave to the system  → 
Send modified data to the Slave → Modification 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Master to the system  → 
Send modified data to the Slave → Modification 
The fourth root is fabrication. During the fabrication, a malicious attacker 
impersonates an authorized user and send fabricated message to the participants of 
the system. Many properties of security are lost as a result of this attack, like data 
integrity, the authenticity of the participant and confidentiality. The fabrication can 
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be realized in the following ways, the cases given below are describing three paths 
from the attack-tree. 
• Access to the system physically → Install a gateway between master and slaves  
→ Send modified data to the Slave → Fabrication 
• Access to the system physically → Install a gateway between master and slaves  
→ Send modified data to the Master → Fabrication 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Slave to the system  → 
Send modified data to the Slave → Modification 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Slave to the system  → 
Send modified data to the Master → Modification 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Master to the system  → 
Send modified data to the Slave → Modification 
• Access to the system physically → Add  compromised Master to the system  → 
Send modified data to the Master → Modification 
4.2.2 EXISTING SOLUTIONS FOR THE REVEALED WEAKNESSES 
The Modbus protocol is widely used in SCADA systems as it is mentioned in Section 
4.1.2. The protocol is comprehensively studied and tested according to the related 
scientific literature, but the tests are mostly focusing on the Modbus TCP/IP protocol. 
Modbus RTU is usually examined based on different aims to achieve, like to improve 
the transmission quality or to detect and correct errors or to find the maliciously 
modified messages during transmission.  
For instance, Urrea et al. in [137],  designed a particular modem – that has to be 
applied in the master and the slave device also – which concatenate two parity bits 
to the messages defined by a Reed-Solomon code to be able to detect and correct 
errors in the messages. “These modems will have the task of receiving the Modbus 
messages of the associated device, code it, and send the resultant parity bits in the 
time-spaces through the data bus, as well as receive the Modbus messages of the 
network recognizing the parity bits, decode the message, and deliver it to its 
associated device in Modbus format” [137]. Solutions like this are not capable of 
securing the Modbus RTU protocol cryptographically, the data integrity can be 
provided, but confidentiality and the freshness of the messages are not. Moreover, 
neither the sender nor the receiver is authenticated.  
In another approach, intrusion-detection technics are applied for filtering and 
finding the maliciously modified messages in a Modbus RTU flow. Intrusion-
detection systems raise alerts about suspicious activities for a human operator, 
where the operator can tune the system by reacting to the notifications. Misuse and 
anomaly-based intrusion-detection systems can be distinguished, by the first type 
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known-attacks can be detected, while the anomaly-based systems are able to 
recognize abnormal behaviour in a system, without any preliminary information 
about the attacks. Solution published in [138] presents an anomaly-based system, 
which is “using semantic information about the protocol, such as the type and 
meaning of a field and expected or observed interdependencies between fields, to 
construct features that capture the meaning of messages rather than only their 
format” [138]. Solutions like this are not able to provide any of the required security 
properties, although the number of malicious actions can be reduced by monitoring 
the communication flow.  
The solutions what is widely applied to secure the communication over Modbus RTU 
are called “bump in the wire devices”. These devices are installed on each side of 
the communication next to the master and the slaves and serve to enhance the 
security properties of the communication protocols, such as the data integrity and 
confidentiality of the messages. In [139] three of these devices are presented, which 
“predicts the incoming plaintext based on previous observations; compresses, 
encrypts and authenticates data online, and pre-sends a portion of the ciphertext 
before receiving the entire plaintext.” Recommended devices are the Yasir [139], the 
SEL-3021-2 [140] and the ADA SCM [141]. 
4.2.3 OWN SOLUTION: REALIZING CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY SECURE MODBUS RTU 
COMMUNICATION 
In the previous section, it is shown that the main problems of communication via the 
Modbus RTU protocol are the lack of security parameters as confidentiality, data 
integrity, authentication of master and slave devices, and freshness. The latter 
causes that slave devices accept a request and perform tasks at any time if the 
destination address is equal to its address in the Modbus PDU. Furthermore, the 
master does not verify the origin of the replies it receives. Thus, the problems to be 
solved are to prevent the messages from eavesdropping, to authenticate the slaves 
and the master of the network, and to provide data integrity and freshness of the 
messages sent via Modbus RTU. In the designed solution, it is taken advantage of the 
fact that the Modbus RTU based communication not always uses the full of its 
standardized message length and the messages have a relatively low update 
frequency. Usually, the MTUs and field devices have a built-in AES engine to encrypt 
the standard request and response before sending it, this engine is built-in by the 
device manufacturers and has no connection with the applied industrial 
communication protocol. However, the AES engine alone, with encrypting the 
messages before sent through the channel is not enough to solve all the revealed 
problems of the Modbus RTU protocol. Our solution provides authentication of the 
participants to each other, and data integrity, freshness, and confidentiality of the 
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messages. In this section, the paper [142] written by my co-authors and me is 
overviewed. 
4.2.3.1 INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
It is recommended that the initial steps of the secure protocol designed by my co-
authors and me be taken when the network is built or for latency systems at the time 
of regular revisions. The first message exchange has to be taken on a secure channel. 
On both sides of the master and the slave, random and prime number generators 
are required to be able to provide proper properties for the secure protocol. The 
generated prime and random numbers have to meet with the requirements for the 
minimum lengths recommended by the related scientific literature. All calculations 
are taken over a finite prime field. A random polynomial over a finite prime field 
𝐺𝐹(𝑝) is constructed in the initialization, where the following restrictions are 
applied: 
• Order of the field should at least be  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠2 +𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 1. 
• Generator prime of the finite field 𝑝 has to be large enough. 
• The coefficients of the random polynomials are chosen uniformly from the 
interval (1, 𝑝 − 1). 
• The 𝑦 values of the random polynomials are computed 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 for distinct 𝑥 
values are chosen from (1, 𝑝 − 1). 
• The size of 𝑦 values of the random polynomials has to be equal size to 𝑝. 
Denotations are listed below. 
Table. 20. Denotations 
Denotation Explanation 
𝑴 Master. 
𝑺𝒊 Ith Slave. 
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔 Number of the slaves in the network. 
𝑷𝒊𝒏𝒊(𝒙) A random polynomial over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) used in the initialization. 
(𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊, 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊) Ith point of  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖(𝑥) polynomial. 
𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊  = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝑖𝑛𝑖) 
𝒂𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊 Ith coefficient of  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖(𝑥) polynomial. 
𝒏 Degree of  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖(𝑥) 
𝒑 A large prime number. 
𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆() Prime generator function. 
𝒔𝒌𝒆𝒚() Secret key generator function. 
𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕() Function for encryption. 
𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕() Function for decryption. 
𝑳𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝑰𝑷() Function for constructing secret by Lagrange interpolation. 
𝑲𝑺 The secret key of the master. 
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𝑪𝒊 Challenge value of the ith slave. 
⊕ The operator of the XOR 
𝑷𝒊𝒋 Share. 
|| Operator of concatenation 
𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊 Address of the ith slave. 
𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆
→     Secure channel. 
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
→     Public channel. 
𝑺𝑪 "Send challenge" function code. 
𝑺𝑰 "Shares inside" function code. 
𝑭𝑪 Function code. 
𝑻𝑺 Timestamp. 
𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕 The encrypted data part of a request. 
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒 The data part of a request. 
𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆 The encrypted data part of a response. 
𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔 The data part of a response. 
Secret key and challenge values – generated in the initialization part – authenticate 
the slaves to the master, and vice versa and these keys then planted in the devices, 
so it is only accessible to those specific devices. It is assumed that the AES engine is 
present in both the slave and the master devices; thus, we recommend at least a 
256-bit long secret key. In the test case, which is described in Section 4.2.3.3, a 128 
bit-sized secret key is generated and used by each device. Steps of the initialization 
are the next: 
1: 𝑀 and 𝑆𝑖 synchronize the time 
2: 𝑀 generates a large prime number:  𝒑 =  𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆()  
3: 𝑀 generates a random private key:  𝑲𝑺  =  𝒔𝒌𝒆𝒚() 
4: 𝑀 constructs a random polynomial over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝): 
  𝑷𝒊𝒏𝒊(𝒙) = 𝒂𝟎
𝒊𝒏𝒊 + 𝒂𝟏
𝒊𝒏𝒊 𝒙𝒊𝒏𝒊 + 𝒂𝟐
𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒙𝒊𝒏𝒊
𝟐
…+ 𝒂𝒏
𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒙𝒊𝒏𝒊
𝒏
  
 where: 𝒏 > 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔 and  
  𝑷𝒊𝒏𝒊(𝟎) = 𝒂𝟎
𝒊𝒏𝒊 = 𝑲𝑺 
5: 𝑀 selects 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠 amount of points (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) on the polynomial, where: 
𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊 ≠ 𝒙𝒋
𝒊𝒏𝒊 for 𝒊, 𝒋 = 𝟏…  𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔 
6: 𝑀 sends a unicast request consisting the shares to the slaves, and waits for   
 challenges:  𝑴
𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆
→     𝑺𝒊 ∶ (𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊, 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊)   
 request: [𝒊, 𝑺𝑪, (𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊, 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊), 𝑪𝑹𝑪]  
7: 𝑆𝑖  receives the share: 𝑺𝒊   
𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆
←     𝑴 ∶ (𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊, 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊)  
8: 𝑆𝑖 generates a challenge:   𝑪𝒊  =  𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆()  
9: 𝑆𝑖 sends the challenge to the master: 𝑺𝒊  
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
→    𝑴 ∶  𝑪𝒊⊕𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊   
response: [𝒊, 𝑺𝑪, 𝑪𝒊⊕𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊 , 𝑪𝑹𝑪]  
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10: 𝑀 receives the challenge:  𝑴 
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
←     𝑺𝒊 ∶  𝑪𝒊⊕𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊     
11: M calculates 𝐶𝑖 ∶  𝑪𝒊  =  𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊  ⊕ (𝑪𝒊⊕𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊 ) 
12: 𝑀 sends unicast requests consisting of extra shares to the slaves: 
   𝑴 
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
→     𝑺𝒊 ∶ (𝑷𝒊𝟏||𝑷𝒊𝟐 ||… ||𝑷𝒊𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔) ⊕ 𝑪𝒊     
   request: [𝒊, 𝑺𝑰, (𝑷𝒊𝟏||𝑷𝒊𝟐 ||… ||𝑷𝒊𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔), 𝑪𝑹𝑪] 
   𝑷𝒊𝒌  ≠   𝑷𝒊𝒍  𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒏𝒚  𝒌 ≠  𝒍  
   𝒌, 𝒍 =  𝟏…  𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔𝟐 
13: 𝑆𝑖 receives the extra shares: 
 𝑺𝒊   
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
←     𝑴 ∶ (𝑷𝒊𝟏||𝑷𝒊𝟐|| … ||𝑷𝒊𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔)⊕ 𝑪𝒊    
14: 𝑆𝑖 reconstructs 𝐾𝑆 from the 𝑛 pieces of imprints it already has: 
 𝑲𝑺 = 𝑳𝒂𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆𝑰𝑷((𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊, 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊), 𝑷𝒊𝟏, 𝑷𝒊𝟐, … 𝑷𝒊𝑵𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒔) 
15: 𝑀 creates an address table about the slaves: (𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊, (𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊, 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊), 𝑪𝒊) 
4.2.3.2 COMMUNICATION 
Communication methods differ in the case of different field devices – like sensors 
and actuators –, however, it is right for both cases, that only the data field of the 
Modbus RTU frame is encrypted to avoid known plain text attacks. Denotation can 
be seen in Table 21. 
Table. 21. Denotations 
Denotation Explanation 
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒅𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂 Measured data by the slave. 
𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑶𝒇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 The number of secret shares. 
𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊 Position of the ith register that contains share inside. 
𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊 Position of the ith register that contains random value inside. 
𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑶𝒇𝑼𝑼𝑹𝒆𝒈 The number of unused, empty registers. 
𝑷𝒄𝒐𝒎(𝒙) A random polynomial over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) used in the communication. 
𝒙𝒊
𝒄𝒐𝒎 The ith x value of 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚(𝑥)polynomial. 
𝒂𝒊
𝒄𝒐𝒎 The ith coefficient of 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑚(𝑥)polynomial. 
𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊 Content of the ith register. 
𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎( ) Random number generator which returns a single uniformly 
distributed random number in the interval (0,p-1) 
 
4.2.3.2.1 Communication with actuator slaves 
The synchronized time information and a shared secret key are generated in the 
initialization step. Each slave is aware of the secret key of the master, and the master 
knows the value of the unique challenge for every slave. The shared information 
makes it possible that the participants are able to authenticate each other. 
Confidentiality is provided by the encryption made by the built-in AES engine. 
Communication description can be seen below: 
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1: 𝑀 initiates a request and encrypts the 𝑇𝑆 and data part of the request with 
𝐾𝑆:  𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕 =  𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑲𝑺, 𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒||𝑻𝑺)  
2: 𝑀 sends the request to the slave: 𝑴 
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
→     𝑺𝒊 ∶  𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕   
request: [𝒊, 𝑭𝑪, 𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕, 𝑪𝑹𝑪]  
3: 𝑆𝑖 receives the request: 𝑺𝒊  
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
←     𝑴 ∶  𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕  
4: 𝑆𝑖 makes the checks: 
 𝒊𝒇 𝑖 =  𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏  𝑆𝑖 decrypts the data part:   
  𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒 =  𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑲𝑺, 𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕||𝑻𝑺) 
  𝒊𝒇 𝑇𝑆 fresh enough 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏  
  𝒊𝒇 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑅𝑒𝑞 is correct 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏  𝑆𝑖 performs the task 
  𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆  𝑆𝑖 goes back to initial mode  
 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 
𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆  𝑆𝑖 goes back to initial mode 
 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 
 𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆  𝑆𝑖 goes back to initial mode 
 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 
5: 𝑆𝑖 encrypts the data part of the response and the (𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊⨁ 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊) with 𝐾𝑆:  
 𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆 =  𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑲𝑺, 𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔||(𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊⨁ 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊)) 
6: 𝑆𝑖 sends the response to the master:  𝑺𝒊  
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
→     𝑴 ∶  𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆  
 response: [𝒊, 𝑭𝑪,𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆, 𝑪𝑹𝑪]  
7: 𝑀 receives the response: 𝑴 
𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄
←     𝑺𝒊 ∶  𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆  
8: 𝑀 decrypts the response:  
 𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔 ||(𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊⨁ 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊)  =  𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑲𝑺, 𝑬𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆) 
9: 𝑀 makes the checks: 
  𝒊𝒇 𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊 ⨁(𝒙𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊⨁ 𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊) =   𝒚𝒊
𝒊𝒏𝒊 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 
  𝒊𝒇 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑅𝑒𝑠 is correct 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏    𝑀 processes the response 
  𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆 𝑀 goes back to initial mode 
  𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 
  𝒆𝒍𝒔𝒆  𝑀 goes back to initial mode 
  𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒊𝒇 
4.2.3.2.2 Communication with sensor slaves  
The communication method between sensors and masters are similar to the 
communication presented in the previous section. However, the data field of the 
messages contains different information. In the case of actuator-master 
communication, the data field contains some additional information to the defined 
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function code. Sensors provide more complex data. To extend the level of data 
integrity, the entropy of the system is increased.  
 
 Secure Modbus RTU communication on the Sensor Slave side 
The sensor device displayed in Figure 36. is an end node of a SCADA system. In 
predefined intervals, that slave device measures given characteristics of the system 
and then saves the gathered data in declared registers. If the master sends a request, 
then the slave responds to it with the measured data included. In this solution, the 
Modbus RTU protocol is modified, to be able to divide the measured data between 
the unused register of the slave device, instantly after the measurement is made. 
The unused registers are filled with data generated from the measurement by 
functions of the secret key and the challenge values. The number of the part – 
divided into – and the secret key and the challenges define the position of every 
secret part. Secret sharing is realized in this way and resulted in several so-called 
imprints. Later all of these imprints are required to recreate the original measured 
data – as opposed to the traditional secret sharing method – because the creation 
of these imprints only makes the access more difficult to the secret, but not 
impossible. The more registers are participating in the decryption method, the more 
grows the entropy of the system, which in turn makes it more difficult for an attacker 
to gather relevant data. Keep in mind that if the number of imprints is the same as 
the number of unused registers the decrypting of the encrypted data become trivial, 
but the message cannot be consisted only of these imprints, so after secret-sharing, 
the free registers filled up with randomized data seemingly similar to the imprints. 
The steps of the generation of content of the data field of the request are given 
below. 
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1: 𝑆𝑖 measures a data: 𝑴𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒅𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂 
2: 𝑆𝑖 makes the following calculations:  𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑶𝒇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 =  𝑲𝑺 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝑪𝒊 
3: 𝑆𝑖 calculates the position of the registers to put shares inside: 
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑚 = 0 𝒕𝒐 𝑚 < 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑓𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝒅𝒐  
 𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒎 =  
  (𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑶𝒇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 +𝒎)𝒎𝒐𝒅 (𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑶𝒇𝑼𝑼𝑹𝒆𝒈+ 𝟏) 
  𝒂𝒊
𝒄𝒐𝒎 =  𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎( ) 
  𝒙𝒎
𝒄𝒐𝒎 =  𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎( ) 
𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓  
4: 𝑆𝑖 calculates the position of the registers to put random values inside: 
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑚 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑓𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 1 𝒕𝒐 𝑚 < 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑓𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑒𝑔 𝒅𝒐 
  𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒎 = 
  (𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑶𝒇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 +𝒎)𝒎𝒐𝒅 (𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑶𝒇𝑼𝑼𝑹𝒆𝒈+ 𝟏) 
 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓  
5: 𝑆𝑖 constructs the random polynomial: 
 𝑷𝒄𝒐𝒎(𝒙
𝒄𝒐𝒎) =  𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒅𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂 +  
 𝒂𝟏
𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒙𝒄𝒐𝒎 + 𝒂𝟐
𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒙𝒄𝒐𝒎𝟐… + 𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑶𝒇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔
𝒄𝒐𝒎 𝒙𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑶𝒇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔 
6: 𝑆𝑖 puts share into the right register  
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑚 = 0 𝒕𝒐 𝑚 < 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑓𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝒅𝒐 
  𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒎 =
  (𝒙𝒎
𝒄𝒐𝒎|| 𝑷𝒄𝒐𝒎(𝒙𝒎
𝒄𝒐𝒎 )) ⨁ 𝑪𝒊|| 𝟎𝟎…𝟎 
 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓  
7: 𝑆𝑖 puts random values into the right register 
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑚 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑓𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 1 𝒕𝒐 𝑚 < 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑂𝑓𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑒𝑔 𝒅𝒐 
  𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒎 = (𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒐𝒎( )⨁𝑪𝒊|𝟎𝟎…𝟎 
 𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒇𝒐𝒓  
8: 𝑆𝑖 constructs the data part of the response: 
 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒈𝟏 ||𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒈𝟐||𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒏𝒖𝒎𝑶𝒇𝑼𝑼𝑹𝒆𝒈 
4.2.3.3 TEST SYSTEM 
A test system was designed and constructed in the Department of Electrical 
Engineering and Mechatronics at the University of Debrecen. The system consists of 
a PC, a MOXA converter, a digital oscilloscope a PT1008 data acquisition device, and 
eight PTC thermoresistores. The PC serves as the master of the system, a simple 
Modbus client software was running and logging the gathered data to a comma-
separated text file in it.  The converter and the digital oscilloscope is planted into the 
system for providing the understanding between the HMI and the actuator device, 
which is the  PT1008. The actuator is connected to eight thermoresistores which are 
able to measure temperature and serves as servers in the system. The 
microcontroller, driving the actuator device, is an Atmel ATxmega 128a, and the 
firmware is implemented in Basic. The secure protocol was also implemented in 
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Basic. The eight PTC thermoresistors supplied the data to be encrypted. These 
thermic sensors measured the temperature of the MSc laboratory of the 
department, where the system was installed. The physical layer of the network was 
RS485 2-wire bus, the end nodes connected with the master via a Moxa Serial-to-
USB converter device.  The architecture of the system is displayed in Figure 37. 
 
 Structure of the test system 
The running time of a single message exchange with our secure protocol is 
completed five times longer than with the original Modbus RTU protocol. The overall 
performance of the device has not been reduced, all of its functionality has remained 
the same; thus it can be stated that the protocol is able to be implemented in field 
devices with lower performance. The results of the test case are the following. Time 
of generation of the response on the slave side –  initialization is not included – has 
increased with 400%.  The time needed for transmitting a response to the master 
has grown by 23%. Over the testing period, the number of dropped messages was 
1:15 000.  
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4 SUMMARY AND THESIS POINTS 
In the present dissertation, the vulnerabilities of two different communication 
methods were examined. The first one is the communication between the GPS 
satellites and receivers, and the second one is the communication between field 
devices in a Modbus RTU based SCADA system. The complete technical description 
is presented for both of the underlying systems. Example applications are given and 
described to show the broad applicability of both systems and to draw attention to 
how crucial it is to secure these communication flows. Vulnerabilities and security 
breaches are revealed by comprehensively studying the related scientific literature, 
and available solutions are presented for both of the examined systems. For the 
problem of securing the communication between GPS satellites and receivers, two 
solutions are made and given, with different level of provided security. For securing 
the communication between field devices in a Modbus RTU based SCADA system, 
one solution is designed and presented. Correctness check is implemented for the 
secure protocol created for GPS location calculation, and a test system is built to 
check the running parameters of the secure Modbus RTU communication.   
5.1 FIRST THESIS POINT  
The 3rd Section of the dissertation is devoted to revealing the security problems of 
different GNSS systems, especially the GPS, and overviewing the existing solutions 
for the disclosed security breaches by comprehensively examining the related 
scientific literature. Additionally, to give solutions for the revealed security 
problems and provide a way to authenticate location information from a 
cryptographical point of view.  
5.1.1 REVEALING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE  
Even though the number of GNSS based services, especially the GPS based ones, has 
been increased enormously in the last decades, only a small part of the security 
issues of such systems got enough attention in the related scientific literature. 
Through these years the GNSS technology has gained a considerable portion in the 
civil, scientific, industrial, governmental, or military sectors, and the list is not 
complete at all. In Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of the dissertation, the result of a 
comprehensive examination about the vulnerabilities of the American GNSS, i.e. the 
GPS is given. In the time of our research, it was the most popular, commonly used 
and stable GNSS system. Only a few information was available at that time in the 
related scientific literature about the cryptographic reliability of the entire GPS. On 
the other hand, this approach is an essential part of the system, because there exist 
several GPS based service which has to provide cryptographically authenticated 
data, so it would be necessary to make location determination cryptographically 
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secure and reliable. The research revealed that two types of threats could be 
distinguished, the ones that are attacking the geodetic authenticity of the system 
and the ones that are targeting the cryptographic authenticity of it. Geodetic 
authenticity can be threatened by intentional and malicious attackers through 
jamming and spoofing. Cryptographic authenticity is vulnerable because there can 
be no secure channel provided between the participants, so confidentiality, 
authenticity, data integrity, and freshness are not guaranteed parameters of the 
system. Geodetic weaknesses like jamming and spoofing are exhaustively examined 
in the related literature, and several solutions are performed. At the beginning of the 
2000s, because of the widespread usage of GPS, several researchers started to 
design solutions for the cryptographical authentication shortcomings of the system 
too. A lot of possible methods were made, but it is important to mention, that all 
these solutions require fundamental changes in the structure of the GPS signals, so 
without the evolution of the system cannot be applied. As a summary of my 
research, it can be stated that a solution which provides an authenticated location 
in a cryptographical sense and does not require fundamental changes in the 
structure of the GPS signal can be a niche (can be found in 1., 2.).  
5.1.2 DESING AND REALISATION OF A „LOCATION-STAMPING” PROTOCOL ON THE SOFTWARE 
LEVEL 
To solve the problem revealed in the first thesis point and provide cryptographically 
authentic location information without redesigning the GPS signal, two „location-
stamping” protocols were made by my co-author and me in 2013 (can be found in 
2.).  The developed protocols can provide authentic location and time information 
for any device which has a GPS receiver built in it. The first solution provides safety 
with the help of a software component, a trusted third party, and a mobile phone 
service provider. The aim of the above lower-safety solution, a.k.a the protocol built 
in the software level of the mobile device, is to provide a solution that is less 
hardware dependent. It can be done because it is much easier to access to the 
calculated GPS coordinates than to the Navigational Message broadcasted by the 
satellites. To authenticate the GPS information of the Mobile Device, a trusted third 
party is necessary, that is able to generate the location information of the Mobile 
Device. Then, the location information of the trusted third party can be compared to 
the ones received by the Mobile Device. One option to get suitable location 
information for comparison is to use mobile phone services, which provide cell 
information. However, cell information is not always accurate enough to specify the 
location of the Mobile Device. It is a proper solution if the mobile network coverage 
is broad enough. In the above situation, the mobile phone service has independent 
information on the location of the Mobile Device, which can be compared to the data 
that the Mobile Device has sent to the trusted third party.  
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5.1.3 DESING AND REALISATION  OF A „LOCATION-STAMPING” PROTOCOL ON THE HARDWARE 
LEVEL 
The second solution provides higher-safety with the help of a software component 
and a trusted third party. In this higher-safety solution, the main goal is to receive 
and preserve the content of the Navigational Message, transmitted by the 
satellites, before anybody could modify it (can be found in [2]) The Authentic 
Software is intended to be built in a very deep and hidden layer of the Mobile Device, 
namely in its driver level. The protocol, described in detail in Section 3.2.3.2 of the 
dissertation, has three important participants, which are the satellites of the Global 
Positioning System, the Mobile Device, and the Certification Authority. The designed 
higher-level protocol is built in a portable electronic device, which has been patented 
by the University of Debrecen in the US with the name “Portable electronic device, 
system, and method for authenticating a document associated with a geographical 
location” (can be found in 3.). Correctness proof was made with the Applied-π 
method, and the ProVerif software tool based on the events declared in the 
processes. The declared events label the steps of the protocol. The correspondence 
between the earlier declared events are investigated during correctness proof.  The 
authenticity of the participants and the data integrity is proved by checking the 
correspondence assertions and injective correspondence for events of the 
subprocesses of the participants (can be found in 7.).  
5.2 SECOND THESIS POINT  
The 4th Section of the dissertation is devoted to uncovering the vulnerabilities of 
the Modbus RTU industrial communication protocol, which is one of the basic 
building blocks of such SCADA systems mentioned in Section 4.1.1.3. Additionally, 
to overview the existing solutions for the revealed vulnerabilities by 
comprehensively studying the related scientific literature, and to give a solution 
for the uncovered weaknesses from a cryptographical point of view.  
5.2.1 REVEALING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE MODBUS PROTOCOL  
Drinking fresh water, turning the lights on, travelling by tram, calling our family, or 
getting a medical treatment are usual activities. However, the underlying Critical 
Infrastructures which are maintained and controlled by the so-called “Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition systems” were always targeted by different types of 
attacks. During the last decades, because of the fast spread of internet-based 
services and continuous technical development, Critical Infrastructures become 
more vulnerable than ever, and cyberattacks happen more frequently. 
Consequences of such cyberattacks can be not only financial loss, or devastated 
reputation, but it can be extremely detrimental in health and safety. SCADA systems 
are often using outdated communication protocols, like the Modbus over Serial Line 
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as an underlying network so that an update would be required. However, full 
reconstruction and innovative changes in legacy SCADA systems have a high cost, 
and it is not always possible to carry out. In this dissertation, the focus is on the 
Modbus protocol, especially the Modbus over Serial Line, a.k.a the Modbus RTU. The 
Modbus was originally designed and made by Modicon in 1979. The Modbus RTU 
protocol does not include any security considerations in default. During the design 
process, the required features of the Modbus protocol were reliability, speed, and 
accessibility, but the security of the used channel, thus authentication of the 
participants, confidentiality, data integrity, and freshness of the messages were left 
out, so not provided. Our research – presented in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of the 
dissertation – addressed to find the vulnerabilities of a Modbus RTU based SCADA 
system by comprehensively reviewing the related scientific literature, and applying 
the Attack Tree method for summarizing and classifying the discovered security 
breaches (can be found in 4., 5., 6.). Liabilities of Modbus RTU, revealed by us, are 
the lack of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, the sensibility for the Man in the 
middle attack, for Denial of Service Attack, the possibility of interception, 
interruption, modification, and fabrication. In the available literature, a proper 
solution for the abovementioned problems cannot be found in the case of Modbus 
RTU. Thus, the aims to be reached are to prevent the messages from eavesdropping, 
to authenticate the slaves and the master of the network, and to provide data 
integrity and freshness of the messages sent via Modbus RTU.  
5.2.2 DESING AND REALISATION OF A SECURE MODBUS RTU PROTOCOL  
In Section 4.2.3 of the dissertation, our solution for the previously revealed 
vulnerabilities of the Modbus RTU protocol is presented. The solution is taken 
advantage of the fact, that the Modbus RTU based communication not always use 
its whole standardized message length and the messages have a relatively low 
update frequency. Usually, the Master Terminal Units and field devices have a built-
in AES engine to encrypt the standard request and response before sending it. This 
engine is integrated by the device manufacturers and has no connection with the 
applied industrial communication protocol. However, the AES engine alone, with 
encrypting the messages before sent through the channel is not enough to solve all 
the revealed problems of the Modbus RTU protocol.  
Our solution provides authentication of the participants to each other, and 
additionally data integrity, freshness, and confidentiality of the messages. A test 
system was designed and constructed in the Department of Electrical Engineering 
and Mechatronics at the University of Debrecen to check the applicability of the 
new solution (can be found in 8.). The running time of a single message exchange, 
applying our secure protocol, is five times longer than with the original Modbus RTU 
protocol. The overall performance of the device has not been reduced; all of its 
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functionality has remained the same. Thus it can be stated that the protocol can be 
implemented in field devices also with low computational capacity. The results 
gained by applying our test system are the following: Time of generating a response 
on the slave side –  initialization is not included – has increased with 400%.  The time 
needed to transmit a response to the master has grown by 23%. Over the testing 
period, the rate of dropped messages was 1:15 000.   
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5 ÖSSZEFOGLALÁS ÉS TÉZISPONTOK 
Kutatómunkám során két különböző kommunikációs folyamat sebezhetőségét 
vizsgáltam kriptográfiai szempontból. Az első kommunikációs folyamat a GPS (Global 
Positioning System) rendszerben, a GPS műholdak és a GPS vevőkészülékek között 
valósul meg. Ebben az esetben a célom a vevőkészülék GPS koordinátákkal adott 
földrajzi helyének kriptográfiai hitelesítése volt.  A második kommunikációs folyamat 
a SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) rendszerekben, a rendszer 
terepi eszközök között valósul meg a Modbus RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) ipari 
kommunikációs protokoll segítségével. Itt a célom a terepi eszközök közötti 
biztonságos kommunikációs csatorna létrehozása volt, vagyis a résztvevők 
hitelesítésének, valamint az üzenetek bizalmasságának, integritásának és 
frissességének biztosítása volt. Mindkét esetben olyan megoldást kerestem, amely a 
kommunikáció alapjául szolgáló rendszerek fizikai struktúráját és adatátviteli 
keretrendszerét nem érinti. Dolgozatomban a vizsgált rendszerek működési 
alapelveit részletesen tárgyalom, majd példákkal szemléltettem a rendszereken 
alapuló különböző szolgáltatásokat, így megmutatva az általam vizsgált 
kommunikációs folyamatok kriptográfiai biztonságának alapvető fontosságát. A GPS-
műholdak és vevők közötti kommunikáció biztonsági problémájának kiküszöbölésére 
két megoldást (protokollt) adtunk szerzőtársammal, amelyek különböző szintű 
kriptográfiai és/ vagy geodéziai védelmet biztosítanak. Ezek közül az egyik protokoll 
helyességének bizonyítása is megtörtént. A terepi eszközök közötti kommunikáció 
kriptográfiai védelmére egy megoldás adtunk, illetve megépült egy SCADA rendszer 
az elkészült protokoll futási paramétereinek és használhatóságának tesztelésére. 
6.1 ELSŐ TÉZISPONT 
A disszertációm harmadik fejezete a különböző GNSS rendszerekkel, ezek közül 
elsősorban a GPS rendszerrel kapcsolatos eredményeimet ismerteti. Egy átfogó 
irodalomkutatás és feldolgozás során feltártam a GPS rendszerek biztonsági 
problémáit mind geodéziai, mind kriptográfiai szempontból, valamint áttekintettem 
és elemeztem a megtalált biztonsági hiányosságok kiküszöbölésére már létező 
megoldásokat. Szintén ebben a fejezetben mutatok be két, a szerzőtársammal 
közösen készített „Helyszín-bélyegző” protokollt, amelyekkel a hiányzó biztonsági 
paraméterek okozta problémák kiküszöbölhetőek.  Ezekkel a protokollokkal a GPS 
rendszer által szolgáltatott helyadatok kriptográfiai szempontból hitelesen és 
letagadhatatlanul hozzárendelhetőek egy adott vevőkészülékhez.  Az első 
tézispont a GPS rendszer hiányosságainak feltárását, valamint a két „Helyszín-
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bélyegző” protokoll (az egyik szoftver a másik hardver szintre integrált) tervezését 
és megvalósítását tartalmazza. 
6.1.1 A GPS RENDSZER HIÁNYOSSÁGAINAK FELTÁRÁSA 
A GNSS-alapú szolgáltatások gyakoriak polgári, tudományos, ipari, kormányzati vagy 
katonai alkalmazásokban, számuk az elmúlt néhány évtizedben rendkívüli 
mértékben nőtt. Ennek ellenére a kapcsolódó szakirodalom a GNSS rendszerek 
biztonsági hiányosságainak csak egy szűk szegmensével foglalkozik. A 3.2.1. és 3.2.2. 
fejezetekben az amerikai GNSS, azaz a GPS rendszer hiányosságait feltáró 
vizsgálataimat, és azok eredményét ismertetem.  
Kutatásunk idején a GPS volt a legnépszerűbb, leggyakrabban használt, legnagyobb 
lefedettségű és a legstabilabban működő GNSS rendszer, mégis csak igen kevés 
információ állt rendelkezésre a GPS rendszer kriptográfiai biztonságáról. Pedig 
számos olyan GPS-alapú szolgáltatás létezett és létezik ma is, ahol elengedhetetlen, 
hogy a helymeghatározás kriptográfiai szempontból is biztonságos legyen. 
Dolgozatomban azon szolgáltatásokkal foglalkoztam, ahol a GPS koordinátáknak 
valamely jogi eljárásban bizonyító ereje van.  
A GPS rendszer két szempontból is sérülékeny: geodéziai és kriptográfiai hitelessége 
is sérülhet egy rosszindulatú támadás során. A geodéziai szempontból hiteles 
helymeghatározást veszélyeztető támadások két típusa a „Zavarás” és a 
„Megtévesztés”. „Zavarás” esetén a támadó – a GPS jel elfedésével – a teljes 
szolgáltatást elérhetetlenné teszi a GPS vevő számára, míg „Megtévesztés” esetén a 
valóstól eltérő helyadatokkal téveszti meg azt. Ezen támadások azért kivitelezhetőek, 
mert a műholdak által sugárzott jel a földfelszín közelébe érve már jelentősen 
gyengül. Az fenti támadástípusok elhárítására több módszer is ismert, amelyeket a 
vonatkozó szakirodalom részletesen tárgyal.  
Kriptográfiai szempontból más a helyzet, mivel a műholdak és a vevők közötti 
kommunikációs csatorna nem rendelkezik az alapvető biztonsági jellemzőkkel: 
nevezetesen az üzenetek bizalmassága, integritása és frissessége, valamint a 
résztvevők hitelessége sem garantált. Emellett a vevőkészülékek sem tekinthetők 
kriptográfiai szempontból megbízhatónak, mivel az általuk fogadott adatok, vagy az 
általuk számított koordináták nincsenek megfelelően védve a rosszindulatú 
módosításoktól.  A 2000-es évek eleje óta folynak kutatások a rendszer kriptográfiai 
hiányosságainak pótlására. Több módszer is született, de ezek kivétel nélkül alapvető 
változtatásokat igényelnek a GPS-jel szerkezetében, tehát a rendszer átalakítása 
nélkül nem alkalmazhatóak. 
Összefoglalva elmondható, hogy olyan eljárás, amely nem igényel alapvető 
változtatásokat a GPS-jel szerkezetében, és amely kriptográfiai értelemben 
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hitelesíti a helymeghatározást, azaz biztosítja az üzenetek bizalmasságát, 
integritását, frissességét, valamint a résztvevők hitelességét, emellett a 
vevőkészülékekhez hitelesen és letagadhatatlanul hozzárendeli az általuk számolt 
GPS koordináták által adott helyet és időt, a vizsgálataim előtt nem állt 
rendelkezésre. (lásd 1., 2.)  
 
6.1.2 SZOFTVER SZINTRE INTEGRÁLT „HELYSZÍN-BÉLYEGZŐ” PROTOKOLL  
TERVEZÉSE ÉS MEGVALÓSÍTÁSA 
A 2.1.1 fejezetben elmondottak szerint, vizsgálataim kezdetén nem állt 
rendelkezésre olyan eljárás, amely egyrészt a GPS jel szerkezetének változtatása 
nélkül képes biztosítani azon biztonsági kritériumokat, melyek a GPS műholdak és a 
GPS vevők közötti biztonságos csatorna kiépítéséhez szükségesek, másrészt 
garantálja a vevők által vett és számított adatok kriptográfiai védelmét. Az általunk 
2013-ben készített, szoftver szintre integrált „helyszín-bélyegző” protokoll (lásd 2.) a 
második problémára nyújt megoldást. A szoftver szintre integrált „Helyszín-
bélyegző” protokoll egy olyan szoftver, amely egy megbízható harmadik fél és egy 
mobilszolgáltató segítségével garantálja a vevő által kezelt adatok kriptográfiai 
védelmét, emellett geodéziai hitelességet is biztosít bármely beépített GPS vevővel 
rendelkező eszköz számára. A megoldás hardverfüggetlen, mivel a hitelesítést egy a 
vevőre telepített szoftverrel valósítjuk meg. A módszer alkalmazása során a 
koordináták számítása és aláírása a mobileszköz szoftver szintjén történik. A hiteles 
„Helyszín-bélyeghez” szükséges egy, a GPS rendszertől független rendszer 
helyadatainak összehasonlítása az eredetivel. Az eljárás során használt digitális 
aláírás hitelesíti, hogy a számított GPS koordinátákat a vevőkészülék küldte a 
hitelesítő szervezetnek, és annak tartalma az átvitel során nem változott. A 
mobilszolgáltató által nyújtott helyinformációk összevetése a vevőkészülék által 
aláírt GPS koordinátákkal a helyadatok geodézia hitelességét hivatott igazolni, 
valamint megnöveli a kriptográfiai hitelesség szintjét is. A számított GPS koordináták 
frissességét a protokoll egy véletlen értékkel és a GPS navigációs üzenetéből nyert 
időinformációval biztosítja. 
6.1.3 HARDVER SZINTRE INTEGRÁLT „HELYSZÍN-BÉLYEGZŐ” PROTOKOLL 
    TERVEZÉSE ÉS MEGVALÓSÍTÁSA 
Az általunk tervezett és kivitelezett második protokoll (lásd 2.), magasabb szintű 
kriptográfiai védelmet biztosít, mint az első, de ennek érdekében a 
vevőkészülékekben hardver szintű módosításokat kíván. A dolgozat 3.2.3.2. 
fejezetében részletesen ismertetett protokoll résztvevői a GPS rendszer, a 
vevőkészülék és egy megbízható harmadik fél, jelen esetben egy hitelesítő szervezet. 
Elsődleges cél a folyamatban a műholdaktól érkező navigációs üzenet vétele és 
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rögzítése úgy, hogy a vevőkészülékben a rosszindulatú módosítások ne 
történhessenek meg. A módszer megvalósítása során a koordináták számítása és 
aláírása a mobileszköz hardver szintjére integrált. A protokoll esetében a digitális 
aláírás, valamint a biztonságos hardverelem hitelesíti, hogy az adott mobileszköz 
fogadta az aláírt adatokat a műholdtól, továbbá ez az eszköz számította a GPS 
koordinátákat is. A számított GPS koordináták sértetlenségét is a digitális aláírás 
garantálja. A számított GPS koordináták frissességét a protokoll egy véletlen értékkel 
és a GPS navigációs üzenetéből nyert időinformációval biztosítja. A protokoll egy, a 
Debreceni Egyetem által “Portable electronic device, system, and method for 
authenticating a document associated with a geographical location” (lásd 3.) névvel 
szabadalmaztatott eljárás alapját képezi. Ezen módszer esetében a ProVerif 
automatikus helyesség bizonyító szoftver alkalmazásával igazoltam a protokoll által 
szolgáltatott biztonsági paraméterek közül kettőt (lásd 7.). 
6.2 MÁSODIK TÉZISPONT 
A disszertációm negyedik fejezete a Modbus RTU ipari kommunikációs protokollt 
használó SCADA rendszerekkel kapcsolatos kutatási eredményeimet tartalmazza. 
Egy átfogó irodalomkutatás és feldolgozás során feltártam a Modbus RTU protokoll 
biztonsági hiányosságait, és az azok kiküszöbölésére már meglévő eljárásokat 
áttekintettem és elemeztem. Ebben a fejezetben ismertetem a kriptográfiailag 
biztonságos átviteli csatorna megvalósítására kidolgozott "Biztonságos Modbus 
RTU" protokollt is. Az általam elkészített protokoll a Modbus RTU adatátviteli 
keretének és fizikai struktúrájának változtatása nélkül képes biztosítani a hiányzó 
alapvető biztonsági kritériumokat. A dolgozat második tézispontja a Modbus RTU 
protokoll hiányosságainak az "Attack-tree" módszerrel történő megvalósítását és 
a "Biztonságos Modbus RTU" protokoll tervezését, implementálását és tesztelését 
tartalmazza. 
6.2.1 A MODBUS RTU HIÁNYOSSÁGAINAK FELTÁRÁSA 
Meginni egy pohár tiszta vizet, felkapcsolni a villanyt, felhívni a családunkat, vagy 
igénybe venni valamilyen orvosi kezelést mind hétköznapi tevékenységek, melyek 
biztosításáért ún. kritikus infrastruktúrák felelősek. A kritikus infrastruktúrákhoz 
tartoznak a vízelosztó-, az áramszolgáltató és a telekommunikációs hálózatok, de az 
egészségügyi ellátórendszer létesítményei is. Az említett rendszerek esetében 
általában az irányítást, az adatgyűjtést és a rendszerek felügyelete SCADA rendszerek 
segítségével valósul meg. A SCADA rendszerek működése különböző kommunikációs 
protokollokra és számtalan terepi eszközre támaszkodik. Azonban a vezetéknélküli 
kommunikáció térnyerése, valamint a SCADA hálózatok online jellege miatt, a 
kritikus infrastruktúrák sebezhetősége jelentősen megnőtt az elmúlt évtizedekben. 
A fenti rendszereket nap, mint nap érik kiber támadások, melyek következményei 
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nem csupán pénzügyi veszteség, vagy megromlott vállalati hírnév lehetnek, hanem 
az állampolgárok életének veszélyeztetése is. A nagy hálózatok gyakran régi, elavult 
kommunikációs protokollokra épülnek, mint a Modbus RTU ipari kommunikációs 
protokoll, de a teljes felújítás sokszor nem kivitelezhető, vagy csak nagyon magas 
költség mellett. A dolgozatom fókuszában a Modbus RTU ipari kommunikációs 
protokoll áll, amely a Modbus családdal együtt 1979 óta szabvány. A Modbus 
protokoll tervezése során a biztonságos kommunikáció, mint tervezési cél kimaradt, 
a megbízható működésre és a megfelelő sebességre fektettek csak hangsúlyt. A 
dolgozatom 4.2.1. és 4.2.2. fejezetében bemutatott kutatásaim célja a Modbus RTU 
alapú SCADA rendszerek sebezhetőségének vizsgálata a kapcsolódó szakirodalom 
átfogó áttekintésével és elemzésével, továbbá az „Attack-Tree” módszer 
alkalmazásával. (lásd 4., 5., 6.). A kutatás eredményeként megtalált biztonsági 
hiányosságok egyrészről a résztvevők hitelesítésének, valamint az üzenetek 
bizalmasságának, integritásának és frissességének hiánya az adatátvitelre használt 
csatornán, másrészről a protokoll érzékenysége a MITM (Man in the Middle) és a 
DoS (Denial of Service) típusú támadásokra. Harmadrészt, hogy fennáll a csatornán 
haladó üzenetek lehallgatásának, módosításának, fabrikálásának és az 
üzenettovábbítás megszakításának lehetősége. A vonatkozó szakirodalomban, a 
vizsgálataim kezdetén, a fenti problémákra nem volt létező megoldás. 
6.2.2 BIZTONSÁGOS MODBUS RTU KOMMUNIKÁCIÓ TERVEZÉSE ÉS 
MEGVALÓSÍTÁSA 
A dolgozat 4.2.3-as fejezetében a Modbus RTU ipari kommunikációs protokoll 
biztonsági hiányosságainak megoldására kifejlesztett “Biztonságos Modbus RTU” 
protokollt mutatom be. A javasolt módszer azon alapul, hogy a Modbus RTU 
protokoll az adatátvitel során nem használja ki maximálisan a lehetséges 
üzenethosszt, és az üzenetváltás gyakorisága relatíve alacsony. Jellemzően a 
gyakorlatban a SCADA rendszerekben mind az MTU (Master Terminal Unit), mind a 
terepi eszközök rendelkeznek egy beépített AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) 
titkosítóval, mely a szabványos kéréseket és válaszokat képes titkosítani a csatornán. 
Ez az ún. AES motor az eszközök sajátja, egy a gyártók által beépített szolgáltatás, 
mely független az alkalmazott ipari kommunikációs protokolltól. Meg kell jegyezni, 
hogy habár a beépített AES titkosító elősegíti a biztonságos átviteli csatorna 
kiépítését, de önmagában nem oldja meg a fentebb bemutatott biztonsági 
hiányosságokat.  
Az általunk tervezett és megvalósított megoldás a résztvevők hitelesítését, az 
üzenetek adatintegritását, frissességét és bizalmasságát garantálja. A közös titkos 
kulcs és a kihívás értékek hitelesítik a Mestert a Szolga felé és fordítva. Az üzenetek 
bizalmassága egy beépített AES titkosítóval biztosított. Az adatok integritását a 
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Szenzor típusú Szolgák esetén egy ún. „összekeverés” nevű eljárás biztosítja, amely 
titokmegosztáson alapul (lásd 8.). 
A „Biztonságos Modbus RTU” protokoll gyakorlati alkalmazhatóságának 
ellenőrzésére a Debreceni Egyetem Műszaki Karának Villamosmérnöki és 
Mechatronikai Tanszékén megterveztünk és kiviteleztünk egy teszt rendszert Az 
alábbiakat tapasztaltuk: Egy egyszeri üzenetváltás sebessége ötször nagyobb a 
javasolt biztonságos módszer alkalmazása esetén, mint az eredeti protokoll 
használatával. A terepi eszközök teljesítménye nem csökkent, minden funkciójuk 
hibátlanul, a megszokott módon működött.  A szolga oldalon történő válasz üzenet 
generálásának ideje 400%-kal nőtt, ebbe a kommunikáció inicializáló lépései nem 
kerültek beszámításba. A mester felé történő üzenettovábbításhoz szükséges idő 
hossza 23%-kal nőtt. A tesztelési periódus során az elutasított üzenetek aránya 
1:15000 volt. A teszt alapján kijelenthetjük, hogy a módszer kis számítási kapacitással 
rendelkező terepi eszközök esetén is alkalmazható. 
  
101 
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  News Desk „South Korea to track quarantine violators through tracking 
wristbands,” Geospatial Wolrd, 2020  
[Online]. https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/south-korea-to-track-
quarantine-violators-through-tracking-wristbands/. 
[2]  Turzó, Á. P.  „A koronavírust  is megfékezheti az app, amit egy magyar cég 
fejleszt,” Portfolió, 2020  
[Online]. https://www.portfolio.hu/uzlet/20200320/a-koronavirust-is-
megfekezheti-az-app-amit-egy-magyar-ceg-fejleszt-420965. 
[3]  Shannon, C. E. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. Bell 
system technical journal, 27(3), 379-423.  
[4]  Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. (1949). The mathematical theory of 
communication, 117 pp. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.  
[5]  Dolev, D., & Yao, A. (1983). On the security of public key protocols. IEEE 
Transactions on information theory, 29(2), 198-208.  
[6]  Gasmi, Y., Sadeghi, A. R., Stewin, P., Unger, M., & Asokan, N. (2007, 
November). Beyond secure channels. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACM 
workshop on Scalable trusted computing (pp. 30-40).  
[7]  Williams, N. (2007). On the use of channel bindings to secure channels. 
RFC 5056, November.  
[8]  Maurer, U. M., & Schmid, P. E. (1994, November). A calculus for secure 
channel establishment in open networks. In European Symposium on 
Research in Computer Security (pp. 173-192). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.  
[9]  Basin, D., Radomirovic, S., & Schläepfer, M. (2015, July). A complete 
characterization of secure human-server communication. In 2015 IEEE 
28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (pp. 199-213). IEEE.  
[10]  Clarkson, System Security Course: Secure Channel 2019,  Cornell 
University, 2019 
[Online]. www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs5430/2016sp/l/09-
channel/lec.pdf  
102 
 
[11]  Maurer, U., Rüedlinger, A., & Tackmann, B. (2012, March). Confidentiality 
and integrity: A constructive perspective. In Theory of Cryptography 
Conference (pp. 209-229). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.  
[12]  Menezes, A. J., Katz, J., Van Oorschot, P. C., & Vanstone, S. A. (1996). 
Handbook of applied cryptography. CRC press.  
[13]  Blanchet, B. (2016). Modeling and verifying security protocols with the 
applied pi calculus and ProVerif. Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and 
Security, 1(1-2), 1-135.  
[14]  Blanchet, B. (2002, September). From secrecy to authenticity in security 
protocols. In International Static Analysis Symposium (pp. 342-359). 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.  
[15]  Forouzan, B. A., & Mukhopadhyay, D. Cryptography and network security 
(Sie). McGraw-Hill Education, Southern Illinois University,2011  
[Online]. www.cs.siue.edu/~tgamage/S18/CS490/L/WK12.pdf. 
[16]  ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010 Information technology — Security techniques — 
Entity authentication. International Organization for Standardization.  
[17]  Martin, K. M. (2012). Everyday cryptography. The Australian Mathematical 
Society, 231(6).  
[18]  Diffie, W., Van Oorschot, P. C., & Wiener, M. J. (1992). Authentication and 
authenticated key exchanges. Designs, Codes and cryptography, 2(2), 107-
125.  
[19]  Harkins,D., Carrol, D. „The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), RFC 2409,” IETF 
Tools, 1998 
[Online]. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2409. 
[20]  Matsumoto, T., Takashima, Y., & Imai, H. (1986). On seeking smart public-
key-distribution systems. IEICE TRANSACTIONS (1976-1990), 69(2), 99-106. 
[21]  Menezes, A. (1997). Some new key agreement protocols providing implicit 
authentication. In Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, 1997. 
CRC Press.  
[22]  Chandra, S., Paira, S., Alam, S. S., & Sanyal, G. (2014, November). A 
comparative survey of symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography. In 
103 
 
2014 International Conference on Electronics, Communication and 
Computational Engineering (ICECCE) (pp. 83-93). IEEE. 
[23]  Tripathi, R., & Agrawal, S. (2014). Comparative study of symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptography techniques. International Journal of Advance 
Foundation and Research in Computer (IJAFRC), 1(6), 68-76. 
[24]  Of, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes. "Operation, X9. 52–1998, 
Accredited Standards Committee X9." American National Standards 
Institute (1998). 
[25]  Daemen, J., & Rijmen, V. (1999). AES proposal: Rijndael. 
[26]  Schneier, B. (1993, December). Description of a new variable-length key, 
64-bit block cipher (Blowfish). In International Workshop on Fast Software 
Encryption (pp. 191-204). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[27]  Schneier, B., Kelsey, J., Whiting, D., Wagner, D., Hall, C., & Ferguson, N. 
(1998). Twofish: A 128-bit block cipher. NIST AES Proposal, 15(1), 23-91. 
[28]  Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978). A method for obtaining 
digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the 
ACM, 21(2), 120-126. 
[29]  Rabin, M. O. (1979). Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as 
intractable as factorization (No. MIT/LCS/TR-212). Massachusetts Inst of 
Tech Cambridge Lab for Computer Science. 
[30]  ElGamal, T. (1985). A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme 
based on discrete logarithms. IEEE transactions on information theory, 
31(4), 469-472. 
[31]  Koblitz, N. (1987). Elliptic curve cryptosystems. Mathematics of 
computation, 48(177), 203-209. 
[32]  Miller, V. S. (1985, August). Use of elliptic curves in cryptography. In 
Conference on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques (pp. 
417-426). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[33]  Menezes, A. J., & Vanstone, S. A. (1993). Elliptic curve cryptosystems and 
their implementation. Journal of Cryptology, 6(4), 209-224. 
104 
 
[34]  ANSI, X. (1999). 62: public key cryptography for the financial services 
industry: the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ecdsa). Am. Nat’l 
Standards Inst. 
[35]  Smith,N., „An Overview of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI),” Techotopia, 
2015.  
[Online]. 
https://www.techotopia.com/index.php/An_Overview_of_Public_Key_Infr
astructures_(PKI). 
[36]  MSDN, „MSDN,”  Microsoft, 2015.  
[Online]. https://docs.microsoft.com/. 
[37]  Gallagher, P., & Director, A. (1995). Secure hash standard (shs). FIPS PUB, 
180, 183. 
[38]  Zheng, T., Radhakrishnan, S., & Sarangan, V. (2005, April). PMAC: an 
adaptive energy-efficient MAC protocol for wireless sensor networks. In 
19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (pp. 
8-pp). IEEE. 
[39]  Sanz Subirana, J., Juan Zornoza, J. M., & Hernández-Pajares, M. (2013). 
GNSS Data Processing, Volume I: Fundamentals and Algorithms. ESA 
Communications, ESTEC, Noordwijk, Netherlands, 145-161. 
[40]  U.S. Department of  Homeland Security, “GPS fully operational statement 
of 1995”, Navigation Center of Excellence, 1995  
[Online].www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=global 
[41]  Subirana, J. S., Zornoza, J. J., & Pajares, M. H. (2011). GNSS signal. 
[42]  Martin, H. National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, 
Navigation, and Timing, GPS.gov 
[Online]. www.gps.gov 
[43]  Kaplan, E., & Hegarty, C. (2005). Understanding GPS: principles and 
applications. Artech house. 
[44]  Jeffrey, C. (2010). An introduction to GNSS: GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and 
other global navigation satellite systems. NovAtel. 
105 
 
[45]  Mai, T., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, 2014  
[Online]. 
www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/communications/policy/GPS.html 
[46]  Rajendran, V. „Location Based Services : Expected Trends and 
Technological Advancements,” Geo awesomeness, 2017.  
[Online]. https://geoawesomeness.com/expected-trends-technological-
advancements-location-based-services/. 
[47]  „The Noise App,”  
[Online]. www.thenoiseapp.com. 
[48]  „allGeo,”  
[Online].  www.allgeo.com. 
[49]  „alibi,”  
[Online]. appfelstrudel.com/id/957636810/alibi.html. 
[50]  Papadimitratos, P., & Jovanovic, A. (2008, October). Protection and 
fundamental vulnerability of GNSS. In 2008 IEEE International Workshop 
on Satellite and Space Communications (pp. 167-171). IEEE. 
[51]  Papadimitratos, P., & Jovanovic, A. (2008, November). GNSS-based 
positioning: Attacks and countermeasures. In MILCOM 2008-2008 IEEE 
Military Communications Conference (pp. 1-7). IEEE. 
[52]  Ioannides, R. T., Pany, T., & Gibbons, G. (2016). Known vulnerabilities of 
global navigation satellite systems, status, and potential mitigation 
techniques. Proceedings of the IEEE, 104(6), 1174-1194. 
[53]  Schmidt, D., Radke, K., Camtepe, S., Foo, E., & Ren, M. (2016). A survey 
and analysis of the GNSS spoofing threat and countermeasures. ACM 
Computing Surveys (CSUR), 48(4), 1-31. 
[54]  Sathyamoorthy, D. (2013). Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) 
spoofing: a review of growing risks and mitigation steps. Defence S&T 
Technical Bulletin, 6(1), 42-61. 
[55]  Dixon, C., Smith, S., Hart, A., Keast, R., Lithgow, S., Grant, A., ... & Beatty, C. 
(2013). GNSS Vulnerabilities at sea. Coordinates, IX (11), 37-51. 
106 
 
[56]  Snowball, A. (2007). An update on GNSS vulnerability-threats and 
solutions. 
[57]  Zhang, W., Hou, H., Li, Q., & Wang, W. (2013, November). Vulnerability 
analysis of the global navigation satellite systems from the information 
flow perspective. In 2013 6th International Conference on Information 
Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (Vol. 1, 
pp. 263-267). IEEE. 
[58]  Ji-Hyon, K., „MEDCALC,” Medcalc, 2020 
[Online]. www.medcalc.org/manual/accuracy_precision.php. 
[59]  Dovis, F. (Ed.). (2015). GNSS interference threats and countermeasures. 
Artech House. 
[60]  Hu, H., & Wei, N. (2009, December). A study of GPS jamming and anti-
jamming. In 2009 2nd international conference on power electronics and 
intelligent transportation system (PEITS) (Vol. 1, pp. 388-391). IEEE. 
[61]  Gao, G. X., Sgammini, M., Lu, M., & Kubo, N. (2016). Protecting GNSS 
receivers from jamming and interference. Proceedings of the IEEE, 104(6), 
1327-1338. 
[62]  Wang, P. (2016). Research on Blanket Jamming to Beidou Navigation 
Signals Based on BOC Modulation. International Journal of 
Communications, Network and System Sciences, 9(05), 135. 
[63]  Hambling, D. (2017). Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian 
cyberweapon. New Scientist, 10. 
[64]  van der Merwe, J. R., Zubizarreta, X., Lukčin, I., Rügamer, A., & Felber, W. 
(2018, May). Classification of spoofing attack types. In 2018 European 
Navigation Conference (ENC) (pp. 91-99). IEEE. 
[65]  Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Broumandan, A., Nielsen, J., & Lachapelle, G. (2012). 
GPS vulnerability to spoofing threats and a review of antispoofing 
techniques. International Journal of Navigation and Observation, 2012. 
[66]  Rounds, S. „Jamming Protection of GPS Receivers – Part II. Antenna 
Enhancements,” GPS World 2004 February, pp. 28-45, 2004.  
107 
 
[67]  Ruegamer, A., & Kowalewski, D. (2015). Jamming and Spoofing of GNSS 
Signals–An Underestimated Risk?!. Proc. Wisdom Ages Challenges Modern 
World, 17-21. 
[68]  Joseph, A. „GNSS solutions: Measuring GNSS signal strength,” Inside GNSS 
(2010/11-12):, pp. 20-25, 2010.  
[69]  Jones, M. „Anti-jam technology: Demystifying the CRPA,” GPS World, April 
2012, 2012.  
[70]  „Jamming Technology,” Navcours, 2019 
[Online]. http://www.navcours.com/en/tech/tech_0205.asp. 
[71]  Papadimitratos, P., & Jovanovic, A. (2008, October). Protection and 
fundamental vulnerability of GNSS. In 2008 IEEE International Workshop 
on Satellite and Space Communications (pp. 167-171). IEEE. 
[72]  Margaria, D., Motella, B., Anghileri, M., Floch, J. J., Fernandez-Hernandez, 
I., & Paonni, M. (2017). Signal structure-based authentication for civil 
GNSSs: Recent solutions and perspectives. IEEE signal processing 
magazine, 34(5), 27-37. 
[73]  Scott, L. (2001, March). Anti-spoofing & authenticated signal architectures 
for civil navigation systems. In Proceedings of the 16th International 
Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation 
(ION GPS/GNSS 2003) (pp. 1543-1552). 
[74]  Wullems, C., Pozzobon, O., & Kubik, K. (2005, July). Signal authentication 
and integrity schemes for next generation global navigation satellite 
systems. In Proceedings of the European Navigation Conference GNSS, 
2005. 
[75]  Margaria, D., Motella, B., Anghileri, M., Floch, J. J., Fernandez-Hernandez, 
I., & Paonni, M. (2017). Signal structure-based authentication for civil 
GNSSs: Recent solutions and perspectives. IEEE signal processing 
magazine, 34(5), 27-37. 
[76]  Fernández-Hernández, I. (2014). GNSS Authentication: Design Parameters 
and Service Concepts. In Proceedings of the European Navigation 
Conference. 
108 
 
[77]  Hein, G. et.al. „Authenticating GNSS proofs against spoofs part 2.,” Inside 
GNSS 2.5 , pp. 71-78, 2007.  
[78]  Cheng, X. J., Xu, J. N., Cao, K. J., & Wang, J. (2009, November). An 
authenticity verification scheme based on hidden messages for current 
civilian GPS signals. In 2009 Fourth International Conference on Computer 
Sciences and Convergence Information Technology (pp. 345-352). IEEE. 
[79]  Mark, P. „What is navigation message authentication?,” Inside GNSS 
(2018/01-02), pp. 26-31, 2018.  
[80]  Motella, B., Margaria, D., & Paonni, M. (2018, April). SNAP: An 
authentication concept for the Galileo open service. In 2018 IEEE/ION 
Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS) (pp. 967-977). IEEE. 
[81]  US Marine Corps, “Marine Artillery Survey Operations”, MCVP 3-16.7  
[82]  Ádámkó, E., & Pethő, A. (2013). Location-stamp for GPS coordinates. Acta 
Universitatis Sapientiae, Informatica, 5(1), 63-76. 
[83]  Kabatnik, M., & Zugenmaier, A. (2001, July). „location-stamp”s for digital 
signatures: a new service for mobile telephone networks. In International 
Conference on Networking (pp. 20-30). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[84]  Blanchet, B. (2012, March). Security protocol verification: Symbolic and 
computational models. In International Conference on Principles of 
Security and Trust (pp. 3-29). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[85]  Ádámkó, É. (2017). Security analysis of a „Location-stamping” protocol for 
GPS coordinates. Műszaki és Menedzsment Tudományi Közlemények, 2(2), 
1-12. 
[86]  Meadows, C. A. (1994, November). Formal verification of cryptographic 
protocols: A survey. In International Conference on the Theory and 
Application of Cryptology (pp. 133-150). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[87]  Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., & Fournet, C. (2017). The applied pi calculus: 
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication. Journal of the 
ACM (JACM), 65(1), 1-41. 
[88]  Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2001). Mobile values, new names, and secure 
communication. ACM Sigplan Notices, 36(3), 104-115. 
109 
 
[89]  Milner, R. (1999). Communicating and mobile systems: the pi calculus. 
Cambridge university press. 
[90]  Abadi, M., & Gordon, A. D. (1999). A calculus for cryptographic protocols: 
The spi calculus. Information and computation, 148(1), 1-70. 
[91]  Abadi, M., & Blanchet, B. (2003, June). Computer-assisted verification of a 
protocol for certified email. In International Static Analysis Symposium 
(pp. 316-335). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[92]  Kremer, S., Ryan, M., & Smyth, B. (2010, September). Election verifiability 
in electronic voting protocols. In European Symposium on Research in 
Computer Security (pp. 389-404). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[93]  Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., & Fournet, C. (2007). Just fast keying in the pi 
calculus. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 
10(3), 9-es. 
[94]  Blanchet, B., Smyth, B., Cheval, V., & Sylvestre, M. (2018). ProVerif 2.00: 
automatic cryptographic protocol verifier, user manual and tutorial. 
Version from, 05-16. 
[95]  Hansen, K., Larsen, T., & Olsen, K. (2010). On the efficiency of fast RSA 
variants in modern mobile phones. arXiv preprint arXiv:1001.2249. 
[96]  Bérczes, A., ÁDÁMKÓ, É. C., Folláth, J., & Pethõ, A. (2013). U.S. Patent 
Application No. 13/673,085. 
[97]  Drury, B. (2001). Control techniques drives and controls handbook (No. 
35). IET. 
[98]  Modbus.org, „Modbus FAQ,” 2005 
[Online].http://www.modbus.org/faq.php. 
[99]  Ross, R. S. (2014). Assessing security and privacy controls in federal 
information systems and organizations: building effective assessment 
plans (No. Special Publication (NIST SP)-800-53A Rev 4). 
[100]  CISA, „Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” 2020  
[Online].https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors. 
110 
 
[101]  ISO, I. (1992). Open Systems Interconnection-Basic Reference Model. 
ISO/TC, 97, 7498-1. 
[102]  Network, A. L. A., Layer, D. L., & Layer, P., „ The Ethernet.,” 1980.  
[103]  Kordik, J. „Fundamental Guide to Industrial Networking,” 2017.  
[104]  modbus.org, „MODBUS over Serial LIne Specification & Implementation 
guide,” 2002.  
[105]  modbus.org, „MODBUS application protocol specifications,” 2012. 
[106]  modbus.org, „MODBUS MESSAGING ON TCP/IP IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 
V1.0b,” 2006.  
[107]  Buchanan, B. (2010). The Handbook of Data Communications and 
Networks: Volume 1 (Vol. 2). Springer Science & Business Media. 
[108]  Kugelstadt,T. The RS-485 Design Guide, Texas Instruments, 2008.  
[109]  Boyer, S. A. (2009). SCADA: supervisory control and data acquisition. 
International Society of Automation. 
[110]  Smith, A. B. (1994). IEEE std c37. 1-1994, IEEE standard definition, 
specification, and analysis of systems used for supervisory control, data 
acquisition, and automatic control. IEEE Power Engineering Society, 
Sponsored by the Substations Committee, Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. 
[111]  Carke, G., Rynders, D., & Wright, E. (2003). Practical Modern SCADA 
Protocols. Elsevier. 
[112]  Raghvendra, N. „ SCADA System – Components, Hardware & Software 
Architecture, Types.”  Electricalfundablog, 2015  
[Online]. https://electricalfundablog.com/scada-system-components-
architecture/#Applications_of_SCADA_System. 
[113]  Krambeck, D. „ An Introduction to SCADA Systems,” Allaboutcircuits, 
August 2015.  
[Online]. https://www.allaboutcircuits.com/technical-articles/an-
introduction-to-scada-systems/. 
111 
 
[114]  IVCM156308, M. T. B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
IOT AND INDUSTRIAL SCADA IOT FOR CYBERTERRORISM. 
[115]  Adamko, E., Szemes, P., & Mihoko, N. (2014). Investigation on the heating 
system of the mechatronics research center building using olap 
technology. Environmental Engineering & Management Journal (EEMJ), 
13, 2733-2742. 
[116]  „SCADA Systems and Products,” DCC, 2019   
[Online]. https://digitalcc.com/scada/. 
[117]  Corley, M., „Monitoring Water and Wastewater Systems with SCADA,”  
Indusoft Web Studio , 26 05 2017.  
[Online]. https://www.indusoft.com/blog/2017/05/26/monitoring-water-
and-wastewater-systems-with-scada/. 
[118]  „Critical Infrastructure,” Panda, 2018  
[Online]. 
https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/src/uploads/2018/10/1611
-WP-CriticalInfrastructure-EN.pdf. 
[119]  Turk, R. J. (2005). Cyber incidents involving control systems (No. INL/EXT-
05-00671). Idaho National Laboratory (INL). 
[120]  Nash, T. „Backdoors and holes in network perimeters,” ICS-Cert, 2005.  
[Online].http://ics-cert. us-cert. gov/controlsystems. 
[121]  Hemsley, K., & Fisher, R. (2018, March). A history of cyber incidents and 
threats involving industrial control systems. In International Conference on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (pp. 215-242). Springer, Cham. 
[122]  Ackerman,R. K., „SCADA Systems Face Diverse Software Attack Threats.,” 
Signal, 2013.  
[Online]. https://www.afcea.org/content/scada-systems-face-diverse-
software-attack-threats. 
[123]  Reed, T. C. (2005). At the abyss: an insider's history of the Cold War. 
Presidio Press. 
[124]  Denning, D. E. (2000). Cyberterrorism: The logic bomb versus the truck 
bomb. Global Dialogue, 2(4), 29. 
112 
 
[125]  Markey,E. J., „Infection of the Davis Besse Nuclear Plant by the "Slammer" 
Worm Computer Virus - Follow-up Questions,” U.S. NRC, 2003.  
[Online]. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0329/ML032970134.pdf. 
[126]  Moyer, M. „Expert: A Virus Caused the Blackout of 2003. Will the Next One 
Be Intentional?,” Scientific American, 2011.  
[Online]. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/expert-a-
virus-caused-the-blackout-of-2003-will-the-next-one-be-intentional/. 
[127]  Langner, R., „To kill a centrifuge,” Langner, 2013.  
[Online]. https://www.langner.com/to-kill-a-centrifuge/. 
[128]  Fruhlinger, J., „What is stuxnet who created it anf how does it work,” CSO, 
2017. [Online]. https://www.csoonline.com/article/3218104/what-is-
stuxnet-who-created-it-and-how-does-it-work.html. 
[129]  Keizer, G. (2011). ‘Sloppy’Chinese hackers scored data-theft coup with 
‘Night Dragon’. Computerworld, February, 11. 
[130]  „TOP 2019 CYBER ATTACKS ON ICS (INFOGRAPHIC),” Waterfall, 12 2019.  
[Online]. https://waterfall-security.com/top-2019-attacks-on-ics/. 
[131]  Byres, E. J., Franz, M., & Miller, D. (2004, December). The use of attack 
trees in assessing vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. In Proceedings of the 
international infrastructure survivability workshop (pp. 3-10). Citeseer. 
[132]  Nardone, R., Rodríguez, R. J., & Marrone, S. (2016, December). Formal 
security assessment of Modbus protocol. In 2016 11th International 
Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST) (pp. 
142-147). IEEE. 
[133]  Chen, B., Pattanaik, N., Goulart, A., Butler-Purry, K. L., & Kundur, D. (2015, 
May). Implementing attacks for modbus/TCP protocol in a real-time cyber 
physical system test bed. In 2015 IEEE International Workshop Technical 
Committee on Communications Quality and Reliability (CQR) (pp. 1-6). 
IEEE. 
[134]  Huitsing, P., Chandia, R., Papa, M., & Shenoi, S. (2008). Attack taxonomies 
for the Modbus protocols. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, 1, 37-44. 
[135]  Schneier, B. (1999). Attack trees. Dr. Dobb’s journal, 24(12), 21-29. 
113 
 
[136]  Saini, V., Duan, Q., & Paruchuri, V. (2008). Threat modeling using attack 
trees. Journal of Computing Sciences in Colleges, 23(4), 124-131. 
[137]  Urrea, C., Morales, C., & Muñoz, R. (2016). Design and implementation of 
an error detection and correction method compatible with MODBUS-RTU 
by means of systematic codes. Measurement, 91, 266-275. 
[138]  Yüksel, Ö., den Hartog, J., & Etalle, S. (2016, April). Reading between the 
fields: practical, effective intrusion detection for industrial control 
systems. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Applied 
Computing (pp. 2063-2070). 
[139]  Solomakhin, R., Tsang, P., & Smith, S. (2010, March). High security with 
low latency in legacy SCADA systems. In International Conference on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (pp. 63-79). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[140]  Transceiver, S. E. (2005). SEL-3021 Serial Encrypting Transceiver Security 
Policy. 
[141]  Moore, T., & Shenoi, S. (Eds.). (2010). Critical Infrastructure Protection IV: 
Fourth Annual IFIP WG 11.10 International Conference on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, ICCIP 2010, Washington, DC, USA, March 15-17, 
2010, Revised Selected Papers (Vol. 342). Springer Science & Business 
Media. 
[142]  Ádámkó, É., Jakabóczki, G., & Szemes, P. T. (2018). Proposal of a Secure 
Modbus RTU communication with Adi Shamir’s secret sharing method. 
International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications, 64(2), 107-
114. 
[143]  Maurer, U. M., & Schmid, P. E. (1994, November). A calculus for secure 
channel establishment in open networks. In European Symposium on 
Research in Computer Security (pp. 173-192). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[144]  Van Tilborg, H. C., & Jajodia, S. (Eds.). (2014). Encyclopedia of cryptography 
and security. Springer Science & Business Media. 
[145]  Cornell University, „System Security Course: Secure Channel,” 2019.  
[Online].www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs5430/2016sp/l/09-
channel/lec.pdf. 
114 
 
APPENDIX A 
LIST OF PAPERS RELATED TO THE THESIS POINTS WITH 
CITATIONS 
1. Csernusné Ádámkó Éva, Pethő Attila “Helyszín bélyegzés”, hitelesített GPS 
koordináták In: Lóki, J (szerk.) Az elmélet és gyakorlat találkozása a 
térinformatikában II. : II. Térinformatikai Konferencia és Szakkiállítás Debrecen 
Debrecen, Magyarország : DE TTK Földrajzi Tanszékcsoport, (2011) pp. 381-387. 
, 7 p. 
2. Ádámkó, E., & Pethő, A. (2013). Location-stamp for GPS coordinates. Acta 
Universitatis Sapientiae, Informatica, 5(1), 63-76. 
3. Bérczes, A., ÁDÁMKÓ, É. C., Folláth, J., & Pethõ, A. (2013). U.S. Patent 
Application No. 13/673,085. 
• Freeze-Skret, J. (2016). U.S. Patent No. 9,432,390. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office. 
• Kostiainen, K. (2017). U.S. Patent No. 9,787,667. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office. 
• Cohen, R. H. (2017). U.S. Patent No. 9,800,415. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office. 
• Jones, R. K., Steger, C., Brachet, N., Alizadeh-Shabdiz, F., Broadstone, 
A., & Morrin, J. (2017). U.S. Patent No. 9,817,101. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office. 
• Salmela, P., & Fornehed, J. (2018). U.S. Patent Application No. 
15/551,683. 
4. Ádámkó Éva, Jakabóczki Gábor Security analysis of Modbus RTU pp. 5-11. In: 
Kocsis, Imre (szerk.) Proceedings of the Conference on Problem-based Learning 
in Engineering Education Debrecen, Magyarország: University of Debrecen 
Faculty of Engineering, (2015) p. 98 
5. Jakaboczki, G., & Adamko, E. (2015). Vulnerabilities Of Modbus RTU Protocol–A 
Case Study. Annals Of The Oradea University, Fascicle Of Management And 
Technological Engineering, (1). 
• Muñoz, N., & Davensor, C. (2016). Explotando vulnerabilidades en el 
protocolo MODBUS TCP/IP. 
115 
 
• Dogaru, D. I., & Dumitrache, I. (2017, May). Robustness of Power 
Systems in the Context of Cyber Attacks. In 2017 21st International 
Conference on Control Systems and Computer Science (CSCS) (pp. 506-
512). IEEE. 
• Tranca, D. C., Banu, C. I., & Rosner, D. (2018). EGIFM--Extendable 
Gateway and Industrial Firewall for ModBus. eLearning & Software for 
Education, 4. 
• Urdaneta Velasquez, M. (2018). Attaques informatiques sur le réseau 
de contrôle du trafic routier (Doctoral dissertation, École Polytechnique 
de Montréal). 
• Velasquez, M. U. (2018). Attaques Informatiques sur le Réseau de 
Contrôle du Trafic Routier (Doctoral dissertation, Ecole Polytechnique, 
Montreal (Canada)). 
6. Jakabóczki G, Szemes P T, Ádámkó É A MODBUS RTU protokoll 
biztonságtechnikai vizsgálata, új kriptográfiai megoldások tesztelése = Security 
evaluation of MODBUS RTU protocol, testing new cryptographic methods 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES / 
MŰSZAKI ÉS MENEDZSMENT TUDOMÁNYI KÖZLEMÉNYEK 1: 2 pp. 35-42. , 8 p. 
(2016) 
7. Ádámkó, É. (2017). Security analysis of a „Location-stamping” protocol for GPS 
coordinates. Műszaki és Menedzsment Tudományi Közlemények, 2(2), 1-12. 
8. Ádámkó, É., Jakabóczki, G., & Szemes, P. T. (2018). Proposal of a Secure 
Modbus RTU communication with Adi Shamir’s secret sharing method. 
International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications, 64(2), 107-114. 
• Chromik, J. J., Remke, A., & Haverkort, B. R. (2018). An integrated 
testbed for locally monitoring SCADA systems in smart grids. Energy 
Informatics, 1(1), 56.   
• Volkova, A., Niedermeier, M., Basmadjian, R., & de Meer, H. (2018). 
Security challenges in control network protocols: A survey. IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 21(1), 619-639. 
• Tidrea, A., Korodi, A., & Silea, I. (2019). Cryptographic Considerations 
for Automation and SCADA Systems Using Trusted Platform Modules. 
Sensors, 19(19), 4191 
116 
 
• Gamess, E., Smith, B., & III, G. F. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF 
MODBUS TCP IN NORMAL OPERATION AND UNDER ADistributed 
DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK. International Journal of Computer 
Networks and Communications 12(2):1-21 (2020) 
  
117 
 
APPENDIX B 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Foremost, I would like to thank God; without His grace and blessings, this research 
would not have been possible to complete. 
I would like to express my appreciation to my supervisor Prof. Attila Pethő, for his 
patience and great ideas during the last decade. 
Besides the above, I would like to express my special gratitude to my dearest friend 
and colleague Dr. Szíki Gusztáv Áron for his tireless and tenacious help during the 
last two years—also, the many early mornings and late nights when he was always 
ready to answer my questions. Furthermore, the support that he provided me with 
his wise advice and reassuring presence. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my husband and my two children for 
supporting me throughout the years of my PhD studies and their endless patience 
and kindness. 
